Re: [quickphilosophy] Re: 1.12; 1.13; 1.2 & 1.21
- From: wittrsl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- To: quickphilosophy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 05 Sep 2010 22:28:28 +0100
You may have lost interest in this by now! I've been distracted by
other matters.
I'm not sure what your answers aim to achieve. When you say W wants us
to understand the world as the totality of facts, are we to suppose that
any of these terms have prior meanings? Does "the world" lack meaning
and require a definition, for which W offers "the totality of facts"?
Or do all the words have prior meanings, in which case what reason do we
have for supposing that they can be brought together in that particular way?
What reason do we have for supposing that anything "makes" a statement
true? And if we do suppose something does, what kind of "thing" would
it be? I'm quite lost here.
The reason idealism makes matters easier is that it involves a
relationship between different mental constructs, which seems at least
broadly feasible. If facts are some quite other kind of thing, then
I've no idea what kind of relationship they can have with statements.
Are there any simple objects? On what grounds are we required to
consider them to exist?
walto wrote:
> >
> > The kind of problems I have with the first few sentences are that I
> > don't know what is being referred to by "the world" as it seems to be
> > used in a philosophical way.
>
> He wants us to understand "the world" as the totality of facts.
>
> > Or, I am baffled by what a fact would be
> > if it is not simply a true statement.
>
> I think he would say that it a fact that makes a statement true (or
> false)--it's not itself the true statement.
>
> > But true statements don't exist
> > in any straightforward way.
> >
> > I'm not attempting to push W into any particular view, it's just that an
> > assumption of idealism would make the introductory statements a lot
> > easier to swallow.
>
> I don't see that, actually.
>
> > And we know of W's fascination with solipsism, which
> > most interpreters take to mean (for W) much the same as idealism.
> >
> > An ordinary person would take facts to be true statements (that's what
> > the dictionaries say)
>
> Again, I don't think the true statements ARE the facts, they are what,
> to follow W's usage, is mirrored by true statements.
>
> > but if you want to interpret W in a realist way,
> > then aren't you supposing that facts are something different? If so,
> > what are they?
>
> They are what make true statements true--in W's view, ultimately
> configurations of simple objects.
>
> W
>
>
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