> "He said that he had always regarded his lectures as a form of publication" > -Norman Malcolm, 48, Memoir > > If you don't think you have to quote a man you are making claims for, then > all I can say is that your claims are unfounded. And if that isn't a clear > tautology, well ellipses and stuff. You write: I don't have to quote when I am not claiming anything controversial about what he actually said (or challenging something someone else claims about something he said). Philosophy isn't about citing chapter and verse. It's about ideas and exploring them. If you think otherwise then we are clearly not talking about the same thing. I write: When you are not claiming anything controversial? If you haven't noticed, there is controversy in this thread. Back up your claims. If you think otherwise, you are not thinking. I wrote: > I am not interested in what textbooks say. you wrote: I am not giving you what textbooks say. I am giving you what I say in relation to the Wittgensteinian works we have been discussing here. No, you have been saying you are saying what Wittgenstein has said. I said, back it up and take your time in the next post. It is the same day and you are not backing up your claims but defending your right to claim whatever as Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is absolutely your right to bullshit your way through this thread; I just do not see why we would even be having a conversation on philosophy if your thesis is "I can say whatever and claim that smart people agree with me without evidence, proof, or even the decency of citing my sources". I wrote: > I find it quite easy to quote the man; I read a little bit, see something > that relates to our discussion, and stick a scrap piece of > paper in the > book at that page. You wrote: Just repeating his words is not to properly consider and understand them. He said lots of things. Context is critical in understanding his points. I write: What are you talking about? You call quoting "just repeating his words" and then babble about relativity again. This is why I ask you to quote, because blanket statements like these add nothing to the conversation-- and really bore me. If you have more responses like this in this post I quoted of yours, there doesn't seem any sort of response to them. I wrote: > I dunno why you say the things you do and act as if you have proved a point; You wrote: If I make a claim and then support it (sometimes with quotes, when needed, as in the case of the text I provided here from the preface to the Investigations) then I suppose I do think I have proved something. Why would I not? Obviously I think X and if I give reasons Y and Z for thinking it, and claim that those reasons are supportive, then, having given them, I think I have shown why I'm right. If you respond with reasons to disregard what I've cited and those reasons make sense, then you may very well undermine my claim to having made my case. But just denying them and saying you think otherwise and/or citing some unrelated text from Wittgenstein as justification for thinking otherwise isn't sufficient to demonstrate that what I've offered doesn't do the job I've set for it. I write: Quoting an introduction is not philosophy. There isn't any philosophy in the introduction to the TLP, the PR, nor the PI. So, what are the things he corrected? If you cannot pronounce them, then are you not simply making assumptions? At the least, you are not adding to the debate. I wrote: > if you think quoting in philosophy is religious fanaticism, then allow me to > refer you to philpapers.org; I've quoted Wittgenstein, Mark Twain, Joseph > Conrad, Ernest Hemmingway, etc. I may not be in college, but I still know > how to back up a claim; I can only hope that you don't fall into the > following category: You wrote: I have no problem with anyone offering quotes but the quotes should support one's case. I have not agreed that you have offered quotes here that support some of the claims you've made re: Wittgenstein's thinking and I have told you why. What you do with that is up to you. I write: You think the quotes shouldn't support the cases? What planet are you from? I have provided quotes that contradict what you have had to say about Wittgenstein (namely on the lack of need to differentiate kinds of nonsense); you have simply responded tat Wittgenstein doesn't say that in the PI; But if he disagrees with his own words, and you think it is clear that he does, where is the quote to suggest to me that such is the case? Simply stating that the quote I found was not from the PI doesn't prove a point. So, back up your claim because I have have quotes. It isn't as if you have to say "I lose" or "point taken"... heck, you don't even have to say "nice find". You don't have to say anything-- but that isn't the same as perpetuating unfounded claims. I quoted: > "Apart from other things, I think that there was indeed something in the > content of his philosophy that, improperly assimilated, had and still has an > unfortunate effect on those influenced by it. I refer to his conception that > words are not used with 'fixed' meanings, that concepts do not have 'sharp > boundaries'. This teaching, I believe, produced a tendency in his students > to assume that precision and thoroughness were not required in their own > thinking. From this tendency nothing but slovenly philosophical work could > result." > -Norman Malcolm, 53, Memoir You write: While I do not think Malcolm is the most perspicacious expositor of Wittgenstein, I think he is absolutely right in the above. Precision is important in examining our word uses. Indeed, it is just that precision we must apply in every case. In fact, it's what I have been urging on you here, i.e., to pay attention to the changes in his approach over the years and don't lightly disregard his own words concerning his earlier work merely because you find that work attractive. Noting that word usage is flexible and dependent on context, on the other hand, is not a denial of precision. It's just to look for it in the right places, i.e., in the places where the words are used in ordinary language as opposed to in some rarified realm of our philosophical or theological imaginations. I write: More blanket statements. I've seen numerous claims of his against the TLP (and have not denied such claims, but have been precise in what those claims are); numerous clarifications about his thoughts then; and even posted my thoughts on the PI in light of the TLP; but you still haven't provided any examples for the claims you are making. So, take your time, search for those examples that make your point about Wittgenstein's changes, etc. I wrote: > I have been saying that 'mind' is nonsense, and so is a lot of other stuff; > and there is no point in differentiating nonsense (and > I've quoted W on this matter). you wrote: I don't believe your quotes showed that Wittgenstein didn't think that nonsense takes many different forms and I explained why. I write: I quoted the guy saying there are not different kinds of nonsense and I also showed how several examples make his point clear. You are welcome to disagree, but at the least I back my claims up. I would hope you would do likewise, to show some common courtesy. You write: However, let's say your quotes showed he did agree with that viewpoint. Would that oblige me to agree, too, do you think? After all, Wittgenstein was an insightful thinker but not a prophet who was infallible. Indeed, he himself acknowledged having made what he called "grave mistakes". Is the ultimate source of the rightness of any idea to be found in Wittgenstein alone? I write: If ya disagree with him, don't claim he disagrees with me. If I disagree with him, I'll state it. And whether he was right or wrong has nothing to do with the conversation at hand. you write: Is the term "mind" nonsense as you seem to want to put it? Can you show that this was Wittgenstein's position since you seem to take this position on the grounds that that was what he thought? Now I will grant that you can likely come up with some texts of his seeming to suggest something along those lines, e.g., it's nor a something but not a nothing either. But Wittgenstein also had occasion to speak of minds. Did he do so because the term was nonsense? I write: The only book Wittgenstein ever published was 100% nonsense. Of course he spoke nonsense and of nonsense. So do I. And so do you. And so does, like everyone. From C&V, paraphrased, 'It isn't that we mustn't speak nonsense but be aware of it'.(If you must, I'll grab the quote, but ,iirc, I posted that quote in our other thread. Quote: > But treating nonsense like the bubonic plague is not my intention. Simply, > nonsense is not scientific. W says the TLP is nonsense (and philosophers > tend to say the TLP is a contradictory) and I thought I showed that well > enough, and also why it is tautological (not contradictory). I've given the > example of how the world was created in 6 days by God, according to the > Bible, and that no one knows how long those days are, according to the Bible; > It is complete nonsense and the 'Beetle in the Box' shows how these days > could be of varying length or even constantly changing, etc. When I gave > this sort of example before, you didn't seem to have a problem with it (or, > at least, you didn't say much on it). I don't think I quoted the Bible in > that topic, but I did a little quote from the > opening lines in this topic and ! You write: In your later presentation it was offered by way of showing how the Tractatus is laid out. I think that reflects another "grave mistake", in this case a deification of Wittgenstein and his work. The Tractatus is a book, a metaphysical effort built on logic which aims to delimit and differentiate the zones of speech from what is beyond speech. In the end, he writes, we must climb up the ladder he has built, then throw the ladder away beneath us. Aside from the peculiar