On 2004/04/05, at 15:18, Omar Kusturica wrote: > *You are perhaps correct to identify the market forces > at work, though in China even the people working in > state-run institutions tend to work long hours. But I > would suggest that the effects might not be the same > everywhere. "Not having enough time for relationships" > could suggest, to one, having only non-committing > relationships and distancing oneself from the family > which is perceived as tiresome and demanding. To > another, it might suggest relinquishing 'optional' > relationships that are perceived as tiresome and > demanding, thus settling with the family relationships > and those with the immediate work/study environment. > The market forces may dictate selecting relationships, > but the selections made might differ culturally. > Of course. This is what makes looking at various contexts so=20 interesting. > >> One way to look at Japan is to see it as a place >> that went to extremes >> in becoming a modern society, one of whose defining >> characteristics is >> separation of home and work, with the wife staying >> home with the kids >> and the husband spending most of his days away at >> his job. > > *A rather different kind of modernization, as we see, > from that which took place in the Western societies. > Yes, and no. The difference is largely one of degree. Here is the way=20= I developed the argument in my book, _Japanese Consumer Behavior_: >>> =A0 Jib Fowles was writing about America, but virtually every word = in the=20 following description of industrialisation applies with equal force to=20= Japan. =A0 > > Over time, production and consumption became ever more sharply=20 > delineated spheres. The production and consumption which used to be=20 > commingled on the far separated into two discernible activities,=20 > signalled by their new and distinct loci in time and space. The day=20 > became exactingly sectioned into work and nonwork time; work took=20 > place apart from the home, in a building especially constructed to=20 > contain it. The autonomous factory, where no one lived by many worked,=20= > was virtually unknown before industrialisation but quickly became the=20= > standard. > > (Fowles 1996:31) =A0 As David Harvey points out, the process of industrialisation = imposes=20 new disciplines on the worker. The production of commodities by wage=20 labour =91locates much of the knowledge, decisions as to technique, as=20= well as disciplinary apparatus, outside the control of the person who=20 actually does the work=92 (1990:123). Alluding to Jeremy Bentham=92s=20 panopticon, a prison in which every cell is exposed to view from the=20 guard tower in the centre, Zygmunt Bauman describes modern society as=20 organised around two great panoptical institutions, industrial=20 factories and conscript armies. Because of the centrality of these two=20= institutions, =A0 > Most male members of society could reasonably be expected to pass=20 > through their disciplining treadmill and acquire the habits that would=20= > guarantee their obedience to the order-constituting rules (and later=20= > to enforce those habits on the female members in their capacity of the=20= > =91heads of families=92). > > (Bauman 1999:22) =A0 But now, he writes, the great majority of men and women are seduced=20 instead of policed into accepting society=92s goals. Advertising has=20 replaced indoctrination; need creation has begun to replace normative=20 regulation. =A0 > Most of us are socially and culturally trained and shaped as=20 > sensation-seekers and gathers, rather than producers and soldiers.=20 > Constant openness to new sensations and greed for ever new experience,=20= > always stronger and deeper than before, is a condition sine qua non of=20= > being amenable to seduction. > > (Bauman 1999:24) =A0 =A0 But here the theorist=92s analysis begins to strain against the = images=20 that HILL research provides. There is something about that =91greed for=20= ever new experience, always stronger and deeper than before=92 that=20 clashes with images of water skippers skating nimbly over society=92s=20 surfaces but never diving beneath them. Perhaps in Ikari Tomohiko=92s generation, that =91burning=92 = generation of=20 now-greying corporate warriors, that greed was still strong. There was=20= something of it still left in rebellious members of the New Breed who=20 strove to construct new selves by creating new lifestyles. But the=20 Boomers, who would never be heroes, the Juniors who prefer =91silent=20 appeal=92, and now those water skippers: as in the case of modernisation=20= theory, once again simply importing theory from the West seems to miss=20= something in the Japanese experience. Partly, I suspect, it=92s a matter of sheer intensity. When = Sakaiya=20 Taichi claims that what Japan became in the 1960s is the world=92s most=20= perfect modern industrial society, the proposition is plausible=20 precisely because Japan went further in pursuing modernisation=92s = ideals=20 than its North American or European counterparts. Nowhere has the=20 separation of work and home been more radical, with a workday so long=20 that coming home to time with the family became an impossible dream for=20= the men who found jobs as salarymen. Nowhere has the uniformity of=20 education and the media been greater, with competition so thoroughly=20 focused on internalising the norms of industrial discipline. =A0=A0=A0Arguably it has been the radical depth of modernisation that = has=20 shaped Japan=92s transition to a postmodern society where =91let me do = my=20 thing=92 has given way to =91love me but leave me alone=92. The = strongest=20 case in point is relations between men and women. Clayton Naff captures=20= it for us in an anecdote all the more poignant for being only slightly=20= exaggerated. =A0 > Off in the distance, skyscrapers reached for the clouds, defying the=20= > fatal logic of the quaking earth. All around me packs of young=20 > Japanese women promenaded in razor-edged, wasp-waisted jackets with=20 > epaulets and glinting brass buttons over miniskirts and knitted leg=20 > warmers. Some tottered on high heels that made their long, dark hair=20= > swing wide of their narrow hips as they walked. Others, with hair=20 > bobbed and curled like flappers, clopped along in high-fashion=20 > calfskin boots. Giggling, squealing, shrieking, thrusting glossy=20 > fingertips over neon-painted lips, they swarmed about in twos, threes,=20= > dozens. > > =A0 > > Clearly they were the ones out for a good time. The businessmen, ties=20= > askew, still in the suits they had worn to work, looked more like=20 > casualties than revelers as they stumbled homeward after a night of=20 > hard drinking. A small, red-faced man was vomiting wretchedly at the=20= > curbside not far from me. Two policemen emerged from their sidewalk=20 > police box to save him from pitching headlong into traffic. > > (Naff 1996:9-10) =A0 It isn=92t hard to understand why younger Japanese women observing their=20= older sisters=92 efforts to achieve successful business careers by=20 emulating men have decided that a casual, take-it-or-leave-it approach=20= is much to be preferred. Or, why many young men now favour feminised=20 lifestyles that combine part-time work with absorption in personal=20 appearance. It is hard to imagine a clearer case of consumerism=20 transforming =91modern=92 ideals. >>>> John L. McCreery The Word Works, Ltd. 55-13-202 Miyagaya, Nishi-ku Yokohama, Japan 220-0006 Tel 81-45-314-9324 Email mccreery@xxxxxxx "Making Symbols is Our Business" ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html