[Wittrs] Ontologically Basic Ambiguity: Mode of Existence

  • From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sun, 21 Mar 2010 20:25:14 -0400

Gordon Swobe wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>We cannot call Searle's view dualism because 1) he denies the existence
>of a second non-physical mental substance, a substance asserted by
>Cartesian dualists,

I agree that we can not classify Searle as a *substance* dualist because
he denies the existence of a second substance and we have no evidence
that his philosophy requires a mental/spiritual substance that he denies

Stuart seems to think he can classify Searle as a Cartesian dualist even
if Searle is *not* an interactive substance dualist.

2) he denies the existence of non-physical properties of matter,
properties asserted by property dualists.

he does deny the existence of a second set of properties; but, a good
case can be made that he meets the criteria for essential property
dualism, EPD, as I define it he implicitly recognizes two sets of
physical properties: those that cause measurable phenomena only and
those that cause experienceable phenomena (whether in addition to or
instead of measurable phenomena).

>Moreover his philosophy in no way depends on these dualistic ideas.

nothing in his philosophy presumes or otherwise depends on substance
dualism. the jury's still out as to allegations of EPD.



Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware



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