[Wittrs] Conditions of Assertability: First-Person Self-Reference
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 28 Nov 2009 10:42:49 -0500
Cayuse wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>Cayuse wrote:
>>>Identify the show-er as an aspect of the data of experience, and
>>>then you will have your "showing".
>>would you briefly state the conditions of assertability for
>>first-person self-referencing in your self-lobotomized worldview?
>Self-reference is valid when it refers to the physical organism.
elsewhere you've indicated that the use of 'I' is equivocal, sometimes
referring to the physical self and sometimes to the experiencer. you've
noted that this was a conflation of two uses, which is correct.
my response to the fact of this conflation is to provide a means
(self-referential pronouns subscripted by reality type) that allow for
clarity of reference by the language user. it seems that your response
is to purge from the language within which philosopher discourse is
conducted any use of self-referential pronouns other than your own.
again, you are entitled to self-constrict your language and thereby
self-lobotomize your worldview; but, it makes you incapable of
understanding or even discussing TLP 5.641 and related passages ---
which, you've indicated, are some of the passages that intrigue you.
note that LW expressly indicates that there is a way for philosophy to
discuss the self (the referent of 'I'); but, that the philosophical self
is ... "not the human body".
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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