--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > > --- On Fri, 3/19/10, SWM <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > > > Dennett's point about "intentionality" strikes me as pretty > > sharp. There is nothing there in an important sense. > > He's an eliminativist, as I've said. The question is, what does it mean to be an eliminativist? Is he merely saying we're talking about this in the wrong way (as I see him doing) or is he saying there's really no such thing as mind, consciousness, etc., as you and many others seem to see him doing? > He denies the reality of intentionality, albeit in a subtle fashion. For this > reason he sees no important difference between Kasparov and Deep Blue. Not in the context of that example, no. And I agree with his way of addressing it. > Also for this reason he calls Searle a dualist. But to eliminative > materialists like Dennett, everyone looks like a dualist, including many > (sane) materialists like Searle. > Except Searle is in self-contradiction because of his CRA. I call Searle a dualist for that reason and did so before reading Dennett, however I think Dennett sees the same thing I have referred to. > Funny thing about it is that Dennett in his rush to avoid the stigma of > dualism makes himself into one. In fact many materialists do. More later... > > -gts > > I'd like to see the argument that makes Dennett a dualist (though I think others have made it here before -- but let's see your take on it). Thanks. SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/