Re: Propositions, Clarity, & Instrumentality In addressing some of Glen's concerns, I am aware that I am entering this discourse "midstream," so my pre-emptive apologies for any misinterpretations... Wittgenstein has greatly influenced my group's philosophical & methodological underpinnings but *expressly* in the capture of "essence," or shared/ co-opted, 'essential meanings temporally bestowed upon any particular or general usage of terms, vernacular, or "turns of phrase" - including the implicit rules that apply given specific "set membership" rules that apply in lieu of various germane contextual determinants & acuities. While pragmatism & instrumentality are ubiquitous concerns when assessing what we refer to as inherent or assigned "semantic carriage," we have found Ludwig's language determinants to be most helpful in gleaning out the archetypes that play out in the *collective human intellect* ( or 'CHI'). The architectures derived have addressed directly most of the epistemological issues & concerns brought out in Wittgenstein's later work. One such integrated architecture is that of the varied "states of awareness:" i.e, *boundedness, mediation, & 'transcendency.'* And yet another, addresses the numerous elements found operating within human dialogue, e.g., "propositional progenitors." You may have surmised that this meta-cognitive model is meant to effectively "deal in 'real-time' acquisitions of temporal acumen, in conjunction with learning models, thereby making it possible to reconnoiter (PADM) in an alternative "cyber-environment." I have found that familiarity with Wittgenstein is becoming ever-the-more prevalent for those involved in researching the cognitive sciences & cybernetics... and, I believe it largely due to Ludwig's insights into the human condition, predicament, and potentials wherein all of life's poignancies are born... meanings derived, & imbued with the impetus to affect the hearts, minds, & actions of humankind! >> Yes, so many of us owe so much to thinkers like Wittgenstein... "we all stand on the shoulders of giants." On Thu, Oct 1, 2009 at 4:32 PM, Glen Sizemore <gmsizemore2@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > --- On Wed, 9/30/09, BruceD <blroadies@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > From: BruceD <blroadies@xxxxxxxxx> > > Subject: [Wittrs] Re: Wittgenstein's meaning is use. > > To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > > Date: Wednesday, September 30, 2009, 9:49 PM > > > > --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, > > CJ <wittrs@...> wrote: > > > > > > From Wittgenstein > > > > > > When I think in language, there aren't 'meanings' > > going through my > > > mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the > > language is itself the > > > vehicle of thought. > > > > Is this an empirical discovery? > > Of course not. > > >Is it a claim to knowledge? > > What does THIS mean? > > > Can it be > > true or false? > > I'm not sure that this is a meaningful question. If it is nonsense to say > that "utterances express meanings" - and if one looks at how "meaning" is > used, it becomes obvious that it is - then why would it not be nonsense when > the utterances are observable only to the speaker and listener who, in this > case, are the same person? > > >Perhaps it is true for some folks and not > > others, some > > cultures....or is this statement of our esssence? > > It is a question concerning the meaning of "meaning." > > > > > It is the status of these remarks that concern me. > > And now you know. > > > > For all your Wittrs needs: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/ > > >