[Wittrs] Re: Ontologically Basic Ambiguity: Mode of Existence

  • From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 17:48:04 -0000

--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote:

> --- On Mon, 3/22/10, SWM <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
> > The point is not that Searle ASSERTS a belief in ghosts or
> > that anyone accuses him of doing so but that his conception
> > of mind is consistent with a belief in ghosts in the
> > machine, even though he doesn't explicitly make any such
> > claim or acknowledge that such a claim can be found in the
> > CRA.
> >
> > So Dennett doesn't accuse Searle of "believing in ghosts"
> > because to believe in something (in a case like this) is to
> > espouse a claim asserting its existence.
> >
> > This is a verbal problem arising from the distinction
> > between implicit and explicit.

> In other words you think Searle has an unconscious belief in ghosts, or that 
> he believes in ghosts but keeps it a secret. lol.
> -gts

In other words I think Searle's position on what consciousness is is finally no 
different than the position of those who believe in ghosts. They think of mind, 
in the final analysis, in the same way. I have long said that I have no quarrel 
with dualism per se and even think it could be true but for that to be seen to 
be the case we would need some evidence, including something like a publicly 
verifiable occurrence of ghosts, OR an inability to explain the occurrence of 
minds in any other way.

Of course many believe in ghosts without evidence so believing in them doesn't 
require that. On the other hand, Searle wouldn't say he believes in ghosts any 
more than he'd say he's really a dualist. But this isn't about what he says but 
what his ideas imply.


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