[Wittrs] Re: The Alleged 4th Premise: Is the CRA Valid?
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 09 Apr 2010 12:24:08 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
> SWM wrote:
>
<snip>
The equivocation serves to
> >>>mask the trick, as it were, to create a kind of illusion that a
> >>>truism has been discovered. But because non-identity does not imply
> >>>non-causality and because the third premise can be read as both a
> >>>claim of non-identity and a claim of non-causality, we are snookered
> >>>into accepting a false implication.
>
> you haven't shown that there is an equivocation. let alone that it masks
> an illusion.
>
I've made my case. You find it unconvincing. What else is new? I certainly
didn't expect you to say, 'aha, I see your point'! Given your track record
here, that was never in the cards.
If anyone else's being right about anything on lists like these depended on
your acknowledgment, no one but you could ever hope to be right about anything!
> all you have shown is that the third axiom can be broken down into two
> statements neither of which contradicts the other. you've not shown any
> ambiguity of meaning in any of the terms that the two statements share,
> let alone how that makes an unsound argument appear sound (the essence
> of the fallacy of equivocation according to
> http://www.fallacyfiles.org/equivoqu.html).
>
I've shown how the two readings lead to different conclusions and how the text
CAN be read in the two ways AND that the conclusion of the argument depends on
the truth of one reading when only the other one can be considered to be true,
absent empirical or other evidence (which is, indeed, absent in the CR -- the
scenario on which the CRA depends).
For the rest . . . well, I suppose you can figure it out if you try. If not,
that's fine, too.
> >>I agree that the third premise makes both a claim of non-identity and
> >>a claim of non-causality; and, that non-identity does not imply
> >>non-causality; but, I don't understand how we are snookered just
> >>because both these claims are true.
>
> >Searle says premise #3 is true and self-evidently so. But only the
> >identity reading is self-evidently true while Searle needs the causal
> >reading to be true and that isn't self-evidently true at all but
> >depends on a certain understanding of consciousness which reflects a
> >dualistic presumption, namely that, for consciousness to be present in
> >the CR, one or more of its constituent processes must be seen to be
> >conscious.
> > But that presumption isn't self-evidently true because
> >consciousness could be a system property and, if so, then the CR could
> >be conscious if it could do more things in a certain way (as brains
> >do). So the deeper problem with the CRA is the dualistic issue but this
> >isn't noticed because the third premise gives the appearance of being
> >true because of the conflation of the two readings: one that is
> >self-evidently true and one that isn't.
>
> it seems that the Mirsky FUD (Fallacy of Untyped Dualism) has returned
> from the depths of the quagmire of ambiguity.
>
Whatever. I suppose you have now devised a way to recast my words in some
Polanikian "1,2,3" system, too, eh?
> the claim that Searle's TATA (the Third Axiom is True Argument) has a
> dualistic presumption is the crucial move in this version of the FUD;
> and, interestingly enough, contains a genuine equivocation concerning
> the meaning of 'dualism'.
>
You go to a lot of trouble to devise these faux logic strategms of yours, don't
you?
> in Searle's version of the CRT, understanding is or has an experiential
> component; and, neither the man nor the room as a whole understands
> chinese.
>
> in the Dennett/Mirsky version of the CRT, the room has been 'up-specked'
> but the bar has been lowered. 'understanding' has been redefined so that
> it has no experiential component.
Simply false and reflective of a complete misreading, of both me and Dennett.
However, with this conjunction I am in good company since there is no shame in
being lumped in with Dennett.
> understanding is attributed to the
> room when it is functionally equivalent to a human who understands
> chinese (per Searle's definition).
>
> according to Searle, it is not enough to explain the third-person
> measurable aspects of understanding; one must also explain the
> first-person experiential aspects of understanding as well. this is
> phenomenological dualism. this is the dualism that the TATA assumes:
> that there is subjective experience that must be accounted for.
>
I have quite given up that you will get the point so I won't even try to
explain it yet again.
> it is not necessary to presuppose Cartesian style interactive substance
> dualism in order to explain phenomenological dualism; so, the TATA does
> not presuppose such an explanation.
>
Even Searle would think you miss the point when you tell us that
"phenomenological dualism" (your term, apparently, for "property dualism") is
at the heart of Searle's claim. Even he will tell you he is not a dualist
because to be a dualist is to believe in at least two underlying ontological
basics (which he calls, with traditional philosophy, "substance dualism") and
he claims not to (though, as I've suggested, I think he implicitly does).
But there's no sense in my responding to you re: this because it won't
penetrate anyway, will it?
> however, the FUD begins by recognizing that Searle is a dualist because
> he insists on an explanation for phenomenological dualism. once Searle
> is classified as a dualism of some sort, it continues by redefining
> 'dualism' (the equivocation) to mean 'substance dualism' (as expressed
> in your latest jargon).
Not like your use of silly acronyms and various Polanik-devised terms I
suppose. It's a good thing you're free of such insidious tendencies, eh?
> it concludes by claiming that Searle is a
> Cartesian style interactive substance dualist.
>
> >The point of philosophy, of course, is to wring out ambiguities which
> >lead to confusions and logical mistakes when we find them.
>
> quite true; but, do your own words apply to you as well?
>
> if so; then, it's time to man up.
>
No need where you're concerned, Joe. First you wouldn't understand anyway and
second, if you did, you wouldn't admit to doing so but would only continue to
invest your time and energy in a desperate search for new ways to make the same
old mistakes. I think I'll leave you to commune with others on this list
hereafter.
> just recognizing that there is subjective experience that a philosophy
> of consciousness must account for is dualism; but, it is not substance
> dualism.
>
> Joe
Thinking that the only way to account for subjective experience is by positing
the non-reduction of subjective experience to anything other than itself is
dualism and the fact that you can't conceive of any other alternative and must
fall back on this amply demonstrates where you stand, given your frantic, and
often virtriolic, efforts to save this position.
SWM
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