[Wittrs] Re: Ontologically Basic Ambiguity: Mode of Existence

  • From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2010 10:08:34 -0700 (PDT)

--- On Mon, 3/22/10, SWM <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> The point is not that Searle ASSERTS a belief in ghosts or
> that anyone accuses him of doing so but that his conception
> of mind is consistent with a belief in ghosts in the
> machine, even though he doesn't explicitly make any such
> claim or acknowledge that such a claim can be found in the
> CRA.
> So Dennett doesn't accuse Searle of "believing in ghosts"
> because to believe in something (in a case like this) is to
> espouse a claim asserting its existence.
> This is a verbal problem arising from the distinction
> between implicit and explicit.

In other words you think Searle has an unconscious belief in ghosts, or that he 
believes in ghosts but keeps it a secret. lol.



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