[cryptome] Re: Cryptome: Error 403

  • From: Shaun O'Connor <capricorn8159@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: cryptome@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2014 21:23:00 +0100

looks like cryptome site has been compromised.
On 09/06/2014 21:14, Neal Lamb wrote:
>
> *403: Forbidden *
> This error message is generated when the web server is trying to
> access a file that does not exist or has been configured incorrectly
>
> *Troubleshooting suggestions: *
> Ensure that you have a valid home page defined in your website
> directory (example: /htdocs/index.html, /htdocs/index.php). On Unix,
> this is case sensitive and must be all lower case.
> In your Account Manager, under Hosting Tools, click to .Reset File
> Permissions..
>
>
> On Monday, June 9, 2014 3:06 PM, doug <douglasrankine2001@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
>
> Dear John Young & Colleagues,
> Anyone know why I keep getting error 403 when I visit the cryptome
> website? 
> ATB
> Douglas Rankine.
>
> On 09/06/14 20:51, Jarrod B wrote:
>> So is this why I'm getting a 403 message when i go to cryptome .org?
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 1:39 PM, Neal Lamb <nl1816a@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> <mailto:nl1816a@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
>>
>>     http://ecowatch.com/2014/06/06/china-coal-cap-strand-assets/
>>
>>
>>     On Monday, June 9, 2014 11:55 AM, Aftermath
>>     <aftermath.thegreat@xxxxxxxxx
>>     <mailto:aftermath.thegreat@xxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>     Some one just pointed this out too me:
>>
>>     https://veracrypt.codeplex.com/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>     from the website:
>>
>>     *Project Description*
>>     VeraCrypt is a free disk encryption software brought to you
>>     by *IDRIX *(http://www.idrix.fr <http://www.idrix.fr/>) and that
>>     is based on TrueCrypt, freely available at http://www.truecrypt.org/.
>>     It adds enhanced security to the algorithms used for system and
>>     partitions encryption making it immune to new developments in
>>     brute-force attacks.
>>
>>     For example, when the system partition is encrypted, TrueCrypt
>>     uses PBKDF2-RIPEMD160 with 1000 iterations whereas in VeraCrypt
>>     we use 327661. And for standard containers and other partitions,
>>     TrueCrypt uses at most 2000 iterations but VeraCrypt
>>     uses 655331 for RIPEMD160 and 500000 iterations for SHA-2 and
>>     Whirlpool.
>>
>>     This enhanced security adds some delay only to the opening of
>>     encrypted partitions without any performance impact to the
>>     application use phase. This is acceptable to the legitimate owner
>>     but it makes it much more harder for an attacker to gain access
>>     to the encrypted data.
>>
>>
>>     *VeraCrypt storage format is INCOMPATIBLE with TrueCrypt storage
>>     format.*
>>     *VeraCrypt storage format is INCOMPATIBLE with TrueCrypt storage
>>     format.
>>     *
>>     *VeraCrypt storage format is INCOMPATIBLE with TrueCrypt storage
>>     format.*
>>
>>     (repetition is mine to highlight the fact that you cannot open
>>     truecrypt volumes with veracrypt)
>>
>>     -Afterm4th
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>     On Tue, Jun 3, 2014 at 9:50 AM, <tpb-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxx
>>     <mailto:tpb-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
>>
>>         > Message du 03/06/14 10:51
>>         > De : "Shaun O'Connor"
>>         >
>>         > I take your point about the encryption dilemma(did I spell that
>>         > correctly). I think the Jury is out on that particular
>>         issue though...
>>         >
>>         > Personally I think we are in a perpetual game of cat and
>>         mouse with
>>         > those who make it their business to know everything about
>>         everyone..
>>         >
>>
>>         The rewards for the spies are too great for this game to end
>>         one day.
>>
>>         The game will continue, but because of these disclosures by
>>         half-2015, the spies will have to start all over again, at
>>         least against people who are aware and actively protect their
>>         systems. Because those that got legacy systems will be
>>         forever under the treat.
>>
>>         Considering our increasing life expectancy and the fact that
>>         we are using Cobol and Fortran codes made 40 years ago in
>>         many financial and scientific institutions, we can count many
>>         exploits discovered in the last decade to be still
>>         exploitable in 100 years. Because those systems won't go away.
>>
>>         An example of why this is possible, is how many webservers
>>         (not merely firmware routers hard to re-flash) you will find
>>         that are still vulnerable to heartbleed. The rate of
>>         correction seems to be asymptotic, thus always leaving some
>>         uncorrected systems till the end of their usable lives.
>>
>>         Put that in an automated system like spy agencies have, and
>>         you have interesting data streams forever to exploit. The
>>         only solution to stop them is to uncover their taps and block
>>         them, those are much smaller in number and easier to tackle
>>         than millions of machines.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>

-- 
*_PRIVACY IS A BASIC RIGHT - NOT A CONCESSION _*

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