[Wittrs] The Alleged 4th Premise: Is the CRA Valid?
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 05:51:51 -0400
SWM wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>SWM wrote:
>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>>>in any case, your claim was that the CRA is invalid due to an
>>>>equivocation.
>>>The equivocation serves to mask the trick, as it were, to create a
>>>kind of illusion that a truism has been discovered.
>>>But that the deeper problem lies in the assumption that the CR
>>>demonstrates that understanding cannot occur if it isn't found in the
>>>constituent elements making up the CR. The equivocation serves to
>>>mask the trick, as it were, to create a kind of illusion that a
>>>truism has been discovered. But because non-identity does not imply
>>>non-causality and because the third premise can be read as both a
>>>claim of non-identity and a claim of non-causality, we are snookered
>>>into accepting a false implication.
you haven't shown that there is an equivocation. let alone that it masks
an illusion.
all you have shown is that the third axiom can be broken down into two
statements neither of which contradicts the other. you've not shown any
ambiguity of meaning in any of the terms that the two statements share,
let alone how that makes an unsound argument appear sound (the essence
of the fallacy of equivocation according to
http://www.fallacyfiles.org/equivoqu.html).
>>I agree that the third premise makes both a claim of non-identity and
>>a claim of non-causality; and, that non-identity does not imply
>>non-causality; but, I don't understand how we are snookered just
>>because both these claims are true.
>Searle says premise #3 is true and self-evidently so. But only the
>identity reading is self-evidently true while Searle needs the causal
>reading to be true and that isn't self-evidently true at all but
>depends on a certain understanding of consciousness which reflects a
>dualistic presumption, namely that, for consciousness to be present in
>the CR, one or more of its constituent processes must be seen to be
>conscious. But that presumption isn't self-evidently true because
>consciousness could be a system property and, if so, then the CR could
>be conscious if it could do more things in a certain way (as brains
>do). So the deeper problem with the CRA is the dualistic issue but this
>isn't noticed because the third premise gives the appearance of being
>true because of the conflation of the two readings: one that is
>self-evidently true and one that isn't.
it seems that the Mirsky FUD (Fallacy of Untyped Dualism) has returned
from the depths of the quagmire of ambiguity.
the claim that Searle's TATA (the Third Axiom is True Argument) has a
dualistic presumption is the crucial move in this version of the FUD;
and, interestingly enough, contains a genuine equivocation concerning
the meaning of 'dualism'.
in Searle's version of the CRT, understanding is or has an experiential
component; and, neither the man nor the room as a whole understands
chinese.
in the Dennett/Mirsky version of the CRT, the room has been 'up-specked'
but the bar has been lowered. 'understanding' has been redefined so that
it has no experiential component. understanding is attributed to the
room when it is functionally equivalent to a human who understands
chinese (per Searle's definition).
according to Searle, it is not enough to explain the third-person
measurable aspects of understanding; one must also explain the
first-person experiential aspects of understanding as well. this is
phenomenological dualism. this is the dualism that the TATA assumes:
that there is subjective experience that must be accounted for.
it is not necessary to presuppose Cartesian style interactive substance
dualism in order to explain phenomenological dualism; so, the TATA does
not presuppose such an explanation.
however, the FUD begins by recognizing that Searle is a dualist because
he insists on an explanation for phenomenological dualism. once Searle
is classified as a dualism of some sort, it continues by redefining
'dualism' (the equivocation) to mean 'substance dualism' (as expressed
in your latest jargon). it concludes by claiming that Searle is a
Cartesian style interactive substance dualist.
>The point of philosophy, of course, is to wring out ambiguities which
>lead to confusions and logical mistakes when we find them.
quite true; but, do your own words apply to you as well?
if so; then, it's time to man up.
just recognizing that there is subjective experience that a philosophy
of consciousness must account for is dualism; but, it is not substance
dualism.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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