[lit-ideas] Re: Causal Theories alla Grice
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 19:42:46 +0100
JL:
For A to intend that p, a causal element is involved:
A intends that p iff
i. A wills that p
ii. A believes that the probability of p is > 0.5
iii. (ii) --> (i)
*Well, I suppose that A can still intend it even if he believes that the
probability is lower, cannot he ? If A is in the middle of the sea and the
only way for him to save his life is to reach the nearest island -i.e. to
attain the state of affairs p - then he may understandably undertake the
course of action of swimming toward the island even if he believes that the
probability of reaching it is very low.
Jl:
Stevenson's examples involved things like
Smoke means fire.
I.e. fire causes smoke.
Grice prefers
Smoke 'means' fire.
*Grice may 'prefer' this, but one wonders if he is not actually engaging in
the fallacy of affirming the consequent. To say that 'fire causes smoke' is
reasonable enough because in usual conditions fire is sufficient to cause
smoke. To say that smoke 'means' fire is more suspect because smoke can
have causes other than fire. Similarly, face spots can be caused by measles
but they can also be caused by other diseases. That is why reasoning from
effects to causes is much less reliable than the other way around. Based on
the 'signs' here, there is a suspicion that Grice was not only not to be
bothered with "the details for causal chains" but with examining causality
at all.
O.K.
On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 6:37 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> In a message dated 3/12/2015 7:45:20 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
> omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes:
> About Banquo's ghost... since it comes up every now and then I will say a
> few other words about the matter. There are other ghosts and supernatural
> beings in Shakespeare's plays whom we are supposed to accept as having
> been
> there, at least in the world of the play. The ghost of Hamlet's father is
> seen not only by himself but also by the guards, so presumably it is not
> just Hamlet's hallucination. The Witches in Macbeth are seen both by
> Macbeth
> and by Banquo (who is still alive at this point) so presumably they are
> real
> as well. In the case of Banquo, the conclusion that it is just an
> apparition is reached on the grounds that he is seen by Macbeth only, and
> not by
> the other characters present. The reason Shakespeare here assures the
> audience that the apparition of is not real - to disimplicate, if you
> must - is
> probably that the historical Banquo was thought to be the ancestor of King
> James (for whom the play was originally performed) and so there might have
> been an impropriety in presenting him as a ghost. I am not sure that Grice
> knew that, but 'Thus men learn til' they are alive'.
>
> Indeed. Yes, it would have been improper to have Banquo as a ghost rather
> than a mere hallucination, seeing that "Macbeth" was originally performed
> (and well, too) to King James.
>
> Of course, 'see' can be a trick.
>
> Since Grice wrote "The Causal Theory of Perception", and 'see' is like
> 'perceive', we can assume that Grice would have no problem with adding a
> causal
> element to 'see', too: alla
>
> A sees that p.
> iff
> i. A perceives (visually) that p.
> ii. p
> iii. (ii) --> (i)
>
> Now, Macbeth's hallucination obviously had other causes. And it's here that
> 'cause' applies best. For, as Grice says,
>
> "For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, [the usual
> implicature is that it] must be
> something abnormal or unusual."
>
> The cause in this case is psychological, surely -- and I'm sure King James
> enjoyed the occurrence, however, abnormal, unusual, or, if you must,
> fictional!
>
> It should be pointed out that the causal theory of perception is studied by
> psychologists. Grice was no psychologist, so he knew that he could just
> leave as a _blank_ the specification of the actual causal chain. It is not
> expected of a philosopher to provide the details for causal chains when
> they
> use 'perceive', 'see', or 'know'.
>
> Recall that "Causal Theory of Perception" was Grice's attack on Witters,
> who said that a red pillar box cannot SEEM red (only blue or some colour
> OTHER than red -- I'm not sure what colour pillar boxes that Witters
> might have
> seen in Vienna were, if existant at all!). (Grice's point is that surely a
> red pillar box can seem red; but to say that it SEEMS red when it IS red
> is to flout a conversational maxim for a very otiose purpose).
>
> My favourite causal account proposed by Grice is that of intention.
>
> For A to intend that p, a causal element is involved:
>
> A intends that p iff
> i. A wills that p
> ii. A believes that the probability of p is > 0.5
> iii. (ii) --> (i)
>
> There is an element of uncertainty there (whenever probability is
> introduced) and Grice just introduced it to refute Hart and Hampshire who
> were
> arguing that decision and intention were conceptually linked with
> CERTAINTY,
> rather -- which surely is a no no.
>
> In "Meaning" Grice refers to Stevenson's "Ethics and Language" and
> Stevenson's account of meaning as embedded in a 'causal theory', which he
> finds
> insufficient -- and he spent years trying to tweak the causal element so
> that
> it would fit nicely into his grander scheme of things.
>
> Stevenson's examples involved things like
>
> Smoke means fire.
>
> I.e. fire causes smoke.
>
> Grice prefers
>
> Smoke 'means' fire.
>
> He uses square quotes for 'natural' uses of 'meaning', since surely smoke
> cannot mean.
>
> In these causal uses -- that Stevenson borrowed from Peirce's idea of
> 'index', some factivity is entailed:
>
> The fact that the weathercock points to the NE 'means' that the wind comes
> from the SW.
>
> Grice's example:
>
> Those spots 'mean' measles.
>
> I.e. measles causes those spots.
>
> We can use 'mean' loosely here: "To me, those spots didn't mean anything,
> when I saw them on Timothy, but to the doctor the spots 'meant' measles,
> and
> he knows."
>
> Hart was fascinated by this observation by Grice and kept quoting it when
> Hart had occasion to destroy (in a review, and metaphorically) Holloway's
> pretentious book on "Language and Intelligence". Hart shows that Holloway
> just ignores this important Griceian point.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Speranza
>
> References:
>
> Grice, Causal Theory, repr. in Swartz, "Perceiving and Sensing".
> Roxbee-Cox, On seeing -- causal approach.
> Warnock, On what is seen, in Sibley.
>
>
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