[lit-ideas] Re: Causal Theories alla Grice
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 19:02:16 +0100
For one thing, one may well doubt that Smith formulated to himself a belief
that: "the man who has 10 coins in his pocket will get the job." Even if
that conclusion follows logically from the other beliefs he had, people do
not always realize the logical consequences of their beliefs. (In fact one
wonders if philosophers would have much to do if such was the case.)
But let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that Smith would have
assented to that proposition. If so, his reasoning would have been based on
something like this:
Jones is the person who will get the job.
Jones has 10 coins in his pocket.
_______________________________________________________
Ergo, the person who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket.
Clearly the first premise is false. We may doubt then that Jones had sound
justification to believe the conclusion, even if we have some sympathy for
his error. That the conclusion can happen to be true even though one of the
premises is false should hardly surprize us; in fact the conclusion could
be true even if BOTH of the premises were false.
So, perhaps we just need to make our notion of justification a little more
precise. How about something like: "A belief is justified if and only if
the reasoning that leads to adopting it is sound" ? Where by 'sound' we
mean that it is logically valid and based on true premises.
This seems to me to be both simpler and safer than all the talk about
causal chains, proximate and ultimate causes, formal vs. material
conditions, and what not.
O.K.
On Tue, Mar 10, 2015 at 6:31 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> We are considering in what ways a causal approach alla Grice refutes
> Gettier's alleged counterexamples. O. K. is centering on Gettier's first
> alleged
> countexample. Let's revise it (slightly adapted)
>
> Suppose that A and B have applied for a certain job. And suppose that A
> has strong EVIDENCE for the following conjunctive proposition:
>
> i. B is the man gets the job in the end
> ii. B has 10 coins in his pocket.
>
> A's evidence for (i) and (ii) might be that the President of the company
> assured A that B would in the end be selected, and that he, A, had counted
> the coins in B's pocket ten minutes ago.
>
> The propositions (i) and (ii) entail
>
> p. The man who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket.
>
> Let us suppose that A sees the entailment from (i) and (ii) to that A
> accepts "p" on the grounds of (i) and (ii) for which A has strong
> evidence. In
> this case, we could say that A is allegedly "justified" in believing that
> "p" is true.
>
> Now imagine that, unknown to A, he himself, not B, gets the job in the
> future. Also, unknown to A, A himself has 10 coins in his pocket.
>
> "p" is then true, though the conjuntion of propositions (i) and (ii), from
> which A inferred "p", is false.
>
> The three conditions apply:
>
> CONDITION I: A believes that p is true.
> CONDITION II: p is true.
> CONDITION III: A may be alleged to be "justified" in believing that p is
> true.
>
> But we are reluctant to say that A KNOWS that p.
>
> "p" is true in virtue of the number of coins in A's pocket, while A does
> not KNOW how many coins are in A's pocket. Furthermore, A bases his
> belief
> in "p" on a count of the coins in _B_'s pocket, whom he FALSELY believes
> to be the man who will get the job.
>
> The 'causal' approach "alla Grice" then modifies this, by bringing a LINK
> between CONDITION I and CONDITION III.
>
> We are no longer required to speak of 'justification', but merely to
> account for some link (causal, if you like) from the fact that makes "p"
> true
> (as required per CONDITION II -- and thus between CONDITION II -- AND
> Condition I: A's very belief.
>
> Since it is not the case that it is the fact that makes "p" true which
> CAUSES or generates the belief in A, we are rightly reluctant to speak of
> "knowledge" here.
>
> Grice's alternative analysis to Plato's and Ayer's thus runs:
>
> A knows that p
> =df
> 1. p
> 2. A believes that p.
> 3. Some condition placing restriction on how A came to think p. "(cf.
> causal theory)" -- he adds.
>
> For Grice, 'know' is a factive like 'saw' ("Macbeth saw Banquo even if
> Banquo was nowhere to be seen").
>
> "According to a certain "strong" account of knowledge," Grice notes,
>
> A knows that p.
>
> just in case
>
> CONDITION I: A believes p
> CONDITION II: p.
> CONDITION III: A has conclusive evidence for p.
>
> "This," Grice rightly notes, presents possible difficulties of a regressive
> nature" -- as Gettier was well aware but Ayer and Plato for that matter
> were not.
>
> These difficulties are:
>
> I. does A have to know that the evidence for p is true?
> II. does A have to know that the evidence is conclusive?
>
> Surely not. Otherwise we wouldn't be using 'know' and we do use 'know' --
> we would all be sceptics of the type we don't like in Oxford (he
> implicated)
>
> "In general [Ayer's theory] seems tooo strong", Grice says.
>
> Grice's scenario simplifies the convoluted ones by Gettier:
>
> An examination candidate at an oral does _know_ the date of the battle of
> Waterloo.
>
> The examination candidate may know this (that the battle of Waterloo was
> fought on June 18, 1815, aat Waterloo) without conclusive evidence.
>
> The examination candidate may even asnwer after some (if not too
> remarkable) hesitation (showing in the end that he knows the answer).
>
> As we use 'know', something more like the following" applies.
>
> CONDITION I and CONDITION II remain identical but CONDITION III is replaced
> by
>
> "Some conditions placing restrinctions on how A comes to think that p (Cf.
> causal theory)".
>
> Ayer was merely confused by the 'implicature' of 'know', Grice adds:
>
>
> "If I say
>
> "I know that p"
>
> perhaps SOMETIMES there is a non-conventional implicature of strong or
> conclusive evidence (not mere thinking that p, whith p is true). cfr. "He
> _loves_ her"."
>
> "And this is not the only intepretation."
>
> "I know that p" can also trigger, via implicature,
>
> "You don't need to tell me".
>
> The examiner may disagree and may want -- examiners being what they are --
> the examination candidate to specify the exact HOUR and what BIT of
> Waterloo -- in terms of geographical coordinates -- were involved
> ("Waterloo can
> be big"* -- and "June 18, 1815" entails a full 24 hours.
>
> Waterloo is divided into six districts:
>
> Faubourg Ouest (north-west of Chaussée de Bruxelles)
> Faubourg Est (north-east of Chaussée de Bruxelles)
> Chenois (west of the railway)
> Centre, Joli-Bois (south of centre) and
> Mont-St-Jean (north of the Waterloo battle field).
>
> and the Battle of Waterloo was fought NEAR Waterloo -- Battle of Waterloo
> is a misnomer, as some claim is the University of Warwick, which is in
> Coventry -- (it ain't: Warwick means Warwickshire here, not merely
> Warwick).
>
> Cheers,
>
> Speranza
>
>
>
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