--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote: > If we meet and speak, you would be a physical object in the data of > experience that looks and behaves in a manner to which the ascription of > personhood would be quite appropriate. That is to say, I may be a robot, zombie or ordinary human being. Typically, we size this situation up so fast that we probably don't realize we are doing so. "Sizing up a situation" means evaluating the empirical data-- the way I see it. But you claim... > But there would be no empirical evidence of any putative "experiencer" > associated with that physical object.. which doesn't make sense to me because above you say "ascription of personhood." The ascription is based on the data. No? Do you just randomly assign personhood to physical objects? > and neither would there be anything in the data of experience that gives > grounds for postulating the existence of such a conceptual entity for the > purpose of explanation. I don't know what you have in mind by the expression "conceptual entity." When I ascribe personhood I'm not purposing there is concrete entity which is the person, yet I'm saying that the person is embodied in his body. In that sense, the human body is expressive in the way that sticks and stones are not. bruce > > ========================================== > > Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/ > ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/