[Wittrs] Re: The Alleged 4th Premise: Is the CRA Valid?
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 07 Apr 2010 12:59:22 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
> SWM wrote:
>
> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
> >>where does Searle claim the third premise is self-evidently true;
>
> >Either in Language, Mind and Society or Minds, Brains and Science.
>
> when you find it, let us know.
>
I don't planb to go back and look for it. Why would I need I to?
> >>what makes you think that an argument that the third premise is true
> >>requires that it be self-evidently true?
>
> >Searle, since his point is derived from what he tells us is obvious in
> >the CR. If the premises in question are true for different reasons then
> >you have to make the case for that, i.e., with other steps and
> >premises, other thought experiments, or empirical data, etc.
>
> obviously, if you make a claim you have to support your claim; but,
> claiming that X is true does not require you to prove that X is
> self-evidently true.
>
Well Searle said it but let's say he didn't. He still relies on the CR to
demonstrate what he claims in the CRA. He doesn't invoke any real world
empirical experimental studies or any arguments about mathematical formalism,
quantum mechanics applicability to categorizing the world in three classes (I,
II, and III), etc.
> >>in any case, your claim was that the CRA is invalid due to an
> >>equivocation.
>
> >But that the deeper problem lies in the assumption that the CR
> >demonstrates that understanding cannot occur if it isn't found in the
> >constituent elements making up the CR. The equivocation serves to mask
> >the trick, as it were, to create a kind of illusion that a truism has
> >been discovered. But because non-identity does not imply non-causality
> >and because the third premise can be read as both a claim of
> >non-identity and a claim of non-causality, we are snookered into
> >accepting a false implication.
>
> we need to unpack this vaguely incoherent verbiage.
>
I wouldn't talk about incoherence if I were in your shoes, having given us von
Neumanesque I, II and III categories which you proceeded to translate into your
1, 2 and 3 categories to sustain a claim you never managed to state very
clearly or explicitly at all.
> what implication are we snookered into accepting; and, how do you know
> it is false?
>
I already spelled it all out, numerous times. Go back and read what I have
written previously on this point. I don't plan to constantly repeat myself
because you either don't remember, don't read or don't understand what I've
already said here.
> I agree that the third premise makes both a claim of non-identity and a
> claim of non-causality; and, that non-identity does not imply
> non-causality; but, I don't understand how we are snookered jut because
> both these claims are true.
>
Searle says premise #3 is true and self-evidently so. But only the identity
reading is self-evidently true while Searle needs the causal reading to be true
and that isn't self-evidently true at all but depends on a certain
understanding of consciousness which reflects a dualistic presumption, namely
that, for consciousness to be present in the CR, one or more of its constituent
processes must be seen to be conscious. But that presumption isn't
self-evidently true because consciousness could be a system property and, if
so, then the CR could be conscious if it could do more things in a certain way
(as brains do). So the deeper problem with the CRA is the dualistic issue but
this isn't noticed because the third premise gives the appearance of being true
because of the conflation of the two readings: one that is self-evidently true
and one that isn't.
> there is no equivocation in the third premise except the one you are
> trying to read into it. see below.
>
> are you saying that the CRA presumes or that it concludes that
> "understanding cannot occur if it isn't found in the constituent
> elements making up the CR"?
The CRA's conclusion, which generalizes the case of the CR to all possible Rs,
depends on the presumption that consciousness cannot be found in any R because
it isn't found in the constituent elements of the CR. Of course, if the only
reason it's missing is because it's a system property, not a property of any of
the constituent processes, then the CR may just, in fact, be underspecked as a
thesis like Dennett's argues it is. In that case, the CR does not provide a
basis for the general conclusion.
> or are you saying that the Third Axiom is
> True Argument, TATA,
What IS it with you and acronyms?
>presumes or concludes that "understanding cannot
> occur if it isn't found in the constituent elements making up the CR"?
>
> if either, which is it, presumes or concludes?
>
See above. The conclusion depends on a certain way of thinking about
consciousness, i.e., a presumption about what consciousness is.
> >>in my last post in this thread, I pointed out that there was no
> >>equivocation; that the third premise just made 2 claims.
>
> >>your reply consists entirely of material challenging the *truth* of
> >>the third premise; so, it certainly looks like you've abandoned the
> >>claim that the CRA is invalid.
>
> >No. I have been quite explicit here that there are two issues, both
> >equivocation and a wrong underlying conception of mind.
>
> >>is that true?
>
> >>if not, how do you rehabilitate the claim that there is an
> >>equivocation in the third premise?
>
> >It doesn't need to be rehabilitated. Your reading of it as a claim of
> >non-identity AND non-causality conjoined misses the point that the
> >terms on both sides of the "AND" can be read both ways because
> >"constitute" and "sufficient for" can BOTH be read as relating to an
> >identity and a causal claim.
>
> that is your equivocation, not Searle's.
>
It's Searle's premise, not mine. His words, not mine.
> the grammatical form of A3 ("Syntax does not constitute and is not
> sufficient for semantics") allows it to be broken down into two
> statements:
>
> [S1] "Syntax does not constitute semantics"; and,
> [S2] "Syntax is not sufficient for semantics"
>
> we have the two claims that A3 makes:
>
> [C1] the 'non-identity claim'; and,
> [C2] the 'non-causality claim'.
>
Both can be read as non-identity AND non-causality where the first meets
Searle's claim that it is self-evidently true and the second does not.
> now the sensible thing to do is to read A3 so that S1 asserts C1 and S2
> asserts C2.
>
> you, on the other hand, create an equivocation by insisting that you
> read A3 so that S1 asserts both C1 and C2 and S2 asserts both C1 and C2.
>
I read what's written.
> that is *your* equivocation, not Searle's, and serves no purpose other
> than reducing philosophical discourse to a quagmire of ambiguity.
>
> Joe
>
The text of the premise is Searle's not mine. I can't help it if he wrote it in
such a way that ambiguity is introduced. The point of philosophy, of course, is
to wring out ambiguities which lead to confusions and logical mistakes when we
find them. Identifying and explaining such ambiguities, where they exist,
should not be confused with introducing them. It's the fact that the text is
initially hard to unpack that makes it an ambiguity or confusion after all. If
it were easy, no one would be fooled by it, so it's a strange move to blame the
messenger as it were, but I guess it's one I should have expected in this case,
given your past strategms in these discussions.
SWM
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