imagery of THAT metaphor, it has the effect of acknowledging that the Tractatus, in the end, is nonsense (in the way you take nonsense to be -- referentless terms that seem to make references). I suggested to you that the later Wittgenstein abandoned this approach in favor of one that looks at language in all its manifestations equally. Just as there is not only one way of using language, i.e., as referencing the elements of the world, so there is not only one way of speaking nonsense. I write: There you go with unfounded claims again, saying what Wittgenstein thought of the TLP (and only after I make the grammar clear to you). Your eyes are brown in what I have quoted. Please, take your time with the next post, or just say you disagree with Wittgenstein, or don't care, or leave, or whatever. If you still want to speak of "minds" and "infinities" and "deities" then you haven't thrown the TLP out the window. I read it once and have moved on. I constantly get accusations that I read the book religiously, but it simply is not true. But I was trained to be a journalist and I'll quote everytime I wish to make a claim for another person. You wrote: The later Wittgenstein had a richer, more robust understanding of language and its role in our thinking, in our ideas. That is the point you should not forget. Let the Tractatus go. He did. I write: "Richer" and "More robust" and other nonsense words... We are discussing philosophy here. You have anything pertinent to say, or are you going to be responding to my post with more empty claims in 4 hours time? I wrote: > you seemed to have a lot to say about translating languages and the numbered > verses, etc. And you seem to accuse me of some things while using some > nonsense words (and, going by what I've been saying, > I cannot reply to > nonsense with agreement or disagreement). You wrote: Well if you aren't specific about what you deem nonsense in what I said, I cannot respond. Maybe that's the easiest way to go here. I write: Quit being an ass. "Deity" is a nonsense word. I wrote: > I must say that if you think I (or W) is about hierarchies, you have simply > misunderstood. You wrote: I don't know what that refers to. I write: The word "deities". It isn't exactly a secret that church is hierarchical. I wrote: > If W can write the opening lines of the Bible without mentioning 'creation' > or 'God' or 'Heaven', I do not know why you wish to speak to me about > 'deities' or 'minds' or 'infinities'. You wrote: What makes you think "The world is everything that is the case" is equivalent to the opening lines of Genesis? They do have a similar cadence in English and a similar apodictic tone. And both seem to be about the world, of course. But in the end those aren't a lot of similarities nor do they get at the meaning to be found in the two statements. I write: They are not. That is the whole point. Why do you think he speaks of a calculus. They are both nonsense, however. And there isn't any meaning in it. The world is tautological. I wrote: > I hope I have made it clear that if I am to say anything about those words, > it is that they are nonsense. You wrote: Since you don't recognize kinds of nonsense, but do accept that we can speak nonsense, you essentially shut the door on further inquiry here by labeling these statements as nonsense. Perhaps that is all you want to do though? I write: Well, you can reread that quote from Zettel if you like. Or maybe the PI or something else by W. Yes, I am imitating Wittgenstein, albeit quite terribly. You wrote: In fact the biblical phrase purports to tell us a story about how things came into being while the opening lines of the Tractatus announce a logical truth. There is a great disjunction there unless one decides to treat both statements as just "nonsense", and mean by this term that nothing more is to be said about either of them, in which case the disjunction in their meanings is merely to be ignored (there being, of course, no meanings now to be discovered!). I write: Have we not already been through this? I do wonder if you have read any Wittgenstein when you say something like this. Metaphysical statements, like "it is what it is" and more robust variants, are tautological. But you wanted to say something about logic? You wrote: You are asking us to accept the two statements as nonsense in both cases, the biblical phrase being a pronouncement from on high that may not be questioned because of its provenance; the opening statement of the Tractatus being a pronouncement from the true philosophical prophet which is also, presumably, beyond questioning. I write: Acceptance? Hardly. I would normally ask if you can see, but I don't think there is any point in asking that here. Nor adding that was one of Wittgenstein's questions without an answer. You wrote: But how is this philosophy? And why, if it is, did Wittgenstein alter his methods in his mature years? Did he receive a new revelation? Or are you still certain that he didn't really alter