[quickphilosophy] Re: 1.12; 1.13; 1.2 & 1.21

  • From: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Mon, 06 Sep 2010 00:06:35 -0000


--- In quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Martin N Brampton <martin.lists@...> 
wrote:
>
> You may have lost interest in this by now!  I've been distracted by 
> other matters.
> 
> I'm not sure what your answers aim to achieve.  When you say W wants us 
> to understand the world as the totality of facts, are we to suppose that 
> any of these terms have prior meanings?  Does "the world" lack meaning 
> and require a definition, for which W offers "the totality of facts"? 
> Or do all the words have prior meanings, in which case what reason do we 
> have for supposing that they can be brought together in that particular way?
> 
> What reason do we have for supposing that anything "makes" a statement 
> true?  And if we do suppose something does, what kind of "thing" would 
> it be?  I'm quite lost here.
> 

As I think I said in my first or second post, I think it's a kind of 
stipulative definition.





> The reason idealism makes matters easier is that it involves a 
> relationship between different mental constructs, which seems at least 
> broadly feasible.  If facts are some quite other kind of thing, then 
> I've no idea what kind of relationship they can have with statements.
> 

What would make the statement "The Twins won yesterday" true is the Twins 
having won yesterday, what would make it false is the Twins having actually 
lost.  

> Are there any simple objects?  On what grounds are we required to 
> consider them to exist?
> 

I'm played out on both of those issues myself, having excerpted both Anscombe 
and Griffin at length on them in past posts.  OTOH, if anybody else would like 
to continue the discussion, I'll listen with interest! 

W




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