[Wittrs] Re: Ontologically Basic Ambiguity: Mode of Existence

  • From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 08:29:41 -0700 (PDT)

--- On Mon, 3/22/10, SWM <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> [Dennett] doesn't say Searle believes in ghosts because that's not
> his position. He says Searle's argument requires a Cartesian
> dualist's conception of mind to be considered valid in its
> conclusion.

To have a "Cartesian dualist's conception of mind" entails believing in
ghosts! We inherited from Descartes the idea of the "ghost in the 

I must concur with Joe that it makes no sense to consider Searle a 
Cartesian, or even to believe that Dennett's insinuations to that effect 
have substance. Looks to me like nothing more than subtle name-calling by 
a philosopher who cannot offer a legitimate argument to refute the third
axiom of the CRA, except to wave his hands and say "Perhaps understanding 
would happen in the CR if it had 'more of the same'." I don't consider that an 

Dennett needs to refute the default position - the null hypothesis - which 
states that more of the same will lead to more of the same. And he needs to do 
this *without* begging the question of whether the human brain exists as a 



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