[lit-ideas] Re: Causal Theories alla Grice
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2015 12:45:15 +0100
About Banquo's ghost... since it comes up every now and then I will say a
few other words about the matter. There are other ghosts and supernatural
beings in Shakespeare's plays whom we are supposed to accept as having been
there, at least in the world of the play. The ghost of Hamlet's father is
seen not only by himself but also by the guards, so presumably it is not
just Hamlet's hallucination. The Witches in Macbeth are seen both by
Macbeth and by Banquo (who is still alive at this point) so presumably they
are real as well.
In the case of Banquo, the conclusion that it is just an apparition is
reached on the grounds that he is seen by Macbeth only, and not by the
other characters present. The reason Shakespeare here assures the audience
that the apparition of is not real - to disimplicate, if you must - is
probably that the historical Banquo was thought to be the ancestor of King
James (for whom the play was originally performed) and so there might have
been an impropriety in presenting him as a ghost.
I am not sure that Grice knew that, but 'Thus men learn til' they are
alive'.
O.K.
On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 12:26 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> In a message dated 3/11/2015 9:36:40 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
> omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes:
> Well, the historian is supposed to have good reasons to believe that the
> Battle of Waterloo happened on that date, a high-school student is not. As
> long as the student provides the expected answer, we are going to accept
> it
> whatever its source, even if he heard it from his otherwise quite
> unreliable girlfriend. (As long as it did not happen during the exam.)
> Loosely
> speaking, we might also say something like: "I knew that it would rain
> that day
> (i.e. I heard the prognosis) but it didn't." There is a limit to how far a
> philosophical theory of knowledge can be expected to account for such
> loose uses.
>
> Well, I think for these cases the keyword is DISIMPLICATURE.
>
> Grice talked of disimplicature in unpublications only and for a few
> friends! So one has to be careful. On top of that, it was partly in
> conversations
> with S. Yablo, who commented something along the lines of:
>
> Sh*t happens.
>
> Implicature happens.
>
> And so does disimplicature.
>
> Mainly, DISIMPLICATURE seems to be the technical Griceianism for 'loose
> use'. In the early lectures, Grice did speak of "LOOSE" uses.
>
> But why does 'disimplicature' work better?
>
> Well, to implicate is to mean more than you say.
> To disimplicate is to mean less than you say.
>
> How does disimplicature work?
>
> Suppose we take a factual, casual account of 'see'. Then we are faced with
>
> "Macbeth saw Banquo".
>
> This seems to contradict the conceptual analysis, according to which
> 'entails' features:
>
> Macbeth saw Banquo
> --- Therefore, Banquo was there to be seen.
>
> But in the play by Shakespeare, Banquo was notably NOT there to be seen.
> Yet, this does not mean we have to reject the conceptual analysis where
> ""p
> is true" entails "A sees that p" (surely in the above we can expand Macbeth
> saw that Banquo was there).
>
> So disimplicature is not just the negation of implicature, but an
> intentional act where you DROP ENTAILMENTS, as it were, and end up meaning
> less
> than you say.
>
> Now, you may wonder why in cases of 'know' you don't just drop the alleged
> condition (and thus entailment about the conclusive evidence). I think
> Grice prefers NOT to even TALK about conclusive evidence. Recall the
> difficulties he saw 'of a regressive nature': to wit:
>
> I. does A have to know that the evidence for p is true?
> II. does A have to know that the evidence is conclusive?
>
> As applied to our examination candidate:
>
> FIRST DIFFICULTY:
>
> a. Does Strawson have to KNOW that the evidence for "The battle of Waterloo
> was fought on June 18, 1815" is true?
>
> --- THE IMPLICATURE by Grice seems to be that "Surely he doesn't".
>
> SECOND DIFFICULTY:
>
> b. Does Strawson have to know that the evidence for the fact that the
> Battle of Waterloo was fought on June 18, 1815 is conclusive?
>
> So, I think, as with the case of 'see', the loose use of 'know' amounts to
> dropping that what you know is true.
>
> So back to O. K.:
>
> "Well, the historian is supposed to have good reasons to believe that the
> Battle of Waterloo happened on that date, a high-school student is not."
>
> I'm not even sure we require a historian to have conclusive evidence,
> though. He may THINK he has it, and on occasion, he may IMPLICATE he has
> it ("I
> _know_ that the Battle of Waterloo was fought on June 15, 1816"). Oddly,
> this implicature (cancellable) works better for cases of false
> ascriptions of
> knowledge:
>
> "I KNOW that the battle of Waterloo, in spite of what all historians --
> French and English -- have written and on which they have dedicated tons of
> ink -- did NOT occur on June 18, 1815. Waterloo was an independent
> district
> at the time, and they were 'slightly behind the times'. By the Calendar
> instituted by Napoleon, the exact date was the very first hours of June
> 19,
> 1915 -- and this agrees with the archeological remains, since in the first
> hours of June 19, 1815, soldiers were still fighting, so I wouldn't use
> the
> past 'fought' for the previous date, which is alleged to be known almost
> universally."
>
> ----
>
> O. K. goes on:
>
> "As long as the student provides the expected answer, we are going to
> accept it whatever its source, even if he heard it from his otherwise quite
> unreliable girlfriend. (As long as it did not happen during the exam.)".
>
> By speaking of a restriction, I think Grice is disallowing cases such as
> those like: Strawson DREAMED that the Battle of Waterloo was fought on June
> 18, 1815. Or a witch told him so, or he went to Delphi to ask for the
> answer
> and Apollo replied, "June 18, 1815" (Delphi is still a tourist attraction,
> you know).
>
> ----
>
> O. K. writes:
>
> "Loosely speaking, we might also say something like: "I knew that it would
> rain that day (i.e. I heard the prognosis) but it didn't." There is a limit
> to how far a philosophical theory of knowledge can be expected to account
> for such loose uses."
>
> Here, Grice would have no problem since it's the CONDITION II ("p is true")
> -- an entailment -- that is dropped. It is a case of DISIMPLICATURE.
>
> Note that it is explicitly cancelled, or if you want in an almost explicit
> fashion via an explicit 'defeasible' commentary, or 'excluder':
>
> A: Hi, B. Crazy weather, right?
> B: I know.
> A: I was even not going to come.
> B: Neither was I. You know, I knew that there would be a snow storm today
> -- having heard the weather forecast -- do you watch it, too? the local
> channel, I mean -- , but it didn't. It turned out I didn't KNOW it, nor,
> typically, did the weather forecast person know. I'm not trusting HER
> anymore.
> Why do they have to speak with such authority? It's _really_ confusing.
> A: I know. And what's worse, it keeps us disimplicating EVERY TIME.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Speranza
>
>
>
>
>
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