Popping in and out today, I thought I'd already responded to this, but it's not here so maybe I wasn't sufficiently intentional when I thought I responded! --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > > --- On Fri, 3/19/10, SWM <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > > > Dennett's point about "intentionality" strikes me as pretty > > sharp. There is nothing there in an important sense. > > He's an eliminativist, as I've said. He denies the reality of intentionality, > albeit in a subtle fashion. For this reason he sees no important difference > between Kasparov and Deep Blue. Also for this reason he calls Searle a > dualist. But to eliminative materialists like Dennett, everyone looks like a > dualist, including many (sane) materialists like Searle. > Dennett is talking about how we should talk about what it means to be intentional, i.e., we should not suppose there is something there, to be pointed at, that is intentional. But that doesn't mean we cannot describe ourselves or others as intentional. He calls Searle a dualist for the same reason I do, that it's implicit in the CRA. Why should more of the same not be enough? Because it's the wrong stuff. Why is it wrong? Because, Searle says, look at it and you'll see there's no understanding there. But this hinges on the assumption that, for the CR's constituents to be the right stuff they must be seen to have understanding in the first place. But this implies that understanding cannot be reduced to things going on that would not count as understanding! > Funny thing about it is that Dennett in his rush to avoid the stigma of > dualism makes himself into one. In fact many materialists do. More later... > > -gts > Others here had suggested the same. Can you explain how to hold Dennett's position that consciousness is just a function of certain processes performing certain tasks implies anything dualistic? Thanks. SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/