Re: [quickphilosophy] Re: 1.12; 1.13; 1.2 & 1.21
- From: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 05 Sep 2010 22:58:27 +0100
Thanks for that comment, Ron.
It's not a quirk of mine to draw comparisons between W and the
trasncendentally idealist Kant. Like anything else concerning W there
is no agreement, of course. And come to that, Kant is not altogether
easy to understand.
For example, Hans-Johann Glock:
"Several authors have detected profound analogies between Kant and
Wittgenstein. Their claims have been contradicted by scholars, such
being the agreed penalty for attributions to authorities. Many of the
alleged similarities have either been left unsubstantiated at a detailed
exegetical level, or have been confined to highly general points. At the
same time, the 'scholarly' backlash has tended to ignore the importance
of some of these general points, or has focused on very specific issues
or purely terminological matters. To advance the debate, I distinguish
four different topics: questions of actual influence; parallels at the
methodological level; substantial similarities in philosophical logic;
substantial similarities in the philosophy of mind. The article
concentrates on the second and third topic. Section I argues that the
critical conception of philosophy shared by Kant and Wittgenstein is
itself due to the fact that they explain the a priori status of
necessary propositions by reference to the way we experience or
represent reality. Section II shows how the Tractatiis linguistically
transforms this 'reflective turn', replacing Kant's preconditions of
experience by preconditions of symbolic representation. Section III
suggests that this explanation of the a priori involves the idea of an
isomorphism between thought and reality, and that both Kant's
transcendental idealism and Wittgenstein's early metaphysics of
symbolism distort this isomorphism. Wittgenstein later rejected this
metaphysics of symbolism, on the grounds that language is autonomous,
and section IV detects parallels between that idea and Kant's
'diallelus' argument against the correspondence theory of truth.
Finally, I claim that while Wittgenstein is right to insist that all a
priori propositions are conceptual, Kant, in calling them synthetic a
priori, is right to deny that they simply unpack the concepts involved
in the propositions themselves."
Ron Allen wrote:
>
>
> Hi Martin:
>
> There is one TLP proposition that does have a remarkably idealist ring
> to it:
>
> 5.621 The world and life are one.
>
> If my life is the world, then it seems that my consciousness has a
> crucial generative role to play in making the world, and this sure
> sounds a lot like idealism. So, maybe you have a point, and I would
> think that if W. started with something like this, we'd be fairly well
> justified to classify him as an idealist of some sort.
>
> But, since he derives it from his realist axiomatics, I'd still argue
> that it's rather a case of his extreme realism absorbing what seems to
> be an idealist conclusion into itself.
>
> Thanks!
> --Ron
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