--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "College Dropout John O'Connor" <wittrsamr@...> wrote: <snip> > You wrote: > I am thinking of the discipline of logic, firstly, and, secondly, of the > logical relations involving assertions of truth and falsity > and how our language is far broader than just that. > Now one can stipulate a different meaning for "logic", say that it is all > those relations expressed in the full gamut of rules of linguistic usage but > the later Wittgenstein tended to use a different term for that: "grammar". > Well is logic grammar or is grammar what we mean by logic? I think that this > so broadens the meaning of logic that it enables it to be seen in the > inclusive way you want to use the term but then I don't think it is very > useful anymore since Wittgenstein himself chose to move from an emphasis on > logic as being the paradigm of linguistic usages to that of rules (grammar) > some of which will involve logical relationships (true-false dichotomies) > while some will not (expressive and emotive statements, for instance). > > I write: > All you ever do is hide behind false presentations with me. I'm sorry you feel that way. I have tried to give an honest response, to the best of my understanding, to all your comments in your various posts. The above is no exception. > The latter, the early, etc. There is no such thing. We have both been > speaking of nonsense, with your continual cues as to how the "early" and > "latter" agree with what we were discussing... and now, when asked questions, > all is relative to you! > I think Wittgenstein's point in his later phase (which is the one that mainly interests me) is that our word usage is context dependent, i.e., there is no overarching meaning or use for a term, only how we deploy it in this or that instance, how it fits within some particular "language game". So yes, it's a matter of a given word or word usage being relative to this or that context, this or that intention of the speaker, this or that understanding of the facts in play. > Please of please quit speaking of the 'meaning of words' while citing > Wittgenstein. Even if there were a "latter" Wittgenstein, the 'meaning of > words' would have nothing to do with it. > I disagree strongly. However, as Wittgenstein himself famously noted, the meaning of a word, in a large number of cases (I would say most), is to be equated with how the word is used. > We were originally speaking of the uselessness of the word "mind" in > scientific discourse. Your response seems to be that it is not > useless; Yes. I think it is perfectly useful, particularly when we are keen to distinguish the mass of tissue we call the brain from the array of subjective experiences we think of as being conscious, i.e., having a mind. > and then when we try to talk of anything, you get abstract and say "it > depends". I think that shows my point. Nay, Wittgenstein's point. > Do you think that Wittgenstein would not have thought the meaning depends on the context, the language game in which the word whose meaning we are interested in is deployed? > As for blurring grammar and logic, please at least pretend to have read the > TLP. Grammar is mentioned in there, with great emphasis, as to not being > arbitrary, even if it has the appearance of being arbitrary. > In his later phase Wittgenstein shifts famously from a focus on logic to a focus on the grammar and it is certainly the case, given his discussions of grammar as being given rules of usage deployed in different activities, that he has something quite differnt in mind than classical formal logic which informed his earlier work in the TLP. > > I quoted: > > > 314. Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon > > > in philosophical investigation: the difficulty-- I might say-- is not > > > that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the > > > solution something that looks as if it were only preliminary to it. "We > > > have already said everything.-- Not anything that follows from this, no, > > > this itself is the solution!" > > > This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an > > > explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if > > > we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, > > > and do not try to get beyond it. > > > The difficulty here is: to stop. > > > > > > -LW, Zettel > > > > You wrote: > > Yes, in some contexts that is the way we use language. > > > > I write: > > What makes you think we are speaking of language use? Surely the > > generality can be applied to any search. Again, what does an ellipse add > > that is not already present? A marker? An instruction? > > > > You wrote: > Yes, language is just one of the things we do and I agree that we may just > decide to stop in many other activities in which we are engaged. That is the > value, though, of noting that this is also the way language works when making > claims, arguing, etc. Language, after all, is just another form of human > behavior, just another thing we humans do. > > I write: > How is language only one of the things we do? Considering the context of you > and I, language is all we have. And yet all these 'other things' you wish to > say are important are contained; What sort of tone does my writing confer? > Language may be all we have on-line where the medium of communication is typed in words which can only be of use in the context of a commonly grasped language. But, of course, my reference was to the gamut of things we, as humans, do and that is far more extensive than this kind of on-line communication. I don't yet have a good fix on your "tone" (sometimes it seems peevish to me, actually) but that is hardly relevant. We humans do lots of things including play ball games, watch games ball games, attend concerts, read books, express affection, eat, drink and generally act as if we're merry. Nor would I propose that I have exhausted the options. I make no claim that all these other things (a quite open ended list, actually) are contained in the words I type onto this list though. > > I wrote: > > > What is the difference between [1 2 3] and [1 2 3 ...]? > > > > You wrote: > > Depends. One could say it's the way the notation of inscription is to be > > read. The first allows for the idea that three numbers are the whole story, > > the second, with its dots of continuation (a notational convention), that > > they aren't. The first could be a way of presenting a descriptor that > > reflects the combination of the three digits. The second, suggests not a > > descriptor but merely the commencement of a counting series, etc. > > > > I write: > > Saying it is notation is hardly any more than saying it is three period is > > a row. > > You wrote: > That would be a description of this particular notation. Saying it's a > notation is to say it has a role in our method of employing written > communication, i.e., it signifies something (or some things) when added to a > sentence, the proper recognition (understanding) of which will reflect seeing > the context in which it occurs in a clear enough way. > [Note: above I have corrected a mistake I had previously made in writing the text in question where I had typed "written coordination" but meant to type "written communication" -- which now appears in replacement of the earlier mistyped text!] > I write: > All I see is a bunch of abstract language in that last paragraph. Which, as > I have attested to, says nothing. I don;t think I can stand to hear much > more of it. "proper" and "particular" and "some thing" ... > Whatever. I certainly have no illusions that I can forcefeed what I think I understand into some other, either on this list or anywhere else. You either see my point or don't. If you don't, you can ask for clarifications of course and I would try to oblige, but if your response is simply to announce that all you "see is a bunch of abstract language", implying, thereby, that it is empty for you, then that's it then, isn't it? No sense my trying to be clearer or to elaborate. However, sometimes what looks "abstract" to us does so because we simply don't grasp what has been said. (Perhaps, however, my erroneous typing of "coordination" for "communication" in the above - now corrected - was the cause of your incomprehension in which case, perhaps, that is now corrected. But if not, well, again, there's no sense beating a new dead horse anymore than there was beating the older ones.) > (See, I can use the ellipse as signifying exasperation. But was that not > present even without the ellipse?) > The ellipse also signifies that you have more to say or might have more to say but you choose not to, which is the message of your self-avowed "exasperation". But what is the point of telling us this? Of course the ellipse serves a purpose and, like many of our notations, multiple purposes depending, again, on context. It seems to me that you want in Wittgenstein a set of hard and fast rules, a way of explaining things or some such. I don't think that was Wittgenstein's aim or point at all. Not to give us a fixed set of rules but, rather, to show us a method for examining statements we make, especially in the context of pursuing philosophical questions, that will enable us to see how our statements, and often the questions which prompt them, are misguided and thereby prone to lead us astray, to prompt us to think there must be fixed theoretical answers to such questions when, in fact, the answer lies often enough in blowing up the question. > I wrote: > > As for the whole story description, consider that we have a base 10 number > > system, but ten numbers is not the whole story. Thus, from whence does > > your description come from? > > > > You wrote: > An understanding that something has been left out when an ellipse is employed > in this way. And that is to recognize its notational role. > > I write: > Nothing is left out! Read the quote from Zettel again. This is the > confusion of philosophers; all this superfluous nonsense adds nothing. > I'm glad you take Wittgenstein to heart so much. Look, what is left out are the further numbers you could list but don't, using the three dots instead to indicate you could go on and on and on, i.e., that the sequence you are referencing is open ended! What is left out? In your sequence the numbers that come after. Could they ever be definitively and completely listed? No, because that is not in keeping with the game in which these numbers are deployed in this way. So your ellipse certainly has a meaning, even if it doesn't convert to a single word (though it might, i.e., maybe we'd want to say it signifies infinity or endlessness). At bottom it tells us how to take the statement that has been made, i.e., that it is incomplete, that the statement denotes an endless sequence that could be continued but which you, the writer, do not continue and, presumably, do not need to continue in order to make your point that the number sequence is not complete but is open-ended (could never be completed), etc. > I could write [1 3 6 10] and a pattern is easy enough to guess. But what > pattern of numbers could not be made out to confirm a rule? > > "this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, > because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule."-LW > And your point vis a vis my remarks? > > > I write: > > You say you would not characterize nonsense in any definite way, > > and then you characterize in 5 definitions. > > You wrote: > None of which are claimed by me to be definitive, only to be examples of how > we would use the term. Nor would I claim that that list is exhaustive though > it exhausts my thoughts on the usage for the moment. My point: Linguistic > uses, though involving specific rules and rule following, are not > close-ended. There is always room for new variations. > > I write: > You definitions are not definitive? Is this not a contradiction? It is > nonsense. > Who says definitions must be definitive by dint of their being "definitions"? Aren't you just being misled by the obvious similarity and common eytemology of the two words? Isn't it more nonsensical (in the sense of confusing common linguistic heritage or sounds with common meaning) to suggest, as you do, that to be a definition implies definitiveness? Haven't you considered the possibility of erroneous definitions, or those that are inadequately stated, or those that are incomplete (as in the open ended nature of the number sequence you give us above)? What kind of nonsense would it be? I suspect #2 would be the proper category, to make a mistake which is so obvious it ought to have been avoided. > I wrote: > > All of which say the same thing: nonsense breaks rules, or nonsense is > > obvious. > > > > You wrote: > Sometimes breaking rules is not nonsensical at all, or it is seen to have > sense only in the context of different rules. Is nonsense obvious? I think > that sometimes it is, but in different ways, depending on the type at issue. > > I write: > I was not the one arguing that nonsense breaks rules, you were. Nonsense is > perfectly legitimate. We simply must be aware when we are speaking it. > > Am I coming off as contradictory? > > Good luck! I was not arguing for it in any formal sense but offering a way of understanding what we sometimes mean by "nonsense" (see my previously provided list of five types of nonsense). Well, this has turned out rather badly I think. At least we tried to communicate. Maybe you will have better luck yourself with other interlocutors on this list. And why do you persist in ending your remarks with the phrase "He lived a wonderful life"? Most of us here will know that a variant of that statement was among Wittgenstein's final dying words but why repeat it as if it were some kind of mantra? Is this intended to tell us something or is it merely meant as a kind of important "nonsense"? If so, what kind? So much of Wittgenstein lends itself to such a wide range of personal interpretations that it becomes possible to commandeer the man for a great variety of positions. But is that valid? SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/