Robert Paul wrote: "The argument seems to be that if people are able to choose good, their choice of good must be contrasted with the possible choice of something opposed to it (which has in this exchange mostly been called 'evil'); thus, 'evil' is necessary for the free choice of the good. This is a strange argument." I agree. However, and perhaps this is no longer relevant, it isn't the traditional Catholic argument. That argument, found in Augustine and then finessed by Aquinas, holds that evil is not a something nor is it something one chooses. Rather, good is understood as willing towards a proper end and evil is willing towards a substituted end. On this account, one does not choose to do evil, as though people would consciously prefer to do evil, but rather one chooses something other than what one ought to will. Freedom is freedom to will according to a proper end and evil is willing something else. If it helps, Kant's account of the Moral Law, and one's freedom to follow the law or not, tracks the problem of evil fairly closely. And Kant's contortions in reasoning for how people can not obey the Moral Law also track the contortions we Christians engage in. It seems to me that there is a fairly inscrutable problem here, whether one is or is not religious. Sincerely, Phil Enns Toronto, ON ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html