[cryptome] Re: Cryptome: Error 403
- From: Brian Hecht <brian.hecht@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "cryptome@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <cryptome@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2014 13:35:07 -0700 (PDT)
Here in central Texas .. the main site and his mirrors ... no go ... ! ...
http://cryptome.net/ is empty except for one red text line
I just got my IP address blocked trying to post the site down on
godlikeproductions.com
Brian
________________________________
From: doug <douglasrankine2001@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: cryptome@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Monday, June 9, 2014 3:23 PM
Subject: [cryptome] Re: Cryptome: Error 403
Hi Neal,
Can you get access to the website then...or any of the mirrors?
ATB
Dougie.
On 09/06/14 21:14, Neal Lamb wrote:
>
>403: Forbidden
>This error message is generated when the web server is trying to access a file
>that does not exist or has been configured incorrectly
>
>Troubleshooting suggestions:
>Ensure that you have a valid home page defined in your website directory
>(example: /htdocs/index.html, /htdocs/index.php). On Unix, this is case
>sensitive and must be all lower case.
>In your Account Manager, under Hosting Tools, click to .Reset File
>Permissions..
>
>
>
>On Monday, June 9, 2014 3:06 PM, doug <douglasrankine2001@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
>
>Dear John Young & Colleagues,
>Anyone know why I keep getting error 403 when I
visit the cryptome website?
>ATB
>Douglas Rankine.
>
>On 09/06/14 20:51, Jarrod B wrote:
>
>So is this why I'm getting a 403 message when i go to cryptome .org?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 1:39 PM, Neal Lamb <nl1816a@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>>http://ecowatch.com/2014/06/06/china-coal-cap-strand-assets/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>On Monday, June 9, 2014 11:55 AM, Aftermath <aftermath.thegreat@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>Some one just pointed this out too me:
>>>
>>>
>>>https://veracrypt.codeplex.com/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>from the website:
>>>
>>>
>>>Project Description
>>>VeraCrypt is a free disk encryption software brought to you by IDRIX
>>>(http://www.idrix.fr) and that is based on TrueCrypt, freely available at
>>>http://www.truecrypt.org/.
>>>It adds enhanced security to the algorithms used for system and partitions
>>>encryption making it immune to new developments in brute-force attacks.
>>>
>>>For example, when the system partition is encrypted, TrueCrypt uses
>>>PBKDF2-RIPEMD160 with 1000 iterations whereas in VeraCrypt we use 327661.
>>>And for standard containers and other partitions, TrueCrypt uses at most
>>>2000 iterations but VeraCrypt uses 655331 for RIPEMD160 and 500000
>>>iterations for SHA-2 and Whirlpool.
>>>
>>>This enhanced security adds some delay only to the opening of encrypted
>>>partitions without any performance impact to the application use phase. This
>>>is acceptable to the legitimate owner but it makes it much more harder for
>>>an attacker to gain access to the encrypted data.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>VeraCrypt storage format is INCOMPATIBLE with TrueCrypt storage format.
>>>VeraCrypt storage format is INCOMPATIBLE with TrueCrypt storage format.
>>>
>>>VeraCrypt storage format is INCOMPATIBLE with TrueCrypt storage format.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>(repetition is mine to highlight the fact that you cannot open truecrypt
>>>volumes with veracrypt)
>>>
>>>
>>>-Afterm4th
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>On Tue, Jun 3, 2014 at 9:50 AM, <tpb-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Message du 03/06/14 10:51
>>>>> De :
"Shaun
O'Connor"
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I take
your point
about the
encryption
dilemma(did I
spell that
>>>>>
correctly). I
think the Jury
is out on that
particular
issue
though...
>>>>>
>>>>>
Personally I
think we are
in a perpetual
game of cat
and mouse with
>>>>> those who
make it their
business to
know
everything
about
everyone..
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
The rewards for the spies are too great for this game to end one day.
>>>>
>>>>The game will
continue, but
because of
these
disclosures by
half-2015, the
spies will
have to start
all over
again, at
least against
people who are
aware and
actively
protect their
systems.
Because those
that got
legacy systems
will be
forever under
the treat.
>>>>
>>>>Considering
our increasing
life
expectancy and
the fact that
we are using
Cobol and
Fortran codes
made 40 years
ago in many
financial and
scientific
institutions,
we can count
many exploits
discovered in
the last
decade to be
still
exploitable in
100 years.
Because those
systems won't
go away.
>>>>
>>>>An example of
why this is
possible, is
how many
webservers
(not merely
firmware
routers hard
to re-flash)
you will find
that are still
vulnerable to
heartbleed.
The rate of
correction
seems to be
asymptotic,
thus always
leaving some
uncorrected
systems till
the end of
their usable
lives.
>>>>
>>>>Put that in an
automated
system like
spy agencies
have, and you
have
interesting
data streams
forever to
exploit. The
only solution
to stop them
is to uncover
their taps and
block them,
those are much
smaller in
number and
easier to
tackle than
millions of
machines.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
>
>
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