--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote: > SWM wrote: > >The third premise says: "Syntax does not constitute and is not > >sufficient for semantics". > > >My point is that Searle's third premise can be read two ways: > >As a claim of non-identity (which IS self-evidently true) and as a > >claim of non-causality which depends on the conception of consciousness > the third premise should be read as making *both* claims. it is a > complex proposition and is equivalent to *both* "Syntax does not > constitute semantics" and "Syntax is not sufficient for semantics" > The point is that one claim IS self-evidently true (which is what Searle claims for it) while the other is not and, in fact, could only be true in the context of the CRA if the CR demonstrated that understanding could never be derived from what Searle calls "syntactical" operations. By conflating the two claims, the appearance of self-evidential truth covers over the lack of real evidence that consciousness is not derivable from anything syntactical and leads the reader to carry that conflation into the conclusion. The conclusion requires the causal claim to be true and there is nothing in the CR that demonstrates that but an assumption that is fundamentally dualist in its way of conceiving consciousness. > the first of these asserts the non-identity claim, while the second > asserts the non-causality claim (actually insufficiency of causation > would be better). > And non-identity does not imply non-causality, therefore the non-identity claim, in fact, has no relevance to the conclusion of the CRA. > >Searle needs a claim of non-causality to make the CRA's conclusion > >true > > he's got one. > > Joe > He needs the claim to be true for the conclusion to be. Otherwise all he's done is papered over the gap between the two meanings in the dual use terms. SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/