1. There is a more general issue that lies at the back of my ?issues? with the claim that ?torture must be wrong by definition? (and similar claims) ? viz. what is the role of definition in making moral claims or in knowledge generally? Specifically: what role does definition play as a legitimate argument (rather than rather pointless, question-begging assertion) ? for the question is not whether we can or cannot assert things as true by definition (OK proves we can) but what weight should be given to such an assertion as a argument? I ?suggest? we can give definition very little, if any, weight as an argument. 2. But, first, OK seems to think this suggestion is like a lecture that demands his mere obedience. This is mistaken. Mere obedience is not enough. Only blind obedience will do. OK should know this. He suggests I seek students elsewhere. But my more radical suggestion is that were all students as touch-sensitive to suggestion as OK I would give up on them altogether (bearing in mind the point of course that I am not looking for students so much as blind obedience to whatever I say, whenever I say it; ? indeed that what I say should be obeyed may even be true by definition - who knows?). 3. Some points about definitions:- a. All definitions are either made in terms of undefined terms (so that asking for the definition of the undefined terms leads to an infinite regress) or the terms of the definition are defined in circular fashion in terms of the term to be defined. Consequently the persistent demand for definitional clarity must lead, logically, either to an infinite regress or circularity. b. Definitions are stipulations as to how words are to be used. Such stipulations may have their advantages and disadvantages ? but they cannot constitute an argument for anything more substantive than how we are to use words, and even then ? as alternative definitions show ? they are hardly a conclusive argument even as to how words must be used. c. In the humanities there has been a tradition of taking a term, say ?democracy?, and then seeking to uncover its essence by way of a definition. For example, to take the term ?democracy? in the left-hand corner and seek to uncover its essential meaning or form or structure by way of a formula in the right-hand corner. In science the approach is quite the opposite: the formula in the right-hand corner, given its success at surviving tests, is what matters and any left-hand term is merely a useful shorthand. The scientist does not take a term like ?atom? and try to define its essential properties. He or she theorises about things like the structure of matter, using terms like ?atoms? as instruments in the formulation of theories. When the theories are in place (e.g. of atomic structure) we can of course say they offer a possible definition of what an atom is, perhaps even the currently accepted scientific definition of an atom. ? But in fact this way of talking is highly misleading since the theories do not seek to define or explicate the meaning of ?atom? but rather use ?atom? as an undefined theoretical term that is more or less good enough to be used as part of a theoretical system. Consider:- the Greeks would have said the essence of an atom is that it is indivisible. But scientists rightly don?t have any truck with the view that, because of this definition, you cannot therefore split the atom ? as indeed has been done. The definitional route leads to scholasticism of an empty kind ? mere verbiage of the kind a scientist who theorised about splitting the atom would detect immediately in the objector who said this is impossible because an atom is, as any ful kno, by definition indivisible. The scientific route leads to letting theories and their relative merits [depth, explanatory power etc.] do the work - with terms as mere instruments whose meaning need not be fixed. d. Of course, it is possible to treat a claim like ?e=mc2? as a definition of ?e?. But this is a mistake or at least potentially misleading. Einstein did not propose a definition. He proposed an empirical theory. It is the success of the theory at surviving tests that inclines us to accept the formula ? not some definitional analysis. A definitional claim is (almost by definition) not an empirical claim and an empirical claim is one that can be tested by looking for a counterexample and it cannot therefore be true purely by virtue of the meaning of its terms. e. It follows that no substantive claim about reality, rather than merely about the use of words, can be true by definition. OK?s assertion that ?torture must be wrong by definition? must be read as merely saying ?I assert we should only use the term torture when speaking of morally wrong acts? ? but it cannot be taken seriously as the argument ?we know just by the meaning of torture that it must in fact always be wrong?. That OK might take the former as proving the latter shows his complete confusion on the role of definition in ?knowledge-claims?. Donal I-Am-A-Popper-Dalek I-Obey ___________________________________________________________ Yahoo! Photos ? 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