--- On Mon, 3/22/10, SWM <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > [Dennett] doesn't say Searle believes in ghosts because that's not > his position. He says Searle's argument requires a Cartesian > dualist's conception of mind to be considered valid in its > conclusion. To have a "Cartesian dualist's conception of mind" entails believing in ghosts! We inherited from Descartes the idea of the "ghost in the machine". I must concur with Joe that it makes no sense to consider Searle a Cartesian, or even to believe that Dennett's insinuations to that effect have substance. Looks to me like nothing more than subtle name-calling by a philosopher who cannot offer a legitimate argument to refute the third axiom of the CRA, except to wave his hands and say "Perhaps understanding would happen in the CR if it had 'more of the same'." I don't consider that an argument. Dennett needs to refute the default position - the null hypothesis - which states that more of the same will lead to more of the same. And he needs to do this *without* begging the question of whether the human brain exists as a computer. -gts ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/