--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > > Dennett is talking about how we should talk about what it > > means to be intentional, i.e., we should not suppose there > > is something there, to be pointed at, that is intentional. > > But that doesn't mean we cannot describe ourselves or others > > as intentional. > > When I look at your words above in the context of our discussion about the > chess match between DB and K, I see that in the first sentence you say we > should not "point at" Kasparov as intentional. We should not suppose Kasparov > has beliefs, desires, and other intentional states. But then in the next > sentence you say that you do not mean by this that should cannot describe > Kasparov as intentional. Again, I think you need to make up your mind. > I think that's a mistake. It's just different ways of understanding the same terms. Think Wittgenstein! > > He calls Searle a dualist for the same reason I do, that > > it's implicit in the CRA. Why should more of the same not be > > enough? Because it's the wrong stuff. Why is it wrong? > > Because, Searle says, look at it and you'll see there's no > > understanding there. > > You misrepresent his argument. > > There exists no understanding in the CR, Stuart, because *syntax by itself > does not give semantics*. This is a fact in organic brains, including yours, > just as it is a fact in computers. > > -gts > Then your conclusion is already built into the argument and it's circular in which case it's not logically valid. You do have the intuition you are expressing here, no doubt about it. But if Searle were just making an argument on intuition he would have no need to lay out logical steps as he does. The third premise is not a foregone conclusion and it's the point of the CR to show us its truth. But it doesn't do that unless you already believe it in which case the CR fails to convince and the CRA adds nothing. SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/