[lit-ideas] Re: Causal Theories alla Grice

  • From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 13:37:35 -0400

In a message dated 3/12/2015 7:45:20 A.M.  Eastern Daylight Time, 
omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes:
About Banquo's ghost...  since it comes up every now and then I will say a 
few other words about the  matter. There are other ghosts and supernatural 
beings in Shakespeare's plays  whom we are supposed to accept as having been 
there, at least in the world of  the play. The ghost of Hamlet's father is 
seen not only by himself but also by  the guards, so presumably it is not 
just Hamlet's hallucination. The Witches in  Macbeth are seen both by Macbeth 
and by Banquo (who is still alive at this  point) so presumably they are real 
as well. In the case of Banquo, the  conclusion that it is just an 
apparition is reached on the grounds that he is  seen by Macbeth only, and not 
by 
the other characters present. The reason  Shakespeare here assures the 
audience that the apparition of is not real - to  disimplicate, if you must - 
is 
probably that the historical Banquo was thought  to be the ancestor of King 
James (for whom the play was originally performed)  and so there might have 
been an impropriety in presenting him as a ghost. I am  not sure that Grice 
knew that, but 'Thus men learn til' they are alive'.  

Indeed. Yes, it would have been improper to have Banquo as a ghost rather  
than a mere hallucination, seeing that "Macbeth" was originally performed 
(and  well, too) to King James.
 
Of course, 'see' can be a trick. 
 
Since Grice wrote "The Causal Theory of Perception", and 'see' is like  
'perceive', we can assume that Grice would have no problem with adding a causal 
 element to 'see', too: alla
 
A sees that p.
iff
i. A perceives (visually) that p.
ii. p
iii. (ii) --> (i) 
 
Now, Macbeth's hallucination obviously had other causes. And it's here that 
 'cause' applies best. For, as Grice says, 
 
"For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, [the usual  
implicature is that it] must be  
something abnormal or  unusual."
 
The cause in this case is psychological, surely -- and I'm sure King James  
enjoyed the occurrence, however, abnormal, unusual, or, if you must,  
fictional!
 
It should be pointed out that the causal theory of perception is studied by 
 psychologists. Grice was no psychologist, so he knew that he could just 
leave as  a _blank_ the specification of the actual causal chain. It is not 
expected of a  philosopher to provide the details for causal chains when they 
use 'perceive',  'see', or 'know'. 
 
Recall that "Causal Theory of Perception" was Grice's attack on Witters,  
who said that a red pillar box cannot SEEM red (only blue or some colour 
OTHER  than red -- I'm not sure what colour pillar boxes that Witters might 
have 
seen  in Vienna were, if existant at all!). (Grice's point is that surely a 
red pillar  box can seem red; but to say that it SEEMS red when it IS red 
is to flout a  conversational maxim for a very otiose purpose). 
 
My favourite causal account proposed by Grice is that of intention.
 
For A to intend that p, a causal element is involved:
 
A intends that p iff
i. A wills that p
ii. A believes that the probability of p is > 0.5
iii. (ii) --> (i) 
 
There is an element of uncertainty there (whenever probability is  
introduced) and Grice just introduced it to refute Hart and Hampshire who were  
arguing that decision and intention were conceptually linked with CERTAINTY,  
rather -- which surely is a no no. 
 
In "Meaning" Grice refers to Stevenson's "Ethics and Language" and  
Stevenson's account of meaning as embedded in a 'causal theory', which he finds 
 
insufficient -- and he spent years trying to tweak the causal element so that 
it  would fit nicely into his grander scheme of things. 
 
Stevenson's examples involved things like
 
Smoke means fire.
 
I.e. fire causes smoke.
 
Grice prefers
 
Smoke 'means' fire.

He uses square quotes for 'natural' uses of 'meaning', since surely  smoke 
cannot mean.
 
In these causal uses -- that Stevenson borrowed from Peirce's idea of  
'index', some factivity is entailed:
 
The fact that the weathercock points to the NE 'means' that the wind comes  
from the SW. 
 
Grice's example:
 
Those spots 'mean' measles.
 
I.e. measles causes those spots.
 
We can use 'mean' loosely here: "To me, those spots didn't mean anything,  
when I saw them on Timothy, but to the doctor the spots 'meant' measles, and 
he  knows."
 
Hart was fascinated by this observation by Grice and kept quoting it when  
Hart had occasion to destroy (in a review, and metaphorically) Holloway's  
pretentious book on "Language and Intelligence". Hart shows that Holloway 
just  ignores this important Griceian point.
 
Cheers,
 
Speranza
 
References:
 
Grice, Causal Theory, repr. in Swartz, "Perceiving and Sensing". 
Roxbee-Cox, On seeing -- causal approach. 
Warnock, On what is seen, in Sibley. 
 
 
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