[lit-ideas] Re: The meaning of life
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2008 16:44:21 -0330
Yes, that sounds right. Kant finds all three forms of contradiction to yield
non-universalizable maxims, maxims we have an obligation not to will or act
upon. I find the 3rd form to be the least interesting since Kant provides no
sound argument for ends or principles being "natural." Alas, this is the form
of contradiction to which he himself often appeals, esp. in the Metaphysics of
Morals. There he no longer pursues transcendental analysis - ie., analysis of
the necessary and universal conditions of moral reason, whether such a capacity
actually exists or not - but turns to straight ethics as a prescriptive
discourse.
I do not think Kant engages in equivocation on these matters. Could you provide
an example?
Walter O
MUN
Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>:
> Actually, I was going to ask about Kant's notion of contradiction as applied
> to moral reasoning. It's my understanding that there are several kinds of
> contradiction that scholars have identified in Kant, though there is no
> complete agreement on this as Kant does not use the same terms in the same
> way. They have been termed logical contradiction, practical contradiction and
> teleological contradiction. Logical contradiction arises when an action
> contradicts an adopted maxim, practical contradiction arises when one acts on
> a maxim that is not universilizable, and teleological when the maxim
> contradicts some natural ends or principles. At least, that is my
> understanding.
>
> O.K.
>
>
>
> --- On Wed, 12/3/08, wokshevs@xxxxxx <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote:
>
> From: wokshevs@xxxxxx <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The meaning of life
> To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Donal McEvoy" <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Date: Wednesday, December 3, 2008, 7:07 PM
>
> I hesitate to barge into this thread as I have not yet read the previous 8
> postings by Omar and Donal in dialogue. So if what I have to say has already
> been covered or is irrelevant for one reason or another, please just say so
> and
> I'll go to the other side of the pub where they're talking about some
> Milton
> fellow (no last name has ever been given.)
>
> I believe the most interesting interpretation of Kant's idea of maxims
> being
> engulfed in contradiction has it that a non-universalizable maxim commits a
> practical contradiction between the subjective maxim itself and its
> (attempted)universalized version. An immoral maxim is such that if everybody
> acted on it, nobody could act on it and secure the end posited in that
> maxim.
> As well, immoral (non-universalizable) maxims exhibit illegitimate
> self-exemption: the agent relies on others not to act as she acts (the
> free-rider)in order for her to attain the end specified in her maxim.
> Examples
> with apples readily forthcoming. And finally, no non-universalizable maxim
> can
> be suited for legislation (except in Canada).
>
> As I say, if this doesn't help, just ignore. I hope to be able to get to
> the
> Omar-Donal Correspondence shortly.
>
> Christine Korsgaard has a lovely essay on all this in her *Creating the
> Kingdom
> of Ends*. I forget the title, but if anybody is interested, I'll let you
> know.
>
> Walter O.
> MUN
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Quoting Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>:
>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message ----
> > From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
> > To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Sent: Tuesday, 2 December, 2008 15:28:27
> > Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The meaning of life
> >
> > >*See:
> >
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contradiction
> >
> > >"By extension, outside of classical logic, one can speak of
> contradictions
> > between actions when one presumes that their motives contradict each
> other."
> >
> > DM: The article does not expand on this somewhat unclear statement -
> unclear
> > because is it positing contradictions between an action and its motive, or
> > between action and motive A and action and motive B? It would seem the
> latter
> > since it speaks of "contradictions between actions" in the
> plural. But how
> > so? In what sense of 'contradiction' can, for example, my helping
> John last
> > week because I like him _contradict_ my not helping him this week because
> I
> > no longer like him (he kept giving me irritating Wikepedia references
> > whenever I asked a question, and I tired of it [joking]).
> >
> > > I did attempt to explain that suicide, when interpreted in terms of
> motives
> > or intentions, at least often yields striking paradoxes or contradictions.
>
> >
> > DM: If the article _is_ taking about a contradiction between action/motive
> A
> > and action/motive B, then even its bare unargued assertion is irrelevant
> to
> > your claim that in the case of suicide there may be some kind of
> > contradiction between an action and its motive, or an action "when
> > interpreted in terms of motive".
> >
> > >However, I cautioned that this depends on the interpretation of the
> > suicide's motives, hence is perhaps difficult to prove.
> >
> > DM: But you could nevertheless offer examples where the motive is a given
> > and, where given such a motive, you then reveal a paradox and
> contradiction
> > in something other than the loose sense that we might speak of it being
> only
> > 'logical' that Obama was elected or other Dr.Spockisms. The great
> > mathematician - perhaps the greatest of the twentieth century, who
> > set mathematical agenda for the century at an International Congress in
> 1900
> > - David Hilbert once wrote: "The thought that facts or events might
> mutually
> > contradict each other appears to me the very paradigm of
> thoughtlessness."
> > Actions and motives would appear to be 'facts or events'. That
> they might
> > mutually contradict is at the very least problematic.
> >
> > >The term 'contradiction' is used outside classical logic,
> Hegel introduced
> > it into historical analysis and Marx analized capitalism as being
> inherently
> > >contradictory. Presumably he didn't mean to suggest by this that
> it doesn't
> > exist in reality.
> >
> > DM: No he didn't; but this use of 'contradiction' - as per
> 'dialectical
> > materialism' - is open to severe objections. An excellent essay on
> this is
> > 'What is Dialectic?' by Karl Popper, published in 'Conjectures
> and
> > Refutations' [p.312] (yes, Popper breaks his own injunction against
> 'What
> > is?' questions in the title - though with deliberate irony perhaps).
> >
> > While admitting "a dialectical interpretation of the history of
> thought may
> > be sometimes be quite satisfactory, and that it may add some valuable
> details
> > to an interpretation in terms of trial and error", Popper criticises
> the
> > 'dialectic triad' on a number of grounds, for example...
> >
> > 1) Its way of putting things is largely metaphorical and the metaphors
> > mislead if taken too seriously.
> > For example: (a) a thesis does not 'produce' its antithesis -
> it is "only our
> > critical attitude which produces the antithesis, and where such an
> attitude
> > is lacking - which often enough is the case - no antithesis will be
> > produced." [p.315]
> > (b) a 'synthesis' does not
> merely preserve the best parts
> > of thesis and antithesis because it will, "in every case, embody some
> > new idea which cannot be reduced to earlier stages of the
> development."
> > [p.315]
> >
> > 2) It is wrong to think 'contradictions' are not be avoided but
> admitted as a
> > part of a dialectic explanation: in truth it is the striving to eliminate
> > contradictions that propels thought forward, and if contradictory
> statements
> > are admitted "_any statement whatever must be admitted_" - hence
> no
> > 'synthesis' can logically be produced by admitting contradictions.
> >
> > 3) Its tendency to be used to support or reinforce dogmatic positions.
> >
> > While most of the essay addresses dialectic as a form of logic or logical
> > explanation, its arguments can also be applied to 'dialectical
> materialism'
> > as a purported explanation of social and historical change - where of
> course
> > it lends itself to 'historicism' and a host of other intellectual
> fancies,
> > which Popper addressed more fully in his two volume 'The Open
> Society' and
> > his extended essay 'The Poverty of Historicism'.
> >
> > Donal
> > Snowy Salop
> >
> >
> >
> >
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