anything at all, despite his own acknowledgement that he did? I write: There is a lot of gray area between never changing one's mind and having "a new revelation". Simply because I disagree with your interpretation that Wittgenstein abandoned all ownership of what he published and lectured on besides the PI and OC, doesn't mean my claim is the opposite. Subtle changes are difficult to perceive. You write: I would suggest that this is the kind of stuff that often gives Wittgenstein a bad name in the minds of other schools of philosophy, i.e., he is interpreted by some as being beyond question because he is seen to be beyond all logic and discourse, to have entered the realm of pure revelation. I think his Tractatus does point in that direction which, on my view, is part of the "grave errors" he made there. I write: More blanket statements. Considering he is the most popular philosopher of the 20th century, often regarded as the best thing since Kant, etc. ... well, I guess that is a point in its own right. You just gunna jab at me all night or say something with substance? I wrote: > However, applying the notions of language-games to the evolution of religions > doesn't seem too far out. Language-games are sometimes used as a notion for > comparative theology. Maybe there are other applications, but applications > would be significant. And this goes back to whether a+b=c is true or false > or nonsense. You wrote: "language games" a la Wittgenstein "as a notion for comparative theology"? Well I think he would have said that yes, the claims of different theological persuasions reflect different ways of speaking. But does that convert into the doing of theology? Isnt theology, as a way of describing notions of the deity, to fall into the very mistakes he was on about in his later years, to suppose that one can speak of a deity, which one wishes to have faith in, as though it were a provable object in (or outside) the universe? I write: Now you claim I am doing theology? Or do you think I am saying the TLP is about theology? Where does all this nonsense that you claim come from? I gave an example of what some people do with the notion of language games; google it or something. I was not asking whether you agreed with it. As for proving a deity, or even proving the meanings of words, there is no such thing. "He thought that the symbolisms of religion are 'wonderful'; but he distrusted theological formulations. He objected to the idea that Christianity is a 'doctrine' .... For Wittgenstein, the emphasis on religious belief had to be on doing -- on 'amending one's ways', 'turning one's life around' .... Once I quoted to him a remark of Kierkegaard which went something like this: 'How can it be that Christ does not exist, since I know that he has saved me?' Wittgenstein's response was: 'You see! It isn't a question of proving anything!'" -Malcolm's Memoir I wrote: > But here I am stuck (for the moment :p ). I wish to say something about > applications. 1+2=3 comes to mind, and so too does apple+pine=pineapple. > Maybe the 'verification principle' would do good here. It seems to me, at > least, that it may be related to the good old quote, "Back to rough ground!" You wrote: We should be very careful emulating the master here! As Malcolm notes, many get him wrong because he is so cryptic at times, leaving so much open for the individual's own interpretation. (And that's because, in his case, philosophy was about individual instances of seeing things in a new way.) I write: Why are you calling Wittgenstein "master"? And why do you tell me to be careful when I tell you I can not go on from here? Is it dangerous ahead? You wrote: I never said what he said outside the PI is irrelevant so why would I have to back it up? What I said was that there is a sharp break between the later and earlier Wittgensteins and that the Tractatus represents the earlier at its zenith, the PI the later at its. There are lots of good intervening materials to be discovered and read and certainly the Tractatus is not without interest. But the works he produced are not all of equal merit and even he explicitly announced that there were "grave errors" in his earlier thinking (manifested in the Tractatus). I write: Yeah, that'd be an unfounded claim. If there are grave errors in the TLP, then there ought to be in the PI too, no? If they are not all of equal merit, then we still have a hierarchical structure. This sharp break has not been made sufficiently made clear, unless it is one of those "obvious" things and I am just supposed to roll with what you have to say. I write: Say, if Wittgenstein wrote a book on calculus and then a history of calculi, and these were the TLP and the PI, where would this sharp break be? That would probably be one of those questions without answers, like many of those I "asked" on this thread. Go read some HL Finch or watnot; this thread is dead. -- He had a wonderful life. ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/