[Wittrs] Re: Who beat Kasparov?

  • From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2010 11:00:11 -0700 (PDT)

> Dennett is talking about how we should talk about what it
> means to be intentional, i.e., we should not suppose there
> is something there, to be pointed at, that is intentional.
> But that doesn't mean we cannot describe ourselves or others
> as intentional.

When I look at your words above in the context of our discussion about the 
chess match between DB and K, I see that in the first sentence you say we 
should not "point at" Kasparov as intentional. We should not suppose Kasparov 
has beliefs, desires, and other intentional states. But then in the next 
sentence you say that you do not mean by this that should cannot describe 
Kasparov as intentional. Again, I think you need to make up your mind. 

> He calls Searle a dualist for the same reason I do, that
> it's implicit in the CRA. Why should more of the same not be
> enough? Because it's the wrong stuff. Why is it wrong?
> Because, Searle says, look at it and you'll see there's no
> understanding there.

You misrepresent his argument.

There exists no understanding in the CR, Stuart, because *syntax by itself does 
not give semantics*. This is a fact in organic brains, including yours, just as 
it is a fact in computers. 



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