Joerg, You're new; so you aren't used to the way we do things here. There is of course that Lawrence who reads all those tedious books and writes about them more than anyone ought to, so let's get him off on a tangent and talk about what we want to. The discussion you object to isn't one I initiated or even one I'm particularly interested in. I sympathize with Paul Stone who wrote "Technically, still subscribed, emotionally, mmmm not so much." What I am most interested in is political theory. The two major paradigms confronting us are Fukuyama's and Huntington's. Fukuyama's has been most discussed because it gave rise to the Neocons and what probably seemed a fortuitous opportunity for them to apply their beliefs. The Fukuyama paradigm vs. the Neocon interpretation became even more interesting when Fukuyama declared that the political Neocons had gotten it all wrong. I have read Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man twice and while Fukuyama is technically an Hegelian, implying that what he is describing is implacable law and not political programs, it is difficult, if one subscribes to Fukuyama's thesis, to read it and remain passive. Not even Fukuyama wants to remain utterly passive, but he does not wish to be associated with the sort of exporting of Liberal Democracy which he fancies the Neocons have become identified with, and so he renounced his Neocon association and began a new movement with a name something like Wilsonian Realism (I suspect that's not quite right; however I have a headache -- perhaps due to being emotionally unsubscribed -- and am working on my first cup of coffee and don't wish to). The paradigm that is much more interesting at the present time is Samuel P. Huntington's, described in his The Clash of Civilizations. Interestingly, and I don't know if I mentioned this before, Huntington is quite popular in the Middle East. Many there like his paradigm. It fits right into their thinking, or rather gives form to it. So, did Huntington capture the Islamic situation as it exists, or has he become part of the problem? I think the former but I squirm a little at his popularity over there. And here we approach the point of Andreas tangent, for Huntington referred to their civilization as the Islamic. He wasn't being original using this term. He used existing anthropological terminology. There are nine major civilizations, Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese. He argues that the nations within each of these civilizations (although this is moot in regard to the Japanese) will band together and support each other when confronted by nations of another Civilization. That's an over-simplification and perhaps most colored by what we see in our own Western Civilization, but it seems also to be true of the Islamic, and we do seem to be having one of the Clashes Huntington described. In my own view, and in view of the fact that we've spent considerable time on Lit-Ideas considering the plight of the so-called Moderate Muslims, I am not willing to categorize all of the Islamic Civilization as a threat. Actually, Huntington wouldn't say quite that either, but he hasn't provided a more useful term in his book. So in my own references I don't go so far as Huntington and assume we are "Clashing" with the Islamic Civilization, but merely that part of it that is "Militant" toward us or our allies. Others are gravitating toward this term as well. And it may be due to the work of certain others who while they haven't precisely created a paradigm, have influenced Fukuyama and present a theory about the nature of the Islamic threat. These others haven't created the term "Militant Islam." What they have done is create the need for another term since they have weakened the idea that we are at war with Islamism (the term many preferred for awhile). They are Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy. Their books are, respectively, The War for Muslim Minds, Islam and the West and Globalized Islam, the Search for a new Ummah. These two books seem to have been crucial in causing Fukuyama to abandon the Neocons. To oversimplify again, they argue that the Islamic threat isn't as serious as other writers have suggested. What we have are some alienated Europeanized Muslims who got caught up in the intellectual ideas of Sayyid Qutb and his popularizers and want to engage in Jihad against the West. Roy and Fukuyama after him prefer calling those that pose this threat, the "Jihadists." If it is only the Jihadist we have to worry about, if the bulk of Islam is moderate at heart, then we are over-reacting Is it possible that Kepel, Roy & Fukuyama are right? I've read their books and think it possible - perhaps not at the moment, but as time goes on. Oriana Fallaci and others have painted a picture of the inevitable Islamisation of Europe. Since Muslims breed more prolifically than Europeans the demise of the latter is inescapable unless, we understand implicitly, Europeans resort to violent means. But Roy has statistics to show that once Muslims become part of Europe, their birth rate drops to the same percentage as the ambient society. Also, European Muslims more and more accept their new societies. They do not retain loyalty to the nations that were so unpleasant that they chose to leave. Yes, they find common cause when some event strikes them in a particular way, but that will soon disappear as their inevitable integration occurs. As to the Islamic nations themselves, yes they are backward, but no more so than some of those in Africa or South America. Their problems will disappear as they become integrated more fully into the world economy - as their Ummah becomes globalized. While it would be nice if Kepel and Roy were correct, it would not be acceptable foreign policy to assume that they are. As in aerospace, we must plan for the worst-case scenario. Militant Islam may continue on, growing in strength until it has a "Core State," (Core State being like the US is in the Western Civilization and Russia is in the Orthodox) and establishes itself as it wishes to be; which because of the Jihadist element in their religion is more inherently militant than any other civilization. Thus, when I consider the Balkans, I wonder how readily Fukuyama's Liberal Democracy is working there. They are far down the lists that rank nations according to GDP. The Balkan nations are in amongst the Islamic nations in this list. No Islamic nation is near the top. We scroll down the list until we come to the first major Balkan nation, Greece which has a GDP per capita of $21,300. The next Balkan nation is Croatia ($11,200), and then Bulgaria ($8,200), Macedonia, ($7,100), Bosnia and Herzegovina ($6,500), Albania ($4,900), and last of all is Serbia and Montenegro ($2,400). But note that even Serbia is above Pakistan ($2,200) and Bangladesh ($2,000) and the Sudan ($1,900). The first major Islamic nation we encounter on the list is Saudi Arabia ($12,000). Iran is $7,700, Tunisia $7,100, Algeria $6,600. Some of the Arab Oil-rich principalities have higher GDPs per capita, The United Arab Emirates ($25,200), Qatar ($23,200), and Kuwait ($21,300). When we look at the top of the list we see mostly Western nations (skipping the smaller nations) we see. The US ($40,100), Norway ($40,000), Switzerland ($33,800), Denmark ($32,200), Ireland ($31,900), Canada ($31,500), Austria ($30,300) [it is interesting to note that the other half of the "dual empire" is way down the list at $14,900], Australia ($30,700), Belgium ($30,600), UK ($29,600), Netherlands ($29,500), Japan ($29,400), Finland ($29,000), France ($28,700), Germany ($28,700), Sweden ($28,400), Italy ($27,700), the European Union ($26,9000, and Taiwan ($25,300). That's not the entire list but indicative of the economic contrast between the Western and Islamic Civilizations. It also indicates that the Islamized European nations we briefly discussed haven't risen to the standard of the rest of the Western Civilization. Presumably the EU is working on that. My goal in writing isn't to be short and pithy but to be thorough; so this note wouldn't be complete without mentioning Thomas Barnett. He took Fukuyama's theory and described practical measures for implementing it. He redefines everything calling the economically successful nations part of a "functioning core," and the unsuccessful nations as the "non-integrated gap." A nation is either integrated and part of the functioning core or it is in the non-integrated and in the non-functioning gap. Barnett's provides means for bringing the non-functioning gap, nation by nation over time into the integrated core. His means are not military. He sees the military as primarily providing security so nations won't have to worry about being attacked and can set up viable non-aggressive governments. If these nations are secure and have viable governments, then investment will be attracted and then it is only a matter of time before the nation becomes integrated. This is a vast oversimplification of Barnett's arguments. He has a web site and one can listen to him being interviewed if one likes. So perhaps you can see from the above that I have very little interest in the tangent Andreas got me off on. I do not like tangents, but if one picks something out and says something like (trying to capture the usual Lit-Ideas pugnacity) "hey, you didn't mention Luxembourg which has a GDP per capita much higher than the US, $58,900 to the US's mere $40,100. What's the matter? Don't you like the idea of a European nation having a higher GDP per capita than the US? What's the matter, can't you take it?" And so I would get drawn into this insignificant and puerile tangent and perhaps feel impelled to point out that I was "skipping the smaller nation" and that I skipped Guernsey, the British Virgin Islands and Bermuda as well as others. But by then others would have piled on, and perhaps some new member would pop up and wonder why Lawrence is so Xenophobic as to hate the thought that any part of Europe might in any way be better than something in the All-Mighty Marvelous (In Lawrence's eyes but no one else's) United barfing States of America. And then I would do some soul searching, perhaps even as I'm doing now. Why am I wasting my time here on these unedifying tangents? Does no one read my notes? For if no one does then perhaps I could do just as well writing a journal. But then some lurker will write me privately to assure me that he is reading my notes with great interest and hopes I will not disappear, and so I don't. Lawrence -----Original Message----- From: joerg benesch Sent: Monday, January 22, 2007 5:39 AM Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The de-islamization of Europe "Logical miracle transubstantiates Baathist into Islamist" - [Bell klingeling, a voice from the off shrieking "illogical! imposing on me what I never ..."; distant clatter of at least one hoof] Hopefully, our Grand Logician, whose dialetics smell of Torquemada rather than of Aristotle, may want to mildly take into account that this is not a matter of inference, but of simple definition, which has its set of very basic, yet often neglected, rules. If "Islamic militant" were defined as "a militant person more or less closely connected to Islam", both OBL and Saddam Hussein would qualify If, however, "Islamic militant" were defined as "a militant person fighting for what he considers to be the aims of Islam", OBL still would qualify, but Saddam wouldn't. Even if I'm but an irrational gravitator, I dare remark that to me, only the latter definition seems to qualify as a definitio essentialis. So what we actually do have here are two different definitions, which, by a strange coincidence, were termed alike so that novices to the trivium may easily mix them up. If it were not a sacrilege to criticize the Grand Logician, I'd humbly suggest that he treated such trifles with a tad more of his precious care, thus sparing us poor burnables a lot of confusion & despair. Barely disentagled, joerg featherless on his two legs in Suebia p. s. if a rabbit emerges from the hat, the question is always, who put it there... Lawrence Helm schrieb: > (...) The same is true of what you wrote. Two of Saddam's attributes > were Islamic and Militant. In other words, he was an Islamic Militant > or a Militant Islamic. (...) ------------------------------------------------------------------