[Wittrs] Re: Conditions of Assertability: First-Person Self-Reference
- From: "Cayuse" <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 16:29:05 -0000
Joseph Polanik wrote:
Cayuse wrote:
Self-reference is valid when it refers to the physical organism.
elsewhere you've indicated that the use of 'I' is equivocal, sometimes
referring to the physical self and sometimes to the experiencer.
you've noted that this was a conflation of two uses, which is correct.
It's correct that there is a conflation. However, when we think more deeply
about one of those uses, though it's station in common speech is perfectly
clear, we are mislead into reifying the "experiencer" (and also the "doer").
"Don't think, but /look/" (see PI 66, 109, 340).
my response to the fact of this conflation is to provide a means
(self-referential pronouns subscripted by reality type) that allow for
clarity of reference by the language user. it seems that your response
is to purge from the language within which philosopher discourse is
conducted any use of self-referential pronouns other than your own.
There is no need to purge such phrases from common speech --
their station is perfectly clear.
note that LW expressly indicates that there is a way for philosophy
to discuss the self (the referent of 'I'); but, that the philosophical
self is ... "not the human body".
Yes, "there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the
self" -- not the self as /part/ of the world but as a /limit/ of the world.
There is no subject that thinks or entertains ideas -- the self is not
something that "experiences" the world, but rather the self and the
world are not different. "I am my world" (TLP 5.63).
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