The next thing would be to check with Lewis/Short's Latin Dictionary. Lewis and
Short say that 'pingo' (such is the first person indicative present) may be
said to have TWO main usages:
pingo, pinxi, pictum, 3, v. a., -- he first usage is:
I to represent pictorially with the pencil or needle, to paint, embroider (cf.:
depingo, delineo, adumbro).
This Lewis/Short note have a sub-literal usage:
I Lit.: quas (comas) Dione Pingitur sustinuisse manu, is represented in
painting, Ov. Am. 1, 14, 34; Cic. Fam. 5, 12, 7: tabulas, id. Inv. 2, 1, 1:
tabula picta, a painting, picture, id. Brut. 75: pingere hominis speciem, id.
de Or. 2, 16, 69: Helenae simulacrum, id. Inv. 2, 1, 1: Nero princeps jusserat
colosseum se pingi, Plin. 35, 7, 33, § 51.—Prov.: quae dicunt ii, qui numquam
philosophum pictum, ut dicitur, viderunt, of those who speak of things they
know nothing about, Cic. Fin. 5, 27, 80.— Of embroidering (with or without
acu): textile stragulum, magnificis operibus pictum, Cic. Tusc. 5, 21, 61:
pingere acu, Ov. M. 6, 23: picti reges, in embroidered garments, Mart. 10, 72,
7: picti tori, with embroidered coverlets, Ov. H. 12, 30: toga, the embroidered
toga worn by a triumphing commander, Lampr. Alex. Sev. 40: tapetes, Vulg. Prov.
7, 16.—Pass. in mid. force: pingi, to paint the face, Plaut. Poen. 1, 2, 11.—
But it also has a sub-figurative usage (with two sub-sub-usages):
B Transf. 1 To paint, stain, color with any thing (mostly poet.):
palloribus omnia pingunt, Lucr. 4, 311; 2, 375: sanguineis frontem moris et
tempora pingit, Verg. E. 6, 22; 2, 50; Mart. 14, 5, 2: multas facies, Juv. 9,
146: oculos, id. 2, 94; so, oculos stibio, Vulg. Jer. 4, 30. —Esp., to tattoo:
Agathyrsi ora artusque pingunt iisdem omnes notis, et sic ut ablui nequeunt,
Mel. 2, 1, 10: membraque qui ferro gaudet pinxisse Gelonus, Claud. in Ruf. 1,
313.— 2 To adorn, decorate, embellish: herbas floribus, Lucr. 5, 1396:
bibliothecam aliquā re, Cic. Att. 4, 5, 3: stellis pingitur aether, Sen. Med.
310.—
But Lewis and Short also note that 'pingo' may have a PURELY implicatural usage:
II Trop., of style, to paint, color, embellish: verba, Cic. Brut. 37, 141:
tabula, quam Cleanthes sane commode verbis depingere solebat, id. Fin. 2, 21,
69: locus, quem ego varie meis orationibus soleo pingere, id. Att. 1, 14, 3:
modo mihi date Britanniam, quam pingam coloribus tuis penicillo meo, id. Q. Fr.
2, 15, a, 2: hunc (virum) omnibus a me pictum et politum artis coloribus subito
deformatum vidi, id. Att. 2, 21, 4.—Hence, pictus, a, um, P. a., painted,
colored, of various colors.
A Lit.: volucres, Verg. A. 4, 525: pelles, id. G. 4, 342: absint et picti
squalentia terga lacerti, id. ib. 4, 13: puppes, id. A. 5, 663: carinae, id.
ib. 8, 93.—
B Transf., tattooed: Geloni, Verg. G. 2, 115: Agathyrsi, id. A. 4, 146
Forbig. ad loc.; Prisc. Perieg. 302.— 2 Of style, ornamented, ornate:
orationis pictum et expolitum genus, Cic. Or. 27, 96: Lysiā nihil potest esse
pictius, id. Brut. 95, 293.— 3 Merely painted, i. e. unreal, false,
deceptive, empty, vain: pictos experiere metus, Prop. 4 (5), 6, 50.
------ end of excursus. Lewis and Short are perhaps more confused than Witters.
If 'to paint,' in Ancient Roman, meant mainly, 'to tattoo', I suppose it would
be difficult (but not impossible) to apply this to McGinn's terminology of
'correctness'. A "correct" tattoo sounds pedantic. But suppose I ask someone to
tattoo on me a unicorn. It happens that the tattoer is Grice ("A vacuous
name?"). I explain: "No, a horse, with a horn -- make it in a smaller case." I
look at the tattoo and compare it with the illustration of a unicorn in the
11th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica and I tell Grice, "Your tattoo
came out correct." "Thanks," he says.
McGinn's point is that the correctness of a picture of a unicorn cannot be
judged except by taking into consideration Grice's ability to make this picture
(or tattoo) match a unicorn (or representation thereof). In "I don't believe in
word senses", Kilgariff gives a good example. He was employed by the Longman
Publishing House to analyse their English dictionary. He noted that under
"horse", the dictionary (not a good one) read:
1. a mammal of the genus equus
2. representation of a horse (as in a picture by Stubbs).
Kilgariff notes that (2) is otiose, since it applies to MOST nouns ('cloud' (1.
a metereological phenomenon. 2. a representation of this, notably by
Constable)). So back to McGinn:
"This internal relation expresses itself in the fact that what is the case if
the picture is correct is precisely what the picture pictures: the correctness
of the picture is not something to which we can point independently of the
picture."
And now McEvoy's exegeses: "The assertion after the colon seems implausible,
both as a matter of its truth and of the correct interpretation of the
"Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus": surely “the correctness of the picture”
depends on whether the relevant state of affairs exists as depicted - but
whether this is so would seem independent of the picture,"
I grant that McGinn's addition of the keyword "internal relation" is a case of
obscurus per obscurius?
McGinn is working with the assumption:
"the picture is correct"
McGinn utters a conditional: "what is the case, _if_ the picture is correct, is
what the picture pictures." I admit that McGinn's "the correctness of the
picture is not something to which we can point [or show] independently of the
picture" seems anti-Humeian. As if saying, "the flavour of the apple is not
something to which we can point or show independently of the apple." Or to use
an adaptation of an example by Witters: "the aroma of coffee is not something
which we can show independently of coffee." Or something.
McEvoy goes on: "and also something we can (and must) decide “independently of
the picture”? Perhaps [McGinn] means to say that “what it would mean for the
picture to be correct” is not something independent “of the picture” (and/or
not independent of the “internal relation” between the picture and what the
“picture pictures”) - but this is not what she writes. Had she written it, it
might seem to amount to only the banal observation that the ‘meaning’ of the
picture cannot be given “independently of the (meaning of the) picture”. "
Granted, that sounds trivial -- and analytic. If we take her as referring to or
pointing to or showing an analysis of the relation of 'correctness', the
exegesis may lead us elsewhere.
McEvoy: "But truth and meaning are surely distinct or at least distinguishable,
both in a correct philosophy and in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; and
“correctness” (as in “the correctness of the picture”) would seem a matter of
its truth rather than its mere meaning"
Well, in the case of the "Mona Lisa", indeed, we are dealing with the
proposition, truth-evaluable, as to whether she (the Mona Lisa) was an
attractive lady. The picture by Da Vinci would be correct (although the picture
is not a proposition) if and only if the picture portrays (or depicts, or
'pictures', as McGinn in a tongue-twisting manner prefers) Mona Lisa as an
attractive lady.
Recall, "Warts and all". Some pictures may not be correct. The implicature
behind "warts and all" indeed points to this complex relation that
'correctness' amounts to. Oddly, for the Ancient Romans, to 'paint' or picture
was to 'embellish', so we can safely claim that 'warts and all' bears a
post-Roman implicature.
McEvoy: "e.g. a picture with clear meaning could lack “correctness”. [McGinn]
here appears confused - in either her expression or (underlying) thought, or
both. Trying to discern where my view agrees and disagrees with [McGinn]'s is
not straightforward, as this above example may indicate. It is not the only
example where [McGinn] writes in a way that is either badly expressed or
implausible or both.""
Well, it may do to revise if she corrects her hyper-corrections about
correctness -- or shows some inclination to do so! Cheers,
Speranza
