[Wittrs] Re: The Alleged 4th Premise: Alternate Grounds for the Third Premise
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 07 Apr 2010 01:37:25 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
> SWM wrote:
>
> >Joseph Polanik wrote:
>
> >>you are confusing and conflating validity and truth again.
>
> >>arguments about the validity of an argument need not send out for
> >>external evidence; but, arguments for and against the truth of the
> >>premises of an argument must do so.
>
> >My argument is that the CRA does not demonstrate its conclusion. It
> >fails because
>
> >1) at least one key premise is not demonstrably true as derived from
> >the CR; and
>
> >2) the CRA as an argument is invalid because that same premise
> >incorporates an equivocation that purports to show one thing but really
> >shows another.
>
> >>there are grounds unrelated to the CRA Presumption for believing
> >>that syntax does not constitute and is not sufficient for
> >>semantics.
>
> >Nevertheless, they are not part of Searle's CR which is the basis for
> >the claims made in the CRA.
>
> and, therefore ... what?
>
And therefore the CRA does not contain within it premises based on empirical
research or other kinds of arguments. It is made based on the three premises
cited by Searle. If any of them fail to do what he claims for them, the
conclusions he says they lead to do not hold.
> a deductive argument stands on its own as far as its validity is
> concerned. the CRT supports not the CRA but the argument that A3 is
> true. there is no rule against looking for additional evidence
> elsewhere.
>
The CR is a scenario (a thought experiment), not an argument. The CRA is the
argument developed from the CR. An important distinction.
If you make another argument then you have to develop other premises or
supports for the existing premises. But then it isn't the CRA anymore. We are
only talking here about the success or failure of the CRA.
> <snip> . . . the point that's relevant in the current
> >>context is that mathematicians acknowledge that attributing semantics
> >>to syntax is an operation separate from manipulation of the syntax.
>
> >And how does that show that what Searle calls "syntax" cannot cause
> >"semantics"?
>
> the premise of formalism is similar if not identical to Searle's A3;
> but, it doesn't depend for its validity on an alleged equivocation; and,
> it doesn't depend for its truth on an assumption of Cartesian style
> interactive substance dualism.
>
> Joe
>
>
We already acknowledge that syntax is not the same as semantics, i.e., they are
not identical. Saying that "attributing semantics to syntax is an operation
separate from syntax" does not preclude that the attribution of meaning
(semantics) is itself a function of syntactical operations. Non-identity does
not imply non-causality unless you make the same mistake Searle makes of
thinking that for "syntax" to "cause" "semantics" the semantics must already be
present in the syntax. But there is no reason to assume that.
SWM
=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
Other related posts:
