[lit-ideas] Re: Causal Theories alla Grice
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- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 13:31:50 -0400
We are considering in what ways a causal approach alla Grice refutes
Gettier's alleged counterexamples. O. K. is centering on Gettier's first
alleged
countexample. Let's revise it (slightly adapted)
Suppose that A and B have applied for a certain job. And suppose that A
has strong EVIDENCE for the following conjunctive proposition:
i. B is the man gets the job in the end
ii. B has 10 coins in his pocket.
A's evidence for (i) and (ii) might be that the President of the company
assured A that B would in the end be selected, and that he, A, had counted
the coins in B's pocket ten minutes ago.
The propositions (i) and (ii) entail
p. The man who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket.
Let us suppose that A sees the entailment from (i) and (ii) to that A
accepts "p" on the grounds of (i) and (ii) for which A has strong evidence.
In
this case, we could say that A is allegedly "justified" in believing that
"p" is true.
Now imagine that, unknown to A, he himself, not B, gets the job in the
future. Also, unknown to A, A himself has 10 coins in his pocket.
"p" is then true, though the conjuntion of propositions (i) and (ii), from
which A inferred "p", is false.
The three conditions apply:
CONDITION I: A believes that p is true.
CONDITION II: p is true.
CONDITION III: A may be alleged to be "justified" in believing that p is
true.
But we are reluctant to say that A KNOWS that p.
"p" is true in virtue of the number of coins in A's pocket, while A does
not KNOW how many coins are in A's pocket. Furthermore, A bases his belief
in "p" on a count of the coins in _B_'s pocket, whom he FALSELY believes
to be the man who will get the job.
The 'causal' approach "alla Grice" then modifies this, by bringing a LINK
between CONDITION I and CONDITION III.
We are no longer required to speak of 'justification', but merely to
account for some link (causal, if you like) from the fact that makes "p" true
(as required per CONDITION II -- and thus between CONDITION II -- AND
Condition I: A's very belief.
Since it is not the case that it is the fact that makes "p" true which
CAUSES or generates the belief in A, we are rightly reluctant to speak of
"knowledge" here.
Grice's alternative analysis to Plato's and Ayer's thus runs:
A knows that p
=df
1. p
2. A believes that p.
3. Some condition placing restriction on how A came to think p. "(cf.
causal theory)" -- he adds.
For Grice, 'know' is a factive like 'saw' ("Macbeth saw Banquo even if
Banquo was nowhere to be seen").
"According to a certain "strong" account of knowledge," Grice notes,
A knows that p.
just in case
CONDITION I: A believes p
CONDITION II: p.
CONDITION III: A has conclusive evidence for p.
"This," Grice rightly notes, presents possible difficulties of a regressive
nature" -- as Gettier was well aware but Ayer and Plato for that matter
were not.
These difficulties are:
I. does A have to know that the evidence for p is true?
II. does A have to know that the evidence is conclusive?
Surely not. Otherwise we wouldn't be using 'know' and we do use 'know' --
we would all be sceptics of the type we don't like in Oxford (he implicated)
"In general [Ayer's theory] seems tooo strong", Grice says.
Grice's scenario simplifies the convoluted ones by Gettier:
An examination candidate at an oral does _know_ the date of the battle of
Waterloo.
The examination candidate may know this (that the battle of Waterloo was
fought on June 18, 1815, aat Waterloo) without conclusive evidence.
The examination candidate may even asnwer after some (if not too
remarkable) hesitation (showing in the end that he knows the answer).
As we use 'know', something more like the following" applies.
CONDITION I and CONDITION II remain identical but CONDITION III is replaced
by
"Some conditions placing restrinctions on how A comes to think that p (Cf.
causal theory)".
Ayer was merely confused by the 'implicature' of 'know', Grice adds:
"If I say
"I know that p"
perhaps SOMETIMES there is a non-conventional implicature of strong or
conclusive evidence (not mere thinking that p, whith p is true). cfr. "He
_loves_ her"."
"And this is not the only intepretation."
"I know that p" can also trigger, via implicature,
"You don't need to tell me".
The examiner may disagree and may want -- examiners being what they are --
the examination candidate to specify the exact HOUR and what BIT of
Waterloo -- in terms of geographical coordinates -- were involved ("Waterloo
can
be big"* -- and "June 18, 1815" entails a full 24 hours.
Waterloo is divided into six districts:
Faubourg Ouest (north-west of Chaussée de Bruxelles)
Faubourg Est (north-east of Chaussée de Bruxelles)
Chenois (west of the railway)
Centre, Joli-Bois (south of centre) and
Mont-St-Jean (north of the Waterloo battle field).
and the Battle of Waterloo was fought NEAR Waterloo -- Battle of Waterloo
is a misnomer, as some claim is the University of Warwick, which is in
Coventry -- (it ain't: Warwick means Warwickshire here, not merely Warwick).
Cheers,
Speranza
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