[lit-ideas] Re: On being called a Lyre
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2008 15:50:16 -0230
Well that certainly was an interesting and educational seminar on David Hume.
We
should thank RP, Phil and Chris Bruce for their enlightening contributions to
the hermeneutic question of Hume interpretation.
The quotations and translations confirm for me that Hume understands "custom"
within a conceptual skein that includes "habit," "common sense," "sentiments of
the mind," (bearing close connection to Smith's "sentiments of the impartial
spectator") and expectations or predictions of the future based on given and
past social practices. As a whole, this conceptual network seems to refer to a
disposition to accept the authority of tradition in such matters as morals and
politics - domains which, if Hume is to be believed, do not permit of logical
or scientific demonstration, or, indeed of reasoning as such.
This authority seems to me to be clearly social or collective. I think Phil's
interpretation of Hume's "custom" here is preferable to RP's somewhat
monological emphasis on the individual predicting future events on the basis of
inductive experience. (Custom and habit being primarily a *social*, not mental,
force.) While I agree with DH that this "fundamental feature of human nature
[the disposition to act on the force of socially ingrained habit]" is
motivationally efficacious in moral judgement, I don't see how such a feature
is of any epistemic relevance in moral judgement. My doubt remains regardless
of the nuances differentiating "custom"/"der Brauch" as per National Socialism
and "custom" as customarily deployed (no pun intended, again) by D.H. (Though
one glaring similarity between the two deserves mention: DH is translated as
referring to "der Fuehrer."
Walter O
MUN
P.S. Note that when DH writes that "Custom, then, is the great guide to human
life," he refers to what we in the post-Kantian era call "ethics"
("Sittlichkeit") in differentiation from "morality" (Moralitaet"). The former
is the domain of custom and the authority of tradition - what Gadamer called
"Vorurteilen" ("prejudgements"). The latter is the domain of rationally
autonomous willing from the obligation to respect the dignity of others and
ourseleves as ends-in-themselves. Hume, like Smith, failed to recognize such a
domain. (Though Smith came very, very close, as argued by a famous Newfoundland
philosopher.
P.P.S. Stay tuned for a deduction of the apriori relation
between "metaphysical contentment" and the 18-yr. old Glenlivet.
Hal Polus: "I'm supposed to get an after-taste of dark chocolate with this one
but I don't get it. I taste only french fries with ketchup."
Phil O. Sefir: "You have to first think the tasting note and the experience of
it will eventually follow."
Quoting Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>:
> Robert wrote:
>
> "I'm not sure where Hume talks of custom (or habit's) being of
> 'epistemic value' in justifying moral judgments. Custom and habit
> refer to what one's become accustomed to through experience (the
> water's consistently boiling when heated, e.g.). Since we can't
> demonstrate that it will in future boil when heated, it's custom or
> habit that give us the strong expectation that it will. We can't prove
> that things will (for the most part) continue as before but we feel
> that they will."
>
> What intrigues me about Hume's talk of custom is the manner in which
> it includes common experience or common sense so that the 'strong
> expectation' Robert mentions above is not simply that of individuals
> but something held in common. So, here is Hume on custom from the
> _Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding_
>
> "But this same proposition - ·that causes and effects cannot be
> discovered by reason· - may seem less obvious when it is applied to
> events of kinds (1) that we have been familiar with all our lives, (2)
> that are very like the whole course of nature, and (3) that are
> supposed to depend on the simple ·perceptible· qualities of objects
> and not on any secret structure of parts. We are apt to imagine that
> we could discover these effects purely through reason, without
> experience. We fancy that if we had been suddenly brought into this
> world, we could have known straight off that when one billiard ball
> strikes another it will make it move - knowing this for certain,
> without having to try it out on billiard balls. Custom has such a
> great influence! At its strongest it not only hides our natural
> ignorance but even conceals itself: just because custom is so strongly
> at work, we aren't aware of its being at work at all."
>
> and again:
>
> "Now suppose that our person gains more experience, and lives long
> enough in the world to observe similar objects or events occurring
> together constantly; now what conclusion does he draw from this
> experience? He immediately infers the existence of one object from the
> appearance of the other! Yet all his experience hasn't given him any
> idea or knowledge of the secret power by which one object produces
> another; nor can any process of reasoning have led him to draw this
> inference. But he finds that he can't help drawing it: and he won't be
> swayed from this even if he becomes convinced that there is no
> intellectual support for the inference. Something else is at work,
> compelling him to go through with it. It is custom or habit. When we
> are inclined to behave or think in some way, not because it can be
> justified by reasoning or some process of the understanding but just
> because we have behaved or thought like that so often in the past, we
> always say that this inclination is the effect of 'custom'. In using
> that word we don't claim to give the basic reason for the inclination.
> All we are doing is to point out a fundamental feature of human nature
> which everyone agrees is there, and which is well known by its
> effects."
>
> As I said above, what I find intriguing about Hume's discussion of
> custom is the manner in which it suggests something held in common.
> As far as I know, Hume does not develop this in any detail, but
> alludes to it. For example:
>
> "Does the behaviour of men differ in different ages and countries?
> That teaches us the power of custom and education, which mould the
> human mind from its infancy and form it into a fixed and established
> character."
>
> What does come up occasionally in Hume's writings is the role of
> common sense in relation to custom. For example:
>
> "It is easy for a profound ·abstract· philosopher to make a mistake in
> his intricate reasonings; and one mistake is bound to lead to another,
> while the philosopher drives his argument forward and isn't deterred
> from accepting any conclusion by its sounding strange or clashing with
> popular opinion. Not so with a philosopher who aims only to represent
> the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more attractive
> colours: if by accident he falls into error, he goes no further.
> Rather than pushing on, he renews his appeal to common sense and to
> the natural sentiments of the mind, gets back onto the right path, and
> protects himself from any dangerous illusions."
>
> or:
>
> "But when the spirit of religion is joined to the love of wonder,
> there is an end of common sense; and human testimony in these
> circumstances loses all claims to authority."
>
> In the _Dialogues_ Philo argues the following:
>
> "So long as we confine our theorizing to trade, or morals, or
> politics, or criticism, we make continual appeals to common sense and
> experience; these appeals strengthen our philosophical and scientific
> conclusions, and at least partly remove the suspicion that we rightly
> have regarding any reasoning that is very subtle and delicate."
>
> I am not a Hume scholar so I may very well be missing something
> important, but I think an interesting argument could be made that, for
> Hume, custom, in conjunction with common sense, has epistemic import
> that makes possible philosophical reflection on morals as well as the
> associated justificatory practices.
>
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Phil Enns
> Yogyakarta, Indonesia
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