[lit-ideas] Re: New Program in Psychoanalysis and Culture
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2008 21:12:15 +0000 (GMT)
--- On Wed, 23/7/08, Eric Yost <mr.eric.yost@xxxxxxxxx> wrote?"
> When I wrote the question, I was wobbling and wafting
> between two
> notions of belief:
Popper might suggest this was because you is-a "wobbling and wafting
between two notions".
To stop "wobbling and wafting between two notions" you may need, even as a mere
heuristic, a theory such as Popper's of the 'Three Worlds'.
(Anyone who knows his work well, rather than second-hand or based on some
selective aspects thrown in as part of their syllabus, will know he is flexible
as to how many 'worlds' etc. we admit: but he sees it as what others might call
"conceptual confusion" in talking as if there were no distinctions to be
potentially drawn here).
Popper does not, btw, believe in belief. (As per EMF quotn.).
In what sense?
He does accept that people have beliefs. He accepts that, for example, given
proposition 'p', people might have a sliding scale of 'belief' in 'p' (i.e.
scale of "attitude" to 'p', where one attitude is belief).
He _argues_ this is misconceived insofar as it is taken as fundamental to any
epistemology.
He _argues_ it is only taken as fundamental by those who think epistemoly. can
be erected as an objective concern, or equally collapsed as a subjective
concern, on the basis of a fundamentally _subjective_ theory of knowledge.
His theory is "objectivist" through and through (albeit not Platonic):
knowledge was "objective" long before the (human) 'subject' came into the
picture. See his "Objective Knowledge" as a starting-point perhaps. What humans
added was a W3 to the process of feedback between the 'subject' and its W1 (and
subsequent W2) environment.
He argues that so-called 'epistemic logic' - the idea of exploring the
conceptual links between belief, truth, and justification - is misconceived.
That 'JTB=knowledge' is mistaken and relies on a traditional 'subjectivist"
conception of 'knowing' [that X] as having a 'justified true belief' [that X].
There's more, much more.
But few are taught Popper's stuff in any serious or fair or knowledgable way
(my contact with this list corroborates that): compare with Popper someone who
got a First from Oxford because of their understanding of Hume/Berky/Loc by
tutors who said dismissively "Though its not essential to your course, you
perhaps should be aware there is this chap called Kant - not compulsory study
of course - but chucking a few dismissive comments like you have actually read
him closely, can impress the kind of traditionalist numb-nuts who will mark
your papers."
Who's in charge now of overseeing the fairness of academic philos.? And who
does/doesn't get a fair hearing in this field so wide it is impossible to do
justice to all?
Popper's W321 theory was dismissed by one Oxbridge Prof. as "a mule".
Brilliant. And I supppose I'll get as far as you have by calling you an ass.
D
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