McEvoy writes in "Wittgenstein sends us shopping":
"The TLP begins "The world is all that is the case" - which seems simple and
straighforward at one level, but what would it mean to deny it? What picture is
given by saying "It is false that the world is all that is the case". What else
could be the case?"
Leaving aside the implicatural divergence between "It is false that the world
is..." and "It is not the case that the world is...," it should be pointed out
that, if we take seriously something like Popper's third world -- where the
world may be seen as all that is the case, AND, to boot, perhaps possible state
of affairs, too -- it might be argued that Witters, in his terse prose, is
flouting a Griceian conversational maxim. For does Witters mean, "The world is
ONLY all that is the case", or "The world is all that is the case, not more,
not less"? If we take Witters as IMPLICATING the "only" or the "not more, not
less," a proposition alla Popper, that gives room for the world to comprise
possible state of affairs, too -- I made the case earlier re: Bradley -- does
not really 'falsify' (to use again a Popperianism) Witters's claim, as it is
put forward. A different case would be if Witters had EXPLICATED what we take
him to be IMPLICATING. The reasoning is simple enough. If Witters thinks that
the 'actual' world is all that the is the case, only, not more nor less, but
does not say it or explicate it, he is being "less informative than is
required". And a philosophical explanation (we are discussing where these
'stop') meant to prove him wrong need to take this flout to a conversational
maxim seriously. We don't want Witters's son, say, to go: "Dad never _said_ --
or explicated -- that the world is ONLY all that is the case, neither more nor
less -- so Popper's third-world possible states of affairs are more than
welcome!" Or stuff. Cheers,
Speranza
