[cryptome] Re: Cryptome: Error 403

  • From: Aftermath <aftermath.thegreat@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: cryptome@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2014 13:41:11 -0700

lol cyber terrorism


On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 1:35 PM, Brian Hecht <brian.hecht@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:

> Here in central Texas .. the main site and his mirrors ... no go ... !
> ...
>
> http://cryptome.net/ is empty except for one red text line
>
> I just got my IP address blocked trying to post the site down on
> godlikeproductions.com
>
> Brian
>
>
>
>   ------------------------------
>  *From:* doug <douglasrankine2001@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> *To:* cryptome@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> *Sent:* Monday, June 9, 2014 3:23 PM
> *Subject:* [cryptome] Re: Cryptome: Error 403
>
> Hi Neal,
> Can you get access to the website then...or any of the mirrors?
> ATB
> Dougie.
>
> On 09/06/14 21:14, Neal Lamb wrote:
>
>
>   * 403: Forbidden *
>  This error message is generated when the web server is trying to access a
> file that does not exist or has been configured incorrectly
>
> * Troubleshooting suggestions: *
>  Ensure that you have a valid home page defined in your website directory
> (example: /htdocs/index.html, /htdocs/index.php). On Unix, this is case
> sensitive and must be all lower case.
>  In your Account Manager, under Hosting Tools, click to .Reset File
> Permissions..
>
>
>    On Monday, June 9, 2014 3:06 PM, doug <douglasrankine2001@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> <douglasrankine2001@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
>   Dear John Young & Colleagues,
> Anyone know why I keep getting error 403 when I visit the cryptome
> website?
> ATB
> Douglas Rankine.
>
> On 09/06/14 20:51, Jarrod B wrote:
>
> So is this why I'm getting a 403 message when i go to cryptome .org?
>
>
> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 1:39 PM, Neal Lamb <nl1816a@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>  http://ecowatch.com/2014/06/06/china-coal-cap-strand-assets/
>
>
>    On Monday, June 9, 2014 11:55 AM, Aftermath <
> aftermath.thegreat@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
>   Some one just pointed this out too me:
>
>  https://veracrypt.codeplex.com/
>
>
>
>
>  from the website:
>
>  *Project Description*
> VeraCrypt is a free disk encryption software brought to you by *IDRIX *(
> http://www.idrix.fr) and that is based on TrueCrypt, freely available at
> http://www.truecrypt.org/.
> It adds enhanced security to the algorithms used for system and partitions
> encryption making it immune to new developments in brute-force attacks.
>
> For example, when the system partition is encrypted, TrueCrypt uses
> PBKDF2-RIPEMD160 with 1000 iterations whereas in VeraCrypt we use 327661.
> And for standard containers and other partitions, TrueCrypt uses at most
> 2000 iterations but VeraCrypt uses 655331 for RIPEMD160 and 500000 iterations
> for SHA-2 and Whirlpool.
>
> This enhanced security adds some delay only to the opening of encrypted
> partitions without any performance impact to the application use phase.
> This is acceptable to the legitimate owner but it makes it much more harder
> for an attacker to gain access to the encrypted data.
>
>
>  *VeraCrypt storage format is INCOMPATIBLE with TrueCrypt storage format.*
>
> *VeraCrypt storage format is INCOMPATIBLE with TrueCrypt storage format. *
>  *VeraCrypt storage format is INCOMPATIBLE with TrueCrypt storage format.*
>
>  (repetition is mine to highlight the fact that you cannot open truecrypt
> volumes with veracrypt)
>
>  -Afterm4th
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 3, 2014 at 9:50 AM, <tpb-crypto@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > Message du 03/06/14 10:51
> > De : "Shaun O'Connor"
> >
> > I take your point about the encryption dilemma(did I spell that
> > correctly). I think the Jury is out on that particular issue though...
> >
> > Personally I think we are in a perpetual game of cat and mouse with
> > those who make it their business to know everything about everyone..
> >
>
>  The rewards for the spies are too great for this game to end one day.
>
> The game will continue, but because of these disclosures by half-2015, the
> spies will have to start all over again, at least against people who are
> aware and actively protect their systems. Because those that got legacy
> systems will be forever under the treat.
>
> Considering our increasing life expectancy and the fact that we are using
> Cobol and Fortran codes made 40 years ago in many financial and scientific
> institutions, we can count many exploits discovered in the last decade to
> be still exploitable in 100 years. Because those systems won't go away.
>
> An example of why this is possible, is how many webservers (not merely
> firmware routers hard to re-flash) you will find that are still vulnerable
> to heartbleed. The rate of correction seems to be asymptotic, thus always
> leaving some uncorrected systems till the end of their usable lives.
>
> Put that in an automated system like spy agencies have, and you have
> interesting data streams forever to exploit. The only solution to stop them
> is to uncover their taps and block them, those are much smaller in number
> and easier to tackle than millions of machines.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

Other related posts: