Come accade sempre piu’ spesso speranza manca il bersaglio. Il suo manifesto
non ha contenuto visto che il medium e’ il messaggio.
Vale dire o implicate in senso griceano che il messaggio passato ad altri e’ la
buridda da 1300 grammi sganciata quotidianamente sul lettore.
Ecco per voi una delle migliori registrazione dello psettacolo di speranza in
Buenos aires
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zqO3CcM1Xr0
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On ;
Behalf Of dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Saturday, July 16, 2016 12:50 PM
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Köpcke's Implicature
McEvoy, typically misses the point of my post. Since it had no point, I guess
he did okay, as missing goes. In any case, he is fond of what J. L. Austin
called (with typical sexism) "trouser words," like "really" ('words that wear
the trousers," as Austin defines them):
McEvoy writes:
"[Popper] [would not say 'irrefudiable']; he really [would not]."
In general, the generalised conversational implicatures of 'would' are tricky.
If I say:
i. If I would live in Mars, my horizon would be red.
the implicature is that I don't live in Mars. It may be an entailment. But I
take it as cancellable:
ii. If I would live in Mars, as it may well be the case that I do, if Descartes
is right, and some malign demon is constantly tricking me, my horizon would (or
if Descartes is right, is) red.
But I say McEvoy misses the point regarding Köpcke's implicature, which may
need some tweaking. We see that Köpcke conceived an object d'art that included
something that resembled a crossword puzzle with a caption,
iii. Insert words!
I use "!" as the neustic sign of the imperative. Suppose Köpcke is Mr Grice.
Then Ms Grice goes to see the object d'art, and, as ordered, does insert words.
"Slithy", "brillig," whatever. This requires Köpcke-Grice to realise that his
addressee will have at least three concepts:
iv. the concept of 'insert'.
v. the concept of 'word' (a controversial one according to Ducrot)
vi. The concept of "!".
However, one need to distinguish between Köpcke's Griceian implicature and the
exhibitor's implicature. Here is Ms Grice's point. As she pointed out to the
police -- I'm quoting from an English report of her German utterance to the
German cop:
vii. If the museum did not want people to follow Köpcke's instruction, they
should put up a sign to make that perspicuous.
In Griceian parlance:
viii. If U2 (we take the exhibitor to be a "second Griceian utterer", with
Köpcke as the "first" or original or authorial Griceian utterer -- or author)
does not intend Köpcke's utterance ("Insert words!") to be complied, U2 should
make that clear (as per various designs: either cover the thing in a protective
glass or as the art gallery now prefers, by adding an order that trumps
Köpcke's original order ("Insert words!"). To wit: "Do not insert words!". A
prohibition.
This leads us to the irrefutable or irrefudiable statement that is the topic of
McEvoy's post:
ix. Insert words; on second thoughts, don't!
An M-intentended Griceian addressee is surely to be confused. The logical form
is
x. !(p & ~p).
Since this is a contradiction, even if it does not depict a state of affairs,
as Witters would have it, enjoins a state of affairs that is contradictory:
xi. Words are inserted and words are not inserted.
Or, to use R. M. Hare's jargon:
xii. Words are inserted, please, and words are not inserted, please.
Now, contradictions for Popper are possible irrefutable. They would be the
opposite of tautologies, like
xiii. Insert the words, or not, as if you feel like.
Now, (xiii), whose logical form is
xiv. p v ~p
is under a traditional two-valued interpretation, vacuous. Recall Alice:
xv. White Knight: The song is too sad. I'm not sure I will sing it to you.
Either it will bring tears to your eyes, or...
Alice: Or else what?
White Knight: Or else it won't, you know.
(cited by Ramsey, that Witters knew, in "Foundations of Mathematics").
It might be argued that Köpcke meant:
xvi. Insert words in your imagination. Or
xvii. Imagine you insert words!
This is also an order -- to imagine. I don't think you can order people to
imagine. But I can conceive that Köpcke thinks it possible. We are all the time
assuming Köpcke is the utterer and Ms Grice the addressee -- this is
traditional 'aesthetic' theory, or art theory. Ms Grice refudiated that by
taking an active role, as author, and follow the instruction.
Objects d'art need provenance, and the art gallery took the trouble to contact
the donor, who was amused. But the policy is that Köpcke's piece will be
restored to its 'blank' originally intended format, so that it applies not just
to Ms Grice but whoever happens to visit this new art gallery in Nuernberg.
When Köpcke's piece was first exhibited, it was understood that Köpcke's
m-intention was NOT to insert words, i.e.
iii. Insert words!
was meant as ironic. But this is controversial. If someone would have happened
to insert words on the first exhibition of Köpcke's piece -- when the thing
became 'art' -- then Köpcke might have changed his mind, and allowed the
'filled-in' piece to stay as it was -- with the words inserted by the piece or
utterance's first addressee. As it happens, the scenario posed by Ms Grice is
novel, and it's not up to Köpcke to decide matters now. We can hypothesise that
Köpcke would have accepted the words inserted by Ms Grice (provided they are
not too rude?) but this brings us back to the beginning: the tricks of 'would'.
Or not.
Cheers,
Speranza
