[lit-ideas] Re: Hitchens' Hypothetical Iraq War
- From: "Lawrence Helm" <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2006 22:30:46 -0800
The Foreign Affairs article (
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060501faessay85301-p20/kevin-woods-james-la
cey-williamson-murray/saddam-s-delusions-the-view-from-the-inside.html>
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060501faessay85301-p20/kevin-woods-james-lac
ey-williamson-murray/saddam-s-delusions-the-view-from-the-inside.html ) is
interesting. I?ve encountered much of this in other articles and books but
there is some new detail here. I subscribe to FA and don?t yet have the
issue this came from. I wasn?t aware that they posted articles on the net
before delivering them to paid subscribers.
Note the Footnote at the end of the article: ?For many months after the fall
of Baghdad, a number of senior Iraqi officials in coalition custody
continued to believe it possible that Iraq still possessed a WMD capability
hidden away somewhere (although they adamantly insisted that they had no
direct knowledge of WMD programs) . . .? This isn?t inconsistent with the
statements of General Georges Sada quoted in
http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=49068 and
http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=49187 stating the WMDs
were shipped out of the country.
Lawrence
-----Original Message-----
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
On Behalf Of Robert Paul
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2006 8:30 PM
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Hitchens' Hypothetical Iraq War
Lawrence Helm wrote:
> I think it was Eric who brought up the subject of the Saddam tapes
> showing that Saddam was worse than thought, that evidence was being
> translated that indicated all the fears were true, and I responded by
> indicating a belief that surely those on Lit-Ideas would eventually
> catch on and put the old ?Bush was lying? nonsense to bed once and for
> all, but not so (I am repeating myself for obvious reasons). It seems
> many of the Lit-Idears prefer reading conspiracy theories about the past
> than the new discoveries being translated. Here is one of the many
> articles available to anyone that wants to catch up:
An extract from the Foreign Affairs article (the entire piece is twelve
web pages worth of text):
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060501faessay85301-p20/kevin-woods-james-lac
ey-williamson-murray/saddam-s-delusions-the-view-from-the-inside.html
Ironically, it now appears that some of the actions resulting from
Saddam's new policy of cooperation actually helped solidify the
coalition's case for war. Over the years, Western intelligence services
had obtained many internal Iraqi communications, among them a 1996
memorandum from the director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service directing
all subordinates to "insure that there is no equipment, materials,
research, studies, or books related to manufacturing of the prohibited
weapons (chemical, biological, nuclear, and missiles) in your site." And
when UN inspectors went to these research and storage locations, they
inevitably discovered lingering evidence of WMD-related programs.
In 2002, therefore, when the United States intercepted a message between
two Iraqi Republican Guard Corps commanders discussing the removal of
the words "nerve agents" from "the wireless instructions," or learned of
instructions to "search the area surrounding the headquarters camp and
[the unit] for any chemical agents, make sure the area is free of
chemical containers, and write a report on it," U.S. analysts viewed
this information through the prism of a decade of prior deceit. They had
no way of knowing that this time the information reflected the regime's
attempt to ensure it was in compliance with UN resolutions.
What was meant to prevent suspicion thus ended up heightening it. The
tidbit about removing the term "nerve agents" from radio instructions
was prominently cited as an example of Iraqi bad faith by U.S. Secretary
of State Colin Powell in his February 5, 2003, statement to the UN.
Another factor reduced Iraq's military effectiveness: sanctions. For
more than a dozen years, UN sanctions had frayed the fiber of the Iraqi
military by making it difficult for Baghdad to purchase new equipment,
procure spare parts, or fund adequate training. Attempts to overcome the
effects of the sanctions led Saddam to create the Military Industrial
Commission as a means to sustain the military. The commission and a
series of subordinate organizations steadily promised new capabilities
to offset the effects of poor training, poor morale, and neglected
equipment. Saddam apparently waited for the delivery of wonder weapons
that would reverse the erosion of his military strength.
A captured Military Industrial Commission annual report of investments
made in 2002®¢3 showed more than 170 research projects with an estimated
budget of about 1.5 percent of Iraq's gdp. The commission divided
projects among areas such as equipment, engineering, missiles,
electronics, strategic weapons, artillery, and air forces. One senior
Iraqi official alleged that the commission's leaders were so fearful of
Saddam that when he ordered them to initiate weapons programs that they
knew Iraq could not develop, they told him they could accomplish the
projects with ease. Later, when Saddam asked for updates on the
nonexistent projects, they simply faked plans and designs to show progress.
This constant stream of false reporting undoubtedly accounts for why
many of Saddam's calculations on operational, strategic, and political
issues made perfect sense to him. According to Aziz, "The people in the
Military Industrial Commission were liars. They lied to you, and they
lied to Saddam. They were always saying that they were producing or
procuring special weapons so that they could get favors out of Saddam --
money, cars, everything -- but they were liars. If they did all of this
business and brought in all of these secret weapons, why didn't [the
weapons] work?"
Members of the Military Industrial Commission were not the only liars.
Bending the truth was particularly common among the most trusted members
of Saddam's inner circle -- especially when negative news might reflect
poorly on the teller's abilities or reputation. According to one former
high-ranking Baath Party official, "Saddam had an idea about Iraq's
conventional and potential unconventional capabilities, but never an
accurate one because of the extensive lying occurring in that area. Many
reports were falsified. The ministers attempted to convey a positive
perspective with reports, which were forwarded to Saddam's secretary,
who in turn passed them up to Saddam." In the years before Operation
Iraqi Freedom, everyone around Saddam understood that his need to hear
only good news was constantly growing and that it was in their best
interest to feed that hunger.
A 1982 incident vividly illustrated the danger of telling Saddam what he
did not want to hear. At one low point during the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam
asked his ministers for candid advice. With some temerity, the minister
of health, Riyadh Ibrahim, suggested that Saddam temporarily step down
and resume the presidency after peace was established. Saddam had him
carted away immediately. The next day, pieces of the minister's
chopped-up body were delivered to his wife. According to Abd al-Tawab
Mullah Huwaysh, the head of the Military Industrial Commission and a
relative of the murdered minister, "This powerfully concentrated the
attention of the other ministers, who were unanimous in their insistence
that Saddam remain in power."
Robert Paul
Reed College
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