--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote: > SWM wrote: > > >Joseph Polanik wrote: > > >>Gordon Swobe wrote: > > >>>Here we see the logical structure of Searle's formal argument as > >>>given in his article in Scientific American that I referenced > >>>earlier. > > >>>(A1) Programs are formal (syntactic). > >>>(A2) Minds have mental contents (semantics). > >>>(A3) Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for > >>>semantics. (This is what the Chinese room experiment shows.) > > >>>(C1) Programs are neither constitutive of nor sufficient for minds. > > >>>(This conclusion should follow without controversy from the first > >>>three axioms.) > > >>C1 *does* follow from the first three axioms alone. > > >>the controversy that Stuart is promoting does not concern the validity > >>of the argument. it concerns the grounds for thinking that A3 is true. > > >Let me congratulate you Joe for accurately parsing the argument this > >time although I think you overstate the case when you say my point does > >not concern the validity of the argument since it actually does ... > > you are confusing validity and truth. > Actually you're right but not in this part of what I said. I did confuse it at one point in my response (I said "valid argument" when I meant "true conclusion". But here I did mean "valid" when I said "valid" since my point was that the equivocal nature of the terms of the third premise does undermine the validity of the CRA. But that is a separate issue from whether the third premise itself can be said to be true in the context of the given argument. The truth of the third premise depends on whether a particular way of conceiving consciousness is the ONLY way it can be conceived or whether there are some factual issues that may affect this (in Searle's argument there aren't). > validity just concerns the form of the argument, its logical structure. > if the conclusion follows from the premises by valid steps, then the > argument is valid --- irregardless of whether the premises are true. > Once again, I have to thank you for the logic lesson which you always stand ready to provide, I see. However, my point about the equivocation in the third premise's terms does go to the question of the form of the argument, i.e., that the third premise does double duty and so is really two different claims conflated in the same terms. This is the fallacy of equivocation and an argument that carries a fallacy is not, by definition, valid. > arguments about validity are internal to the argument; so, if you claim > it is invalid you should be able to show that without dragging in > speculations about Searle's psyche and any latent dualistic tendencies > you think he might have. > As I have noted, I have distinguished between my claim about the form of the third premise and the truth or falsity of its content. A rigorous logician like yourself ought to see that. > if you have a claim as to validity, now would be a good time to make it. > See above (and read my numerous past comments on the equivocation in the third premise, both on this list and on the prior one where we have each participated). > >... with regard to the fallacy of equivocation that I have said I've > >detected in the third premise. > > the fallacy of equivocation involves using a word in two ways during the > course of the argument. if you think that there is an equivocation in > the third premise; then, would you kindly specify which word in the > third premise is used equivocally and describe the two meanings > involved? > > Joe > Actually the issue is one of terms, not words, where "terms" may mean any set of words that describes or denotes something. I suppose I should now conclude you have missed this particular issue then, despite your past close readings of my critique of the CRA? Here it is, once again, then: The third premise says: "Syntax does not constitute and is not sufficient for semantics". I have said that there are two ways to read this. Searle asserts that the third premise is trivially true, self-evident based on the CR. I have noted that reading this premise in a certain way is self-evidently true, as Searle claims: If syntax is not the same as semantics (non-identical), then it is self-evidently true that to say we have an instance of syntax is not to say we have an instance of semantics. Thus syntax does not constitute and is not sufficient for semantics in the sense that syntax is not the same as semantics. Instances of syntax do not constitute instances of semantics and it is never sufficient to say we have an instance of semantics just because we have an instance of syntax. However, the claim of the CRA is a claim of non-causality (since, for Searle, brains "cause" consciousness while the point of the CRA is to show that computers can't do what brains do). But non-identity has no implication for causality questions, i.e., non-identity does not imply non-causality. My point is that Searle's third premise can be read two ways: As a claim of non-identity (which IS self-evidently true) and as a claim of non-causality which depends on the conception of consciousness I have already linked to Searle's statements about the CR and which is not obviously true -- unless one thinks of consciousness in a certain way, i.e., a way in which we are NOT compelled to think of it. Thus, the self-evident nature of the non-identity claim masks the fact that a non-causality claim, which is not self-evident, is being made. Put a little differently, Searle's third premise, which he tells us is self-evidently true, is only so in terms of identity. But Searle needs a claim of non-causality to make the CRA's conclusion true and the third premise is not self-evidently true in terms of causality (BECAUSE THE CR DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT CONSCIOUSNESS CAN ONLY BE UNDERSTOOD AS A PROCESS PROPERTY). SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/