[Wittrs] What would Wittgenstein have said?
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 02 Apr 2010 00:13:28 -0000
It seems to me that on a Wittgenstein list we have been somehow hijacked by an
approach to philosophy that seems to be very unWittgensteinian. As I have said
in the past, I don't think we ought to be slaves to Wittgeinsteinian ideas but,
rather open, to all ideas (at least to consider them on the merits), nor do I
think we should simply abandon traditional philosophy because Wittgenstein, in
some of his more assertive moments, proclaimed that classical philosophy had
gone the way of the dodo once one undertook to think of philosophical issues as
he did. In fact, I think he was somewhat right about it though. Much of what
philosophers of a traditional bent expend their energy on is stuff Wittgenstein
would probably have looked askance at.
Our ongoing debates about the relative merits of Searle's and Dennett's views
of consciousness, and the ideas of others (like Chalmers, Strawson, Fodor,
Hauser, et al) often seem to be nearly pointless, especially when they descend
into metaphysical disputes over what the world really is. Of course we cannot
know except in a somewhat instrumentalist way (what seems to work) because all
affirmative speculation, once we go beyond the hard sciences, is just so many
ideas without a basis for distinguishing truth from falsehood.
Yet major thinkers in this area, like Searle and Dennett, both claim to have
taken some influence from Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's insights into how
language works, especially his remarks on the impossibility of private
language, have a bearing on questions of consciousness (though sometimes it
seems recognizing the particularly difficult terrain of the mental landscape
for language doesn't seem to have much impact on those of us keen to traverse
it).
Would Wittgenstein have troubled much about questions of consciousness? Well
it's fair to say he would have asked what we mean by the term in various
contexts, how is the word actually used, etc. I think he would have done
something much like Sean attempted earlier on in these discussions, i.e., he
would have said that a lot of this debate comes down to identifying and
clarifying the different uses we are each making of the terms in question
("consciousness", "mind", "intentionality", "awareness", "understanding",
"thoughts", "thinking", "belief", "feeling", "memory", "representing",
"hoping", "willing", etc., etc.). There's plenty in the words alone to explore
so why isn't that enough?
I think someone like Dennett is doing genuinely useful stuff by offering a way
of understanding what we mean by "consciousness" that is consistent with a
scientific worldview. It doesn't mean he's right except insofar as his approach
coheres with that of modern science. He is saying, in essence, that this is
what philosophy can do in this arena: show us how a scientific approach to
analyzing what consciousness is all about could work. Dennett doesn't maintain
(at least to my knowledge) that he is certainly right about how consciousness
works. He only says he is right about this being a way to conceive of
consciousness that captures and accounts for all the features our ordinary ways
of talking about mind suggest are relevant.
Searle takes a more traditionally philosophic view with his formal argument
from the Chinese Room (even if it is deeply mistaken on my view) but his
approach, which does try to step out of the existing linguistic categories and
modes of classification, also seems to partake of Wittgenstein though I think
Dennett's effort is finally doomed by his attachment to the idea of
first-personness.
Searle, it seems to me, has inspired a very strong cadre of believers and
supporters but I am unaware that Dennett has done the same. On most lists I
have found that Dennett is generally attacked while Searle almost revered. I
find that especially fascinating since I think it's so clear that Searle is
deeply mistaken while Dennett is just the clearer thinker. This has led me to
think that the ongoing Dennett vs. Searle debate is at least in part a dispute
between partisans (on at least one side). How would Wittgenstein have managed
to stop this seemingly endless tussle? Could he have done it? Does his approach
to philosophy enable us to find a way to cut the Gordian knot of competing
belief systems in a way that enables us to "go on"?
If Wittgenstein's contribution to philosophy was as earth shaking as many of
his admirers have thought, oughtn't we able to find something in his work that
brings the endless arguments to heel? Or are we doomed, even on a
Wittgenstein-oriented list, to simply soldier on forever with logical claims
vs. claims about logic and metaphysical disputes about underlying ontological
"facts"?
SWM
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