--- On Sun, 3/21/10, SWM <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > His CRA depends on a dualistic notion of consciousness. You may think as much, but Dennett certainly does not give us reason to believe it. In the quote that you provided, Dennett *insinuates* but does not actually claim or prove (because he cannot) that Searle's view equates to Cartesian dualism. Dennett's argument takes this form: 1) Searle believes the CRA. 2) A Cartesian dualist would believe the CRA for such-and-such reason. Even if we take 2) as true, it does not follow that Searle believes the CRA on account of his holding to a dualistic world-view. Frankly I lost a lot of respect for Dennett based on that quote. It strikes me as a case of intellectual dishonesty. The CRA stands on its own, distinct from any considerations about dualism or non-dualism. We can and should consider it a simple logical proof. One needn't have any understanding of philosophy to follow the simple logic of the CRA. Dennett needs to disprove Searle's simple logic. Specifically, he needs to SHOW that syntax by itself is somehow constitutive of or sufficient for semantics. He cannot offer any such argument, so he casts aspersions. -gts ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/