McEvoy goes on to quote from Witters: "Four years ago I had occasion to re-read
my [essay] (the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas to
someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and
the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by
contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking." Here, in
the Preface, we have a passage that makes most sense when we understand how a
showing-saying distinction supplies the fundamental point of continuity between
earlier and later "thoughts", and how the earlier might have to understood
first in order to grasp that what W[itters] is doing in [Philosophische
Untersuchungen] is 'showing rather than saying' (remember: every
'pseudo-proposition' in TLP says nothing with sense but instead shows the
truth)." ----- One thing are the pseudo-propositions Witters qua philosopher
(it's a tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, after all) and the propositions like
"It's raining" with which the essay is concerned. These have sense. They are
assertions, with Fregeian assertoric force, and used to provide a picture of
the world. In "Philosophische Untersuchungen", Witters has broadened his views
(alla Buehler, almost; Popper would be fascinated) to allow for functions of
language OTHER than 'depicting' (Sraffa helped).
McEvoy: "We can then turn to understanding a passage like that at PI 43. Take
the observation: "And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing
to its bearer." A key word here is "explained", and this is qualified by
"sometimes"." ----- It's also code for 'ostension'.
McEvoy: "[W]hat this means, when we understand W[itters]'s fundamental point of
view, is that the meaning of a name is sometimes shown by pointing to its
bearer." ------ Witters is having in mind Augustine, and I hope, Mills, who
said that "London" has denotation, but not connotation. (He was wrong).
McEvoy: "In this simple observation we have a condensed expression of
W[itters]'s fundamental point of view in [Philosophische Untersuchungen[: he is
not saying the meaning of a name is expressed by its bearer or by the name
itself, and he is not suggesting that the name acquires its meaning because of
its relation to its bearer (or vice versa). Rather we learn the names of
things, and so learn a relation between name and bearer in terms of meaning,
but this relation is not constituted by anything over and above the learning
involved. Among the ways we learn is by someone "pointing to its bearer"" ----
And how can you point to London? Surely "Hammersmith" and "Chelsea" have
different meanings, and different bearers! A similar problem had Ryle when he
was asked a visitor to show him the bearer of "Oxford" ("No such thing: only
colleges, dear").
McEvoy: "to explain the meaning: but of course we might infer the meaning
without such explanation. The fundamental thing to realise is that in the
learning process we are not looking for any kind of relationship between name
and bearer other than their relationship in terms of 'meaning', and that
'meaning' in these terms is matter of what is learnt and teachable." -----
Well, I'm not sure 'red' has a bearer. If you try to teach 'red' to someone by
pointing a red apple, she might think 'red' means 'apple'. This is especially
tragical in Tagalog -- and in the story of Snowwhite).
McEvoy: "In understanding this, we see the contrast with the view of names in
[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus], and with the [Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus]
view that names acquire their meaning by virtue of standing in some underlying
symmetrical structural relation to their bearers [i.e. the objects they name].
W[itters] does not offer this later view as something difficult to understand,
but he offers it as something philosophers are wont to overlook. By these
observations and remarks he brings the notion of meaning 'down to earth' by
asking us to consider how meaning is established in case after case." -----
Witters the Casuistic, as it were -- and his envy to philosophers who crave for
generalisations and often get them. Grice did!
McEvoy: "[Witters] seeks to show that in this process, of learning and
teaching, meaning is something shown rather than expressed. The wider
philosophical consequences of this view are not very explicitly drawn in
[Philosophische Untersuchungen] but may be drawn as there implicitly:" ---- You
mean, by implicature, I hope.
"but, before understanding any wider consequences, we should get clear
W[itters]'s account of the many ways meaning may be shown. So, yes, if
saying-showing was a turtle then, in terms of meaning, the [Philosophische
Untersuchungen] maintains that it's turtles all the way down." ---- which
reminds me of Glenda Jackson's film, "Turtles" -- Turtle Diary is a British
film about "people rediscovering the joys of life and love," based on a
screenplay adapted by Harold Pinter from Russell Hoban's novel Turtle Diary,
directed by John Irvin, and starring Glenda Jackson, Ben Kingsley, and Michael
Gambon. The film contains elements of romance, comedy, and drama and has been
described as a romantic comedy." Unlike The Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, four
fictional teenaged anthropomorphic turtles named, for some good reason, after
Renaissance Italian artists. And stuff. Thanks again for the quotes and the
exegeses!
Cheers,
Speranza
