[lit-ideas] Re: Causal Theories alla Grice
- From: Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 13:21:12 +0000
Misth kurtz dead grice dead balls busted
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Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Causal Theories alla Grice
In a message dated 3/11/2015 9:36:40 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes:
Well, the historian is supposed to have good reasons to believe that the
Battle of Waterloo happened on that date, a high-school student is not. As
long as the student provides the expected answer, we are going to accept it
whatever its source, even if he heard it from his otherwise quite unreliable
girlfriend. (As long as it did not happen during the exam.) Loosely speaking,
we might also say something like: "I knew that it would rain that day (i.e. I
heard the prognosis) but it didn't." There is a limit to how far a
philosophical theory of knowledge can be expected to account for such loose
uses.
Well, I think for these cases the keyword is DISIMPLICATURE.
Grice talked of disimplicature in unpublications only and for a few friends! So
one has to be careful. On top of that, it was partly in conversations with S.
Yablo, who commented something along the lines of:
Sh*t happens.
Implicature happens.
And so does disimplicature.
Mainly, DISIMPLICATURE seems to be the technical Griceianism for 'loose use'.
In the early lectures, Grice did speak of "LOOSE" uses.
But why does 'disimplicature' work better?
Well, to implicate is to mean more than you say.
To disimplicate is to mean less than you say.
How does disimplicature work?
Suppose we take a factual, casual account of 'see'. Then we are faced with
"Macbeth saw Banquo".
This seems to contradict the conceptual analysis, according to which 'entails'
features:
Macbeth saw Banquo
--- Therefore, Banquo was there to be seen.
But in the play by Shakespeare, Banquo was notably NOT there to be seen.
Yet, this does not mean we have to reject the conceptual analysis where ""p is
true" entails "A sees that p" (surely in the above we can expand Macbeth saw
that Banquo was there).
So disimplicature is not just the negation of implicature, but an intentional
act where you DROP ENTAILMENTS, as it were, and end up meaning less than you
say.
Now, you may wonder why in cases of 'know' you don't just drop the alleged
condition (and thus entailment about the conclusive evidence). I think Grice
prefers NOT to even TALK about conclusive evidence. Recall the difficulties he
saw 'of a regressive nature': to wit:
I. does A have to know that the evidence for p is true?
II. does A have to know that the evidence is conclusive?
As applied to our examination candidate:
FIRST DIFFICULTY:
a. Does Strawson have to KNOW that the evidence for "The battle of Waterloo
was fought on June 18, 1815" is true?
--- THE IMPLICATURE by Grice seems to be that "Surely he doesn't".
SECOND DIFFICULTY:
b. Does Strawson have to know that the evidence for the fact that the Battle of
Waterloo was fought on June 18, 1815 is conclusive?
So, I think, as with the case of 'see', the loose use of 'know' amounts to
dropping that what you know is true.
So back to O. K.:
"Well, the historian is supposed to have good reasons to believe that the
Battle of Waterloo happened on that date, a high-school student is not."
I'm not even sure we require a historian to have conclusive evidence, though.
He may THINK he has it, and on occasion, he may IMPLICATE he has it ("I _know_
that the Battle of Waterloo was fought on June 15, 1816"). Oddly, this
implicature (cancellable) works better for cases of false ascriptions of
knowledge:
"I KNOW that the battle of Waterloo, in spite of what all historians -- French
and English -- have written and on which they have dedicated tons of ink --
did NOT occur on June 18, 1815. Waterloo was an independent district at the
time, and they were 'slightly behind the times'. By the Calendar instituted by
Napoleon, the exact date was the very first hours of June 19,
1915 -- and this agrees with the archeological remains, since in the first
hours of June 19, 1815, soldiers were still fighting, so I wouldn't use the
past 'fought' for the previous date, which is alleged to be known almost
universally."
----
O. K. goes on:
"As long as the student provides the expected answer, we are going to accept it
whatever its source, even if he heard it from his otherwise quite unreliable
girlfriend. (As long as it did not happen during the exam.)".
By speaking of a restriction, I think Grice is disallowing cases such as those
like: Strawson DREAMED that the Battle of Waterloo was fought on June 18,
1815. Or a witch told him so, or he went to Delphi to ask for the answer and
Apollo replied, "June 18, 1815" (Delphi is still a tourist attraction, you
know).
----
O. K. writes:
"Loosely speaking, we might also say something like: "I knew that it would
rain that day (i.e. I heard the prognosis) but it didn't." There is a limit
to how far a philosophical theory of knowledge can be expected to account
for such loose uses."
Here, Grice would have no problem since it's the CONDITION II ("p is true")
-- an entailment -- that is dropped. It is a case of DISIMPLICATURE.
Note that it is explicitly cancelled, or if you want in an almost explicit
fashion via an explicit 'defeasible' commentary, or 'excluder':
A: Hi, B. Crazy weather, right?
B: I know.
A: I was even not going to come.
B: Neither was I. You know, I knew that there would be a snow storm today
-- having heard the weather forecast -- do you watch it, too? the local
channel, I mean -- , but it didn't. It turned out I didn't KNOW it, nor,
typically, did the weather forecast person know. I'm not trusting HER anymore.
Why do they have to speak with such authority? It's _really_ confusing.
A: I know. And what's worse, it keeps us disimplicating EVERY TIME.
Cheers,
Speranza
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