[lit-ideas] Re: Do You Have a Moral Urgency?
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2006 17:29:11 -0230
Phil lays out a banquet of moral thought for us to feast upon. (Along with some
very long German sentences). Some questions and comments appear below.
Quoting Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>:
> Walter Okshevsky wrote:
>
> "I'm not clear on why it is so often claimed that K had a problem with
> consequences. Action in accord with moral law for its own sake
> identifies the moral worth of a maxim independently of consequences."
>
> There are a few different ways of responding to this, but I will choose
> one. I will begin with Kant, himself, describing the problem:
>
> "Now, the moral law as a law of freedom commands through determining
> grounds that are to be quite independent of nature and its harmony with
> our faculty of desire; the acting rational being in the world is,
> however, not also the cause of the world and of nature itself.
> Consequently, there is not the least ground in the moral law for a
> necessary connection between the morality and the proportionate
> happiness of a being belonging to the world as part of it and hence
> dependent upon it, who for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of
> this nature and, as far as his happiness is concerned, cannot by his on
> powers make it harmonize thoroughly with his practical principles.
> Nevertheless, in the practical task of pure reason, that is, in the
> necessary pursuit of the highest good, such a connection is postulated
> as necessary: we ought to strive to promote the highest good (which must
> therefore be possible)." (Critique of Practical Reason, 5:124-5)
>
> To summarize, the problem is that there is no assurance that what one
> ought to do can be done
W: I think what Kant means is that there is no asurance that she who does her
duty from duty will reap any rewards of happiness, well-being or even a great
deal from Geico. (I think Kant subscribes to the view that "ought" implies
"can.")
since there is nothing in the idea of the moral
> law that necessarily connects its imperatives to the world. The moral
> law may command all sorts of actions but what does that have to do with
> us as beings in the world? If one cannot be certain that acting morally
> will produce good consequences, then how can one be certain that moral
> acts are even possible?
W: By coming to recognize that the good will is not defined by its successes and
failures as effects of its willing?
So, while the moral law functions independently
> of consequences, the moral law requires a certainty that moral acts and
> the proper consequences will necessarily follow from such acts.
W: You lose me on the second part: consequences have no "necessity" about them
since they display empirical connections (with causes) and are as such
contingent.
>
> "Therefore, the highest good in the world is possible only insofar as a
> supreme cause of nature having a causality in keeping with the moral
> disposition is assumed." (5:125)
W: Well put. But the highest good is not the moral motive for Kant; it is only
an end we are permitted to postulate if we need it. The "determining ground" of
the will must be and only be the form of law. And such a ground as a motive
must be independent of all interests and their attainments. (Though the two are
not necessarily opposed.)
>
> And so at this point of the Second Critique, Kant turns to the idea of a
> supreme cause of nature that turns out, surprise, surprise, to be God.
> According to Kant, {A: if one does not assume a Supreme Lawgiver, then one
> cannot assume that the causality required for moral activity is possible
> in the world.} Now Kant is not at all comfortable with this conclusion
> so it is qualified in all sorts of ways but it seems pretty clear to me
> that Kant thinks there is a problem with the moral law and consequences,
> hence his need to introduce the idea of God.
Kant was very sceptical about God entering into the province of morality and
moral education. (Religion was OK so long as it stayed within rational limits.)
Could you provide a reference for "A" in your par. above?
>
Walter C. Okshevsky
Memorial U
> Sincerely,
>
> Phil Enns
> Toronto, ON
>
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