[lit-ideas] Re: Is torture wrong by definition?
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2006 09:53:17 +0100 (BST)
1. There is a more general issue that lies at the back of my ?issues? with
the claim that ?torture must be wrong by definition? (and similar claims) ?
viz. what is the role of definition in making moral claims or in knowledge
generally? Specifically: what role does definition play as a legitimate
argument (rather than rather pointless, question-begging assertion) ? for the
question is not whether we can or cannot assert things as true by definition
(OK proves we can) but what weight should be given to such an assertion as a
argument?
I ?suggest? we can give definition very little, if any, weight as an
argument.
2. But, first, OK seems to think this suggestion is like a lecture that
demands his mere obedience. This is mistaken. Mere obedience is not enough.
Only blind obedience will do. OK should know this. He suggests I seek
students elsewhere. But my more radical suggestion is that were all students
as touch-sensitive to suggestion as OK I would give up on them altogether
(bearing in mind the point of course that I am not looking for students so
much as blind obedience to whatever I say, whenever I say it; ? indeed that
what I say should be obeyed may even be true by definition - who knows?).
3. Some points about definitions:-
a. All definitions are either made in terms of undefined terms (so that
asking for the definition of the undefined terms leads to an infinite
regress) or the terms of the definition are defined in circular fashion in
terms of the term to be defined. Consequently the persistent demand for
definitional clarity must lead, logically, either to an infinite regress or
circularity.
b. Definitions are stipulations as to how words are to be used. Such
stipulations may have their advantages and disadvantages ? but they cannot
constitute an argument for anything more substantive than how we are to use
words, and even then ? as alternative definitions show ? they are hardly a
conclusive argument even as to how words must be used.
c. In the humanities there has been a tradition of taking a term, say
?democracy?, and then seeking to uncover its essence by way of a definition.
For example, to take the term ?democracy? in the left-hand corner and seek to
uncover its essential meaning or form or structure by way of a formula in the
right-hand corner.
In science the approach is quite the opposite: the formula in the right-hand
corner, given its success at surviving tests, is what matters and any
left-hand term is merely a useful shorthand. The scientist does not take a
term like ?atom? and try to define its essential properties. He or she
theorises about things like the structure of matter, using terms like ?atoms?
as instruments in the formulation of theories. When the theories are in place
(e.g. of atomic structure) we can of course say they offer a possible
definition of what an atom is, perhaps even the currently accepted scientific
definition of an atom. ? But in fact this way of talking is highly misleading
since the theories do not seek to define or explicate the meaning of ?atom?
but rather use ?atom? as an undefined theoretical term that is more or less
good enough to be used as part of a theoretical system.
Consider:- the Greeks would have said the essence of an atom is that it is
indivisible. But scientists rightly don?t have any truck with the view that,
because of this definition, you cannot therefore split the atom ? as indeed
has been done.
The definitional route leads to scholasticism of an empty kind ? mere
verbiage of the kind a scientist who theorised about splitting the atom would
detect immediately in the objector who said this is impossible because an
atom is, as any ful kno, by definition indivisible.
The scientific route leads to letting theories and their relative merits
[depth, explanatory power etc.] do the work - with terms as mere instruments
whose meaning need not be fixed.
d. Of course, it is possible to treat a claim like ?e=mc2? as a definition
of
?e?. But this is a mistake or at least potentially misleading. Einstein did
not propose a definition. He proposed an empirical theory. It is the success
of the theory at surviving tests that inclines us to accept the formula ? not
some definitional analysis. A definitional claim is (almost by definition)
not an empirical claim and an empirical claim is one that can be tested by
looking for a counterexample and it cannot therefore be true purely by virtue
of the meaning of its terms.
e. It follows that no substantive claim about reality, rather than merely
about the use of words, can be true by definition. OK?s assertion that
?torture must be wrong by definition? must be read as merely saying ?I assert
we should only use the term torture when speaking of morally wrong acts? ?
but it cannot be taken seriously as the argument ?we know just by the meaning
of torture that it must in fact always be wrong?.
That OK might take the former as proving the latter shows his complete
confusion on the role of definition in ?knowledge-claims?.
Donal
I-Am-A-Popper-Dalek
I-Obey
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