Gordon Swobe wrote: >Joseph Polanik wrote: >We cannot call Searle's view dualism because 1) he denies the existence >of a second non-physical mental substance, a substance asserted by >Cartesian dualists, I agree that we can not classify Searle as a *substance* dualist because he denies the existence of a second substance and we have no evidence that his philosophy requires a mental/spiritual substance that he denies having. Stuart seems to think he can classify Searle as a Cartesian dualist even if Searle is *not* an interactive substance dualist. 2) he denies the existence of non-physical properties of matter, properties asserted by property dualists. he does deny the existence of a second set of properties; but, a good case can be made that he meets the criteria for essential property dualism, EPD, as I define it he implicitly recognizes two sets of physical properties: those that cause measurable phenomena only and those that cause experienceable phenomena (whether in addition to or instead of measurable phenomena). >Moreover his philosophy in no way depends on these dualistic ideas. nothing in his philosophy presumes or otherwise depends on substance dualism. the jury's still out as to allegations of EPD. Joe -- Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ http://what-am-i.net @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/