[Wittrs] Re: The Alleged 4th Premise: Is the CRA Valid?
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 07 Apr 2010 01:46:15 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>
>
> where does Searle claim the third premise is self-evidently true;
Either in Language, Mind and Society or Minds, Brains and Science.
and,
> what makes you think that an argument that the third premise is true
> requires that it be self-evidently true?
>
Searle, since his point is derived from what he tells us is obvious in the CR.
If the premises in question are true for different reasons then you have to
make the case for that, i.e., with other steps and premises, other thought
experiments, or empirical data, etc.
> in any case, your claim was that the CRA is invalid due to an
> equivocation.
>
But that the deeper problem lies in the assumption that the CR demonstrates
that understanding cannot occur if it isn't found in the constituent elements
making up the CR. The equivocation serves to mask the trick, as it were, to
create a kind of illusion that a truism has been discovered. But because
non-identity does not imply non-causality and because the third premise can be
read as both a claim of non-identity and a claim of non-causality, we are
snookered into accepting a false implication.
> [Stuart]: I did confuse it at one point in my response (I said "valid
> argument" when I meant "true conclusion". But here I did mean "valid"
> when I said "valid" since my point was that the equivocal nature of the
> terms of the third premise does undermine the validity of the CRA.
>
> [Stuart]: my point about the equivocation in the third premise's terms
> does go to the question of the form of the argument, i.e., that the
> third premise does double duty and so is really two different claims
> conflated in the same terms. This is the fallacy of equivocation and an
> argument that carries a fallacy is not, by definition, valid.
>
> in my last post in this thread, I pointed out that there was no
> equivocation; that the third premise just made 2 claims.
>
> your reply consists entirely of material challenging the *truth* of the
> third premise; so, it certainly looks like you've abandoned the claim
> that the CRA is invalid.
>
No. I have been quite explicit here that there are two issues, both
equivocation and a wrong underlying conception of mind.
> is that true?
>
> if not, how do you rehabilitate the claim that there is an equivocation
> in the third premise?
>
> Joe
>
It doesn't need to be rehabilitated. Your reading of it as a claim of
non-identity AND non-causality conjoined misses the point that the terms on
both sides of the "AND" can be read both ways because "constitute" and
"sufficient for" can BOTH be read as relating to an identity and a causal claim.
SWM
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