[cryptome] Re: Cryptome: Error 403
- From: Shaun O'Connor <capricorn8159@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: cryptome@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2014 21:52:37 +0100
that is straight out of one of the cryptome video archives.
On 09/06/2014 21:34, Neal Lamb wrote:
> no,
> try email?
> while we wait, here is one of my favorites that John put up
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=36fP3cmNh3c
>
> Could someone help me identify what that black ufo thingy is to the
> left of the Tower before it is turned to dust?
>
>
> On Monday, June 9, 2014 3:23 PM, Shaun O'Connor
> <capricorn8159@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
> looks like cryptome site has been compromised.
> On 09/06/2014 21:14, Neal Lamb wrote:
>>
>> *403: Forbidden *
>> This error message is generated when the web server is trying to
>> access a file that does not exist or has been configured incorrectly
>>
>> *Troubleshooting suggestions: *
>> Ensure that you have a valid home page defined in your website
>> directory (example: /htdocs/index.html, /htdocs/index.php). On Unix,
>> this is case sensitive and must be all lower case.
>> In your Account Manager, under Hosting Tools, click to .Reset File
>> Permissions..
>>
>>
>> On Monday, June 9, 2014 3:06 PM, doug
>> <douglasrankine2001@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>> <mailto:douglasrankine2001@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Dear John Young & Colleagues,
>> Anyone know why I keep getting error 403 when I visit the cryptome
>> website?
>> ATB
>> Douglas Rankine.
>>
>> On 09/06/14 20:51, Jarrod B wrote:
>>> So is this why I'm getting a 403 message when i go to cryptome .org?
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 1:39 PM, Neal Lamb <nl1816a@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>> <mailto:nl1816a@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
>>>
>>> http://ecowatch.com/2014/06/06/china-coal-cap-strand-assets/
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, June 9, 2014 11:55 AM, Aftermath
>>> <aftermath.thegreat@xxxxxxxxx
>>> <mailto:aftermath.thegreat@xxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Some one just pointed this out too me:
>>>
>>> https://veracrypt.codeplex.com/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> from the website:
>>>
>>> *Project Description*
>>> VeraCrypt is a free disk encryption software brought to you
>>> by *IDRIX *(http://www.idrix.fr <http://www.idrix.fr/>) and that
>>> is based on TrueCrypt, freely available
>>> at http://www.truecrypt.org/.
>>> It adds enhanced security to the algorithms used for system and
>>> partitions encryption making it immune to new developments in
>>> brute-force attacks.
>>>
>>> For example, when the system partition is encrypted, TrueCrypt
>>> uses PBKDF2-RIPEMD160 with 1000 iterations whereas in VeraCrypt
>>> we use 327661. And for standard containers and other partitions,
>>> TrueCrypt uses at most 2000 iterations but VeraCrypt
>>> uses 655331 for RIPEMD160 and 500000 iterations for SHA-2 and
>>> Whirlpool.
>>>
>>> This enhanced security adds some delay only to the opening of
>>> encrypted partitions without any performance impact to the
>>> application use phase. This is acceptable to the legitimate
>>> owner but it makes it much more harder for an attacker to gain
>>> access to the encrypted data.
>>>
>>>
>>> *VeraCrypt storage format is INCOMPATIBLE with TrueCrypt storage
>>> format.*
>>> *VeraCrypt storage format is INCOMPATIBLE with TrueCrypt storage
>>> format.
>>> *
>>> *VeraCrypt storage format is INCOMPATIBLE with TrueCrypt storage
>>> format.*
>>>
>>> (repetition is mine to highlight the fact that you cannot open
>>> truecrypt volumes with veracrypt)
>>>
>>> -Afterm4th
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jun 3, 2014 at 9:50 AM, <tpb-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxx
>>> <mailto:tpb-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
>>>
>>> > Message du 03/06/14 10:51
>>> > De : "Shaun O'Connor"
>>> >
>>> > I take your point about the encryption dilemma(did I spell
>>> that
>>> > correctly). I think the Jury is out on that particular
>>> issue though...
>>> >
>>> > Personally I think we are in a perpetual game of cat and
>>> mouse with
>>> > those who make it their business to know everything about
>>> everyone..
>>> >
>>>
>>> The rewards for the spies are too great for this game to end
>>> one day.
>>>
>>> The game will continue, but because of these disclosures by
>>> half-2015, the spies will have to start all over again, at
>>> least against people who are aware and actively protect
>>> their systems. Because those that got legacy systems will be
>>> forever under the treat.
>>>
>>> Considering our increasing life expectancy and the fact that
>>> we are using Cobol and Fortran codes made 40 years ago in
>>> many financial and scientific institutions, we can count
>>> many exploits discovered in the last decade to be still
>>> exploitable in 100 years. Because those systems won't go away.
>>>
>>> An example of why this is possible, is how many webservers
>>> (not merely firmware routers hard to re-flash) you will find
>>> that are still vulnerable to heartbleed. The rate of
>>> correction seems to be asymptotic, thus always leaving some
>>> uncorrected systems till the end of their usable lives.
>>>
>>> Put that in an automated system like spy agencies have, and
>>> you have interesting data streams forever to exploit. The
>>> only solution to stop them is to uncover their taps and
>>> block them, those are much smaller in number and easier to
>>> tackle than millions of machines.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> --
> *_PRIVACY IS A BASIC RIGHT - NOT A CONCESSION _*
>
>
--
*_PRIVACY IS A BASIC RIGHT - NOT A CONCESSION _*
Other related posts:
