[Wittrs] Re: The Alleged 4th Premise: Alternate Grounds for the Third Premise
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 01 Apr 2010 18:57:50 -0000
I'm going to snip here because there's a lot of redundancy. I will try not to
snip out anything that is needed to follow the arguments here however (and rely
on Sean's past assurances that prior commentary can be viewed easily in the
tree by those not using the Yahoo format):
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
>
<snip>
>
> you are confusing and conflating validity and truth again.
>
> arguments about the validity of an argument need not send out for
> external evidence; but, arguments for and against the truth of the
> premises of an argument must do so.
>
Once again I must thank you for your frequent lessons in logic. My response:
My argument is that the CRA does not demonstrate its conclusion. It fails
because
1) at least one key premise is not demonstrably true as derived from the CR; and
2) the CRA as an argument is invalid because that same premise incorporates an
equivocation that purports to show one thing but really shows another.
> >>I pointed out a few days ago that "there are grounds unrelated to the
> >>CRA Presumption for believing that syntax does not constitute and is
> >>not sufficient for semantics".
>
> >I have repeatedly agreed that there MIGHT be empirical reasons to
> >think of consciousness in a dualist way and/or for believing that
> >computer processes were just the wrong sort to produce consciousness,
> >either of which would have the effect of sustaining the CRA's
> >conclusion.
>
> true enough; but, the alternate grounds that I supplied came from
> mathematics rather than science.
>
Nevertheless, they are not part of Searle's CR which is the basis for the
claims made in the CRA.
> again, from the wikipedia article I quoted: "According to formalism, the
> truths expressed in logic and mathematics are not about numbers, sets,
> or triangles or any other contensive subject matter - in fact, they
> aren't 'about' anything at all. They are syntactic forms whose shapes
> and locations have no meaning unless they are given an interpretation
> (or semantics)."
>
And how does that show that what Searle calls "syntax" cannot cause "semantics"?
> now, Hilbert's attempt to reduce all of mathematics to syntactical
> transformations failed; but, the point that's relevant in the current
> context is that mathematicians acknowledge that attributing semantics to
> syntax is an operation separate from manipulation of the syntax.
>
I am reminded of Neils remarks to you about chocolate ice cream.
> if mathematicians are right about that; then, there are grounds
> unrelated to the CR for believing that the CRA's third premise is true
>
> Joe
>
If the grounds are unrelated to the CR it is a different argument than the CRA.
Of course, we are here discussing the validity of the CRA as well as whether IT
proves its conclusion. This has nothing to do with whether there are other
arguments, either empirical or mathematical though, frankly, I find your
mathematical "argument" as confused as I found your argument from von Neumann's
categorization of things into three groups labeled "I,II and III", which you
informed us you had recast as your categories "1,2 and 3". That was a claim
which, when unpacked, was found to lead nowhere with regard to demonstrating
the truth of dualism UNLESS, of course, one already believed in dualism. But in
that case the argument failed because of circularity.
SWM